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The Revolutions in Bolivia conference organised by the Institute of 
Latin American Studies (ILAS) and the Anglo-Bolivian Society in 
London 2017 compared two twelve-year periods of social, political 
and economic transformation in Bolivia. The 1952 National 
Revolution led by the National Revolutionary Movement (MNR) 
until 1964, and the Process of Change started by the Movement to 
Socialism (MAS) as of January 2006 and in power to this day 
through the uninterrupted leadership of President Evo Morales and 
Vice President Alvaro Garcia Linera. Both are seeking re-election 
in October 2019 for a five-year term until 2025, to become Bolivia’s 
longest-serving heads of state and for the MAS to complete 20 
years in power. 
The presentations convened for the conference examined Bolivia’s 
experiences of revolution and reform in shaping its Nation State 
over these two periods.  We were particularly interested in 
comparing MNR and MAS approaches to social transformation, 
and the extent to which the MAS administration has really 
achieved the radical, lasting transformation that merits the term 
‘revolution.’ This is particularly pertinent as the current Morales’ 
government is looking forward to being in power during the2025 
Bicentennial of Bolivian Independence, in order to affirm its legacy, 
showcasing Bolivia as a prosperous, transformed and inclusive 
Nation State. 
A further reason to assess both the National Revolution and 
Process of Change was to try and identify not only differences, but 
linkages and continuities between both processes.  The MAS has 
repeatedly declared a break with past regimes, political parties, 
policies and ideology, and has been particularly critical of the 
policies of the new MNR led by president Gonzalo Sanchez de 
Lozada between 1993 - 1997 and briefly again from 2002 – 2003. 
In his first term Sanchez de Lozada partially privatized five leading 
state enterprises, introduced a regulatory framework, pensions 
system and more importantly a popular participation program to 
decentralize the state devolving resources and political decision 
making to establish hundreds of new municipalities and regional 
autonomies. Despite repeal of the popular participation law (LPP) 
by the MAS, its impact can be felt to this day. LPP transformed 
communities to become self-represented effective political players, 
shunning the discourses of the elites and later abandoning their 
parties.  LPP had a boomerang effect starting the 1999 municipal 
elections when new local political parties and leaders emerged to 
destabilise and reposition Bolivia’s state and party system. In just 
under a decade, popular participation paved the way for a bottom 
up emergence of the MAS starting 2002-03 when the axis shifted 
to redefine the terms of political play and competition enshrined in 
the 2009 Plurinational Constitution.
A lingering pre-conference question remained over whether the 
MAS and its Process of Change, represented a clear break with 
traditional highland and lowland elites, or did the MAS bargain its 
purpose and objectives as a left-wing political and social 
movement. The MAS has after 15 years in power marked a 
distance from many of its original bases of support and founding 
ideologies, including links to peasant Indian movements, the Suma 
Qamaña living well practices and associated cosmology.  At times, 
this has even involved the suppression of social movement 
organisations, infringement of protected areas and harassment of 
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former supporters turned dissidents, in order to focus on the more 
complex and enduring agenda of creating a modern Nation State. 
The papers in this volume explore how the MAS has evolved from 
a ‘political instrument’ of the social movements, into a ruling party. 
This exploration includes an examination of the political strategies 
used to build a hegemony, and an exploration of the inevitable gap 
between the MAS’ discursive strategies and policy.
A further objective of the conference was to examine the continued 
relevance of the Revolutionary Nationalism that emerged from the 
1952 revolution, and its significance as an enduring ideology of the 
Bolivian Nation State. This significance extends beyond the 
national revolution itself, to the formation of the MAS.  After the 
transition period of military rule from 1964 to 1982, there followed a 
return to elected government, and the introduction of neo-liberal 
structural adjustment policies in 1985 to resolve the hyperinflation 
crisis.  The closure of Bolivia's state mines led to the redundancy 
and relocation of thousands of miners, many of whom migrated to 
the Cochabamba tropics to cultivate crops and plant coca.  Some 
twenty years later, the Chapare cocaleros surged to establish the 
Movement to Socialism (MAS) and Evo Morales as head of the six 
coca producer federations. 
The MAS gravitated from the political periphery to win the 2005 
elections, secure successive re-election with an absolute majority 
of votes and a secure majority of seats in the Plurinational 
Assembly.  The MAS administration remains relatively 
unchallenged by  political parties, but a major setback for Morales 
and the MAS came with the 21 February 2016 referendum when 
voters refused, by a narrow margin, to allow Evo Morales and 
Alvaro Garcia Linera to stand as candidates for a fourth term in 
October 2019, a decision subsequently overturned by Bolivia's 
Constitutional Court.  The court’s decision is highly controversial 
and has been actively disputed in several demonstrations in the 
run up to the election.  
An added purpose of the Revolutions in Bolivia conference was to 
examine the transformation of the Process of Change, of Evo 
Morales' leadership, of the structure and alliances established by 
the Movement to Socialism and the vital role played by the 
non-traditional coca leaf producing cocaleros where Evo Morales 
remaining to this day president of the six coca leaf producing 
federations whilst also President of Bolivia. This dual role reflects 
an emerging conflict of interest and national security concern as 
the Chapare coca leaf growers are now part of the base paste and 
cocaine production supply chain. In particular, we look at how well 
the radical potential of the indigenous cosmovision has been 
maintained as the MAS administration deals with the realities of 
power.  A key point of contention throughout the MAS 
administration has been how much power has really been given to 
indigenous people in the new pluri-national constitution of Bolivia.  
To understand this dynamic, the MAS bases of support, and 
strategies for maintaining hegemony, must be explored as well as 
the impacts and interpretations of their policies.  
The indigenous cosmovision provides the framework for our 
exploration here, and the motivation for examining Bolivian politics 
in terms of revolution.  In the prologue to Silvia Rivera's "Oprimidos 
pero No Vencidos" (1984: 11 – 15), Bolivian philologist Luis 
“Cachin” Antezana says a complementarity of opposites double 
code or conceptual articulation that combines mythical, ideological 
and historical narratives that run both behind and alongside 
indigenous and popular grass-root actions, has a bearing on the 
historical horizon of the Bolivian state and society. This double 
code underscoring the importance of memory in tracing linkages 
and continuity between the 1952 National Revolution and the 
Process of Change, in the context of a broader decolonization 
agenda, can contribute to understanding the connection between 
revolutionary processes in Bolivia. 
vSo, to finalise we also sought through the Revolutions in Bolivia 
conference to understand the continuing impact of MNR rule on 
current politics in Bolivia, and in the national imaginary, and the 
importance that indigenous philosophies  may have had on 
restructuring revolutionary nationalism, the sense of nation / 
anti--nation and state in several moments in time. During, the 1964 
to 1982 period of military rule, the return to democracy represented 
first by the role of the new MNRI in the UDP, the post 1985 
implementation by the new MNR’s neo-liberal structural adjustment 
policies, and the Plan de Todos (Plan for Everyone) applied from 
1993 to 1997 together with the aforementioned Ley de 
Participación Popular (LPP) that gradually paved the way for the 
transformation of the Bolivian state and the bottom-up emergence 
of the Movement to Socialism (MAS). But we also wonder how the 
MAS, through an updated Process of Change, has continued the 
legacy of the 1952 Revolution, and what opportunities and risks 
the future may hold for a sustained radical politics in the 
Pluri-national State of Bolivia.
John Crabtree
Research Associate, Latin American Centre, University of Oxford
CHAPTER 1
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The MNR, the MAS and the Meaning of Populism in Bolivia 
Few terms in recent times have gained such common currency to 
describe political developments as ‘populism’. It is, however, a 
notion that has long defied precise definition, often used more as a 
term of disapproval or repudiation than as an analytical tool. 
Political scientists have attempted to provide it with a precise 
meaning (Weyland, 2001; Panizza, 2013), while some have gone 
so far as to argue that the term should be avoided at all costs. Is it 
elitist or democratic? Is it just a political style, or more a strategy of 
legitimation? Can it be applied alike to right-wing regimes and 
left-wing ones? How does it change when applied to governments 
as opposed to movements seeking to overthrow governments?
In the case of Bolivia, it is a term with an extended pedigree. It has 
been applied to the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario 
(MNR) both in its evolution in the 1940s as well as in its period in 
government between the 1952 revolution and the 1964 coup d’etat 
that ushered in a period of military rule. Similarly, it is applied to the 
origins and development of the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) as 
well as its behaviour in government since 2006, as well as a 
number of governments – and not all civilian ones – in between. 
So how apt is populism as an analytical term to help us understand 
Bolivian politics over the last 70 years or so?
Here I will focus on the two periods mentioned above: the period of 
the MNR in the 1940s and 1950s and that of the MAS in the new 
millennium. At the risk of further muddying the definitional waters, 
let me chance my arm with a definition as to how I would use the 
term. I would argue: Populism represents a relationship between 
political elites (whether established ones or new ones) and the 
populous (or pueblo) by which the former seek to mobilise political 
support across different classes around an agenda for change, 
basing their legitimacy on an appeal to unity around a perceived 
‘enemy’ whether internal or external to the political system (or 
both).
It is more than just about ‘style’ (Knight, 1998), and it (as is often 
the case) is ideologically ambiguous, used by both the left and the 
right in different circumstances to rally support and galvanise 
opinion behind their policies. In the final analysis, populism is part 
of a strategy of top-down mobilisation designed to win power and 
reinforce control, rather than one of bottom-up protagonism. 
Populism thus lends itself more to authoritarian rather than 
democratic or representational modes of governance. I use the 
term populism in a political rather than an economic sense; it is not 
just about spendthrift government seeking to use public money to 
curry support through redistribution as some economists would 
argue (Dornbusch and Edwards, 1991).
Use of the term in Latin America has undergone cycles that reflect 
changes both on the ground and how observers view those 
changes. Though originally used to describe movements of rural 
dissidence both in the United States and Russia in the 19th 
century, it came into vogue in the first half of the 20th century to 
describe the regimes that emerged as new elites sought to 
mobilise support around a modernising ideology linked to breaking 
the power of a largely agrarian oligarchy. Perhaps the case of 
Peronist Argentina represents the most poignant example of 
populist government (Hedges, 2017), although the term has also 
been used to describe Cardenismo in Mexico, the Estado Novo in 
Brazil and Aprismo in Peru. Not for nothing are many of the most 
well-known writers on classic populism Argentines (e.g. Di Tella, 
1996; Germani, 1962; Laclau, 2007)
In subsequent years, use of the term diminished. For those on the 
Marxist left, populism represented an obfuscation of the true nature 
of class conflict. And in much of the region, it went out of use as 
right-wing military governments seized power and whose policies 
were anything but ‘populist’. Perhaps only in a few cases, like Peru 
under General Velasco (1968-75) can military governments be so 
described. By the 1990s, and even more into the 2000s, populism 
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once again gained salience as an analytical device in Latin 
America (De la Torre and Arnson, 2013). It was used, for example, 
in a new way – ‘neo-populism’ – to describe governments like 
those of Saúl Menem in Argentina (1989-99) and Alberto Fujimori 
(1990-2000) in Peru (Roberts, 1995). And with the ‘pink wave’ that 
began in Venezuela at the end of the 1990s and brought the return 
of left-of-centre governments throughout much of Latin America 
subsequently, populism took hold once again as a way to analyse 
these governments (Cameron and Hershberg, 2010). The rise of 
the MAS, and its political dominance since Evo Morales’ first 
election as president in 2006, forms part of that ‘pink wave’.
The MNR and the 1952 revolution
How appropriate is it to describe the rise of the MNR in the late 
1940s, its rise to power in 1952 and its subsequent role in 
government until 1964 as populist?
First established in 1941 in reaction against the pro-allies 
Peñaranda regime, the MNR emerged with clear pro-fascist ideas. 
Bolivia’s defeat in the Chaco War (1932-35) and the reformist 
nationalism of the military governments that followed provided 
provided the context for its establishment.  In 1943, after the 
overturn of the Peñaranda government, the MNR joined the 
nationalist military government of Major Gualberto Villarroel, but 
Villarroel tempered his pro-Axis sympathies as it became clear that 
Germany was unlikely to win the Second World War. Under the 
leadership of Víctor Paz Estenssoro, the MNR likewise adopted a 
more measured stance (Klein, 2011), aligning itself with the 
country’s mineworkers and its more left-wing parties around a 
programme of reform involving, among other things, the 
nationalisation of the mining industry and agrarian reform. In its 
origins, the party was clearly influenced by the rise of Peronism in 
neighbouring Argentina and the populist politics that it exemplified. 
Basing its strategy around a poly-classist alliance involving the 
labour movement and middle-class sectors, it sought to mobilise 
wide sectors of the popular movement around a programme of 
reform. Under Paz Estenssoro and Hernán Siles Zuazo, the MNR 
leadership was in the hands of an educated middle class. Paz 
himself came from a landed family in Tarija, but as a soldier in the 
Chaco War he had come to realise the military and political 
ineptitude of the Bolivian political elite. The growth of the MNR 
owed more to its ability to court the leaders of popular movements 
rather than mobilise their rank and file (Mitchell, 1977). The MNR, 
until at least the mid-1950s, maintained a fiercely nationalist 
position (in both the sense of nation-building as well as opposition 
to foreign intervention), but one wedded to the need for political 
and social reform.
The revolution of April 1952 thus brought the MNR to power 
around a reformist programme, although it found itself allied with 
the country’s much more radical mineworkers’ union, the 
Federación Sindical Minera de Bolivia (FSTMB) (Dunkerley, 1984). 
Having seen the remnants of the army largely destroyed and 
struggling to maintain its political control over events, the MNR 
launched a programme of far reaching reforms (Malloy and Thorn, 
1972). Among its first moves was to remove the literacy 
requirement for voting, creating de facto virtually universal 
suffrage. The voting population quintupled as a consequence. The 
revolutionary government found itself supporting the foundation of 
the Central Obrera Boliviana (COB), in which the FSTMB was the 
prime mover. 
Under pressure from the mineworkers, the MNR government 
agreed to the nationalisation of the mining industry, forming the 
Corporación Minera de Bolivia (Comibol). It thus seized (initially 
without compensation) the assets of the three ‘tin barons’, Patiño 
Mines and those belonging to the the Hochschild and Aramayo 
families.  At the insistence of the miners’ union, Comibol was to be 
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‘co-managed’ by the workers themselves. The ideology of the 
FSTMB, as expressed by the the Trotskyist-inspired Thesis of 
Pulacayo of 1949, was well to the left of that of the MNR.  In 
common with the spirit of the times elsewhere in Latin America, the 
Bolivian revolution sought to modernise the country’s economic 
and social structure by means of a statist model of development. 
Not only did it nationalise the mining industry, but the 1950s gave 
way to a strongly interventionist economy and a proliferation of 
government agencies charged with the task of spearheading 
development.  
Then, in 1953, the MNR government enacted a wide-ranging land 
reform, confiscating the lands belonging to highland and valley 
haciendas and turning them over to a peasantry newly organised 
in rural unions (sindicatos). In practice, the reform was a response 
to de facto social pressures as the old system of landed tenure had 
collapsed with the revolution and the army was no longer there to 
prop up the status quo.  Like it or not, the new government had 
little alternative to accept the outcome of land invasions, although 
-- as we shall see -- it managed to turn the new system of agrarian 
sindicatos to its political advantage.  
The Bolivian revolution and its aftermath thus destroyed the 
traditional social structure based on landed estates and a small 
group of mining companies (known as the rosca), opening up 
society to new entrants. This would, in due course, lead to the 
development of a new elite, much of it linked to the power of 
patronage of the state. While the MNR had campaigned in the 
1940s in favour of land reform and the nationalisation of the mines, 
in practice it was forced down this route by virtue of the strength of 
social forces – land invasions and the mineworkers – which offered 
it no alternative. While the MNR leadership helped mobilise these 
forces while in opposition, after 1952 it did its best to try to rein in 
the revolutionary impulse and to discipline the forces it had helped 
inspire. 
The main force behind the conservative backlash in the mid-1950s 
was pressure from the United States, the government of which – or 
important figures within it – saw in the 1952 revolution the 
realisation of the nightmare of ‘communist insurrection’ in its own 
backyard. The revolution took place at the height of the Korean 
War and the Cold War climate which it helped engender. Using its 
economic muscle and taking advantage of Bolivia’s then prostrate 
economy, Washington was able to place pressure on Paz 
Estenssoro to corral the radical FSTMB and its leaders. The 
condition placed on economic assistance to Bolivia was the 
imposition of policies to end the co-management of Comibol and to 
remove miners’ leaders from key posts in the government.  Also, in 
1953, Paz Estenssoro signed a new code for the oil sector (first 
nationalised in 1936) that was subsequently to favour US 
investments. Then, in 1956 Siles Zuazo introduced the 
US-designed economic stabilisation known as the Eder Plan.    
The US response to the Bolivian revolution might well have been 
more draconian but for the fact that relatively few US economic 
assets had fallen victim to nationalisation. But Paz Estenssoro 
(1952-56), Siles Zuazo after him (1956-60) and then Paz 
Estenssoro again (1960-64) expended great efforts to balance 
pressures from the United States with those emanating from the 
mining communities. The US embassy sought to isolate and, 
ultimately, destroy the mineworkers’ organisation (Field 2014). 
Though they failed in this endeavour, repression in the main mining 
zones led to a series of conflicts in which substantial numbers 
were killed during the period of military rule after 1964. At the same 
time, US aid was channelled into developing private-sector 
agribusiness in Santa Cruz in the eastern lowlands where the 
agrarian reform was never implemented (Heilman, 2017).
The MNR’s rural policy, however, emerged into one of domination 
and counterbalance to the power of the mining unions. It quickly 
became clear after the declaration of the agrarian reform that this 
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had largely slaked the political appetite of the country’s peasantry, 
while providing a new organisational structure that leant itself to 
top-down social control. The MNR effectively dominated the rural 
sindicatos and used them in critical moments to mobilise them 
against the government’s left-wing opponents. This was further 
developed by the military governments that followed 1964, 
especially that of General René Barrientos who used the peasant 
sindicatos as the lynch-pin of his Pacto Militar-Campesino, an 
essay in the co-optation of the union structure that was to lead to a 
new breed of peasant politics in the 1970s. The MNR’s strategy 
sought to subdue ethnic identity around a broad definition of what it 
was to be a campesino giving rise to a subsequent indigenista 
reaction (Albó, 1985). 
The 1964 military coup which brought Barrientos to power 
represented the end of the MNR era, until -- that is -- 1985 when 
Paz Estenssoro returned to office with very different political 
agenda. The rebuilding of the military apparatus, following its near 
destruction in 1952, was a direct consequence of the relationship 
struck between the MNR leadership and the US government 
during the 1950s. The army became the bulwark around which the 
government sought to limit the power of the unions and the left. 
Military repression, like the so-called Massacre of San Juan in 
1967, became the hallmark of policy towards the mineworkers, 
with the military government of General Hugo Banzer (1971-78) 
seeking to re-found the country’s politics along new lines.
So, in what sense was the MNR ‘populist’? The party certainly bore 
resemblance, especially in its early stage, to other populist parties 
in Latin America, as an elite-based movement that sought to 
mobilise support for a reformist, modernising agenda, based 
around a statist model of development. It shared with them the 
concern to go beyond the organised working class, building 
poly-classist alliances that incorporated otherwise antagonistic 
forces around a decidedly nationalist agenda. It was never a 
‘liberal’ party in which internal democracy was very evident. But nor 
was it a ‘hegemonic’ party; it constantly had to accommodate itself 
to grass-roots, bottom-up movements with their own agenda. The 
achievements of the MNR in office were substantial, but they also 
reflect the agendas of organised labour which the MNR was never 
able to fully co-opt. 
Once in power and not withstanding its nationalist ideology, the 
MNR found itself forced to retreat from its more progressive 
policies, largely due to the constraints imposed by the United 
States. But it was able to establish a new political structure in rural 
parts of the country through which it was able to exercise a good 
deal of social control, a mechanism taken to its full conclusion after 
its fall from power with the Pacto Militar Campesino. The MNR that 
returned to power in 1985, in very different circumstances, had 
renounced its statist ideology in favour of free-market capitalism, a 
far cry from the party as it emerged in the 1940s. It had shed its 
populist instincts.
Evo Morales and the MAS
The Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS-IPSP) was not a party whose 
roots are to be found in elite politics; rather it was a bottom-up, 
grass-roots movement that sought to challenge the model of 
exclusionary elite-dominated politics that had taken root after 
Bolivia’s return to democracy in the 1980s. ‘Pacted democracy’, as 
it became known, involved a scheme of power-sharing designed to 
underpin a liberalising economic model that led to a concentration 
of power in the hands of the business elite and their political allies. 
Despite regular electoral contests and a formal rotation of parties 
in government, ‘pacted democracy’ failed adequately to represent 
the interests of a large swathe of the electorate.
The MAS arose as a political movement in the non-traditional 
coca-producing Chapare region that challenged ‘pacted 
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democracy’ head-on in the late 1990s. With its roots among the 
coca farmers that had confronted the eradication policies of 
successive governments, it was a quintessentially ‘bottom-up’ 
movement (Harten, 2011). It grew out of the attempt to give a 
political voice to a social movement, calling itself an ‘instrumento 
político’ rather than a conventional party. Its rapid electoral growth 
– it only narrowly missed winning in the 2002 presidential elections 
– owed much to its ability to link up disparate protest movements, 
providing them with a channel through which to challenge the 
existing parties and their grip on political power. It was a political 
movement more ‘popular’ than ‘populist’. 
Its political expansion, both prior to and after the 2002 presidential 
elections, owed much to its ability to provide political leadership to 
an otherwise variegated sequence of social movements, helping to 
draw these together into powerful coalition (Crabtree, 2005). 
Rooted in traditions of peasant sindicalismo, the MAS drew in 
other sectors within the logic of electoral competition. By the 
elections of 2006, which brought Evo Morales and the MAS to 
office, it had incorporated substantial sectors of a disaffected 
middle class. While these sectors became increasingly influential, 
especially after 2006, the MAS remained a movement able to 
articulate and organise the positions adopted by the country’s main 
peasant federations. 
The MAS thus sought to weld a broad coalition of interests. To this 
end, it successfully brought together three powerful and 
inter-related ideological strands. The first of these was a 
pro-indigenous discourse that reflected the changes that had taken 
place in peasant politics since the 1960s when the MNR and later 
the military co-opted peasant unionism and sought to sideline 
expressions of ethnic identity. Whereas the MNR sought to suffuse 
ethnic politics in a discourse that highlighted the role of the 
peasantry, the MAS grew in a context in which pro-indigenous 
mobilisation was a driving force.The second was a potent 
nationalism, geared primarily against the United States and the 
international financial institutions which had sought to promote the 
neo-liberal model. The third was a renewed faith in the 
interventionist state as a route towards promoting greater equality. 
These three were to find expression in the elaboration of a new 
constitution, finally approved in 2009. There are certain parallels 
with the MNR era here, at least with respect to nationalism and 
state intervention, less so as regards pro-indigenous politics.
As with 1952 and the MNR, 2006 represents a dividing line, a shift 
from the MAS as a popular-based protest movement to one with 
the responsibilities of government: a shift from protesta to 
propuesta. Since taking office, it is certainly arguable that the MAS 
government has strayed somewhat from its popular origins. The 
representatives of grass-roots organisations, given senior posts in 
government in 2006, have tended to be eclipsed by more 
technocratic elites. There have been bouts of tension within the 
MAS between those who claim to represent its core values and 
those from middle-class groupings who have become more 
influential with time. Indeed, the ‘process of change’ (as MAS 
officials refer to the policies adopted since 2006) has led to the 
emergence of new elites whose interests may or may not align with 
the drift of policies produced by the MAS government.
The role of leadership has been crucial in maintaining support for 
the MAS government and keeping it relatively united. Evo Morales, 
more so than the leaders of the 1952 revolution, has managed in 
well over a decade in office to remain the personification of the 
‘process of change’. He stands as a towering figure over the 
politics of the MAS, if not quite the charismatic leadership qualities 
attributed to some interpretations of populism. His life story – from 
the humblest origins to becoming Bolivia’s first-ever indigenous 
president (Sivak, 2008) – reflects the dreams and aspirations of 
the majority of citizens in this, the poorest and most indigenous 
country of South America. What has emerged is a highly 
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presidentialist regime (Mayorga, 2014), though not one that can 
ignore popular pressures. 
Like the MNR governments before it, the MAS administration has 
had to adjust to political realities, sacrificing some of its original 
aspirations on the way. Arguably, the redistributive policies of the 
first years in office have given way to rather more conservative 
ones, respectful of the interests of existing elites. Perhaps this is 
clearest in the agrarian sector, where the policies of land reform 
pursued in Morales’ first government (2006-10) gave way to a 
more accommodating stance towards landholders, especially in 
Santa Cruz. The near open rebellion in Santa Cruz in 2008 proved 
a political learning curve for Morales and the MAS, leading to 
acknowledgement of the need to maintain large units of 
landholding in the Bolivian oriente. During his second and third 
terms in office, Morales pursued policies designed to court the 
agro-exporting bourgeoisie of Santa Cruz (Wolf, 2016).
In its economic policies, the MAS governments pursued very 
cautious policies, certainly far removed the stereotype of populism 
associated with profligate government spending. Concerned to 
avoid any return to the sort of hyperinflationary situation that 
characterised the 1980s (which brought down the left-wing 
government of the Unidad Democrática y Popular in 1985), the 
MAS administrations adopted conservative monetary and fiscal 
policies. By 2010, the IMF found itself congratulating Bolivia on the 
success of its government’s macroeconomic policies. Similarly, 
following the much-vaunted ‘re-nationalisation’ of the natural gas 
industry at the end of 2006 (which added substantially to the 
government’s tax take), the Morales government has sought to 
encourage foreign investment in this sector, aware that without it 
Bolivia’s gas fields will soon be exhausted. 
And in its pro-indigenous stance, which led to the extension of 
indigenous rights through the 2009 constitution, the Morales 
administration found it increasingly difficult to marry discourse and 
practice, particularly in seeking to promote the development of 
certain indigenous areas, notably those on which hydrocarbons 
resources were located. (Postero, 2017)
Although it is arguable that the MAS has become less ‘democratic’ 
and more ‘presidential’ in the way it operates, it is also true that it is 
unable to dictate to those of its component organisations, notably 
the country’s peasant unions and the cocaleros, as if they were 
simply party offshoots to be manipulated at will. Popular 
movements that support the MAS retain considerable autonomy, 
pursuing their interests often vigorously and sometimes violently 
(Crabtree and Chaplin, 2013). When the government has faced a 
barrage of protest over policies that go against the interests of 
allied social movements, it has been swift to switch direction.  
Basically, supportive movements have adopted militant tactics to 
defend their interest at certain points, such as the movement of 
mining cooperatives which, since the mid-1980s, account for the 
bulk of the workforce in the mining sector. They also wield 
significant influence in the MAS’s selection of candidates for 
electoral office (Anria, 2018). 
So how well does the MAS experience fit the populist tag defined 
above?  There are certain elements that correspond to notions of 
populism. New elites that have gained access to power since 
2006, a new order that seeks legitimation through appeals to lo 
popular in a country where popular democratic traditions remain 
vibrant. But there has been a shift towards a more bureaucratic 
and presidentialist system of government that is less responsive 
and permeable to popular interests. Representative institutions, 
especially in the formal political arena, have proved relatively 
weak. The Morales government has made use of ‘direct 
democracy’ through referendums to seek public legitimation at 
certain points. The MAS is not a ‘liberal’ party in the classic sense 
of the word, and in this respect, there are some resemblances to 
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the MNR. A degree of clientelism has crept in that has reduced the 
autonomy of grass-roots movements. And Morales has not shied 
away from nationalist appeals, whether against the United States 
or neighbouring Chile (over Bolivia’s access to the Pacific) in ways 
designed to rally opinion in favour of the government. 
But it would be a mistake, in my opinion, to view this new state 
structure as populist in the sense of its manipulation of 
subservient, quiescent clienteles. The powerful tradition of 
bottom-up social mobilisation remains very much alive in today’s 
Bolivia, while the state (though larger and more intrusive than 
before) is insufficiently powerful to be able to ignore or subdue 
these. Government has frequently been faced by keen opposition 
to specific policies, and in most cases it has been forced to 
backtrack in order to maintain that support. Bolivia, I would argue, 
stands out when compared to other ‘pink tide’ countries in Latin 
America that lack its political traditions of autonomous social 
organisation and mobilisation (Silva and Rossi, 2018). These are 
part of the country’s political culture. 
Conclusion
We have sought here to compare two periods of Bolivia’s recent 
political history, and to see the extent to which they can usefully be 
classified as examples of ‘populism’. While, of course, populism is 
a slippery term, open to a variety of interpretations, we have 
offered a working definition. Clearly, no two periods in a country’s 
history are directly comparable, but there do appear to be some 
continuities between the period of the MNR and that of the MAS 
that are worth bearing in mind. Both were predominant parties over 
extensive periods, both brought new political actors into play, and 
both presided over periods of social change.  Both also claimed 
legitimacy on the basis of their ability to mobilise and engage 
popular sectors, albeit sometimes in clientelistic ways. The tradition 
of popular mobilisation that goes back to the 1952 revolution (if not 
well before) permeates the country’s political culture and alive and 
well today. 1952, in my view, represents an important point of 
inflection that had a profound influence over successive 
generations. Such traditions remain today. 
However, comparisons between periods some six decades apart 
should not be pushed too far. The MAS does not willingly hark 
back to any antecedents within the MNR, a party which (because 
of its role in the 1980s and 1990s) is seen as neoliberal and 
anti-popular. The MAS also seeks to proclaim an ethnic discourse 
which was never the vocabulary of the MNR in the 1950s and 
1960s. Populism, as defined here, is not an entirely appropriate 
lens through which to view either of these two experiences and the 
complex relationships that have existed between elites, the 
common people and the state. While there are aspects to both 
periods that smack of populism, this interpretation again should not 
be pushed too far.  Where popular movements retain autonomy 
and are capable of promoting themselves and defending their 
interests against the state, the notion of top-down mobilisation to 
manipulate opinion and legitimise government can appear 
somewhat wide of the mark.
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The Pachacuti Vision of Filemón Escóbar: from Class Struggle to the 
Complementarity of Opposites 
Filemón ‘’Filippo” Escóbar was founder and second general 
secretary of the Movement for Socialism (MAS-IPSP)1, 
Congressman (1989-93), Senator (2002 – 2005), advisor to the Six 
Coca Growers’ Federations in the Cochabamba Chapare tropics, 
ideological mentor to Evo Morales and founder of the Tupac Katari 
Revolutionary Liberation Movement (MRTKL). Perhaps more 
remarkable is the fact that Escobar, a notable left wing and labour 
movement figure of Trotskyist lineage renounces class struggle in 
favour of Pachacuti, a vision of holistic change based on Andean 
complementarity of opposites and reciprocity principles. 
Filemón Escóbar developed this new political vision of change 
based on Andean principles of living well. It is influenced by the 
Indigenous Aymara notion of Suma Qamaña (or Sumaj Kawsay in 
Quechua) and advocates a moral and correct life based on a 
strong sense of community and relationship with Mother Earth 
(Pachamama), involving spiritual and material balance in human 
beings and a harmonious relation with all forms of existence. The 
Pachacuti vision of change is also inspired by ritual use of the coca 
leaf to interconnect the Andean symbolic system in order to 
stimulate the emergence of paradigms and practices different to 
the traditional left-wing conflict-centred approach. As Escobar 
clarified in an interview in 2014: 
“The solution is to bring back a sense of humanity to the economy 
based on the reciprocity principles of giving, receiving and giving 
back found in in rural areas. 
Reciprocity is about producing for the other, working for the other 
and giving your all for the other, instead of for your personal 
individual gain” (Nueva Economia, 2014; 8 April) 
1 Movimiento al Socialismo – Instrumento Político para la Soberanía de los Pueblos (Movement to Socialism – 
Political Instrument for Sovereignty of the People). Known as MAS and/or Intrumento Político or MAS-IPSP. 
In his search for political alternatives Escóbar admitted that he and 
the left were responsible for some very damaging processes, 
including the “political suicides” mentioned by former President 
Carlos Mesa in the prologue to his book, and he made clear his 
hope that these mistakes would not be repeated in the current 
‘Process of Change’ being implemented by the MAS. To avoid this 
happening, Escóbar proposed the MAS-IPSP remain faithful to its 
founding ideology of the Complementarity of Opposites, and not 
reproduce the politics and ideology of confrontation typical of the 
traditional left. 
“This process of Pachacuti, cannot end in another frustration, and 
that frustration will not be the radicalism of the old left, it will be 
more serious, because the Andean – Amazonian civilization will be 
answerable for this new frustration" (Escóbar, 2008: 296) 
Coinciding with Escobar’s work on Pachacuti, the notion of Suma 
Qamaña was being developed by Aymara intellectual Simón 
Yampara and expanded by Javier Medina and other Aymara 
intellectuals including Fernando Huanacuni, Bolivia’s former 
foreign minister, and his predecessor David Choquehuanca2. 
Yampara declares Suma Qamaña, associated with other Andean 
cosmological principles like the complementarity of opposites and 
reciprocity, could shape a fresh political imperative to bring about 
change in Bolivia and the Andean region.
"Little by little we are going to able to open spaces and I think this 
will enable us to (develop) our own political school of thought (...) 
another orientation, another way of thinking that is different from 
Marxism, and different from liberalism." (Saavedra, 2010: 53)
2 “I think it's important to stop for a moment to close our eyes and open our hearts - to see what kind of world 
we have been able to create. A world in a sure race towards destruction. This Western model of society has 
taken us away from nature and our families have dehumanized away from nature. We face a crisis of principles 
and values that does not value our roots. We need a new horizon, new life, that is to “Live Well”. A new history, 
not of class struggle but of regional and global brotherhood.” David Choquehuanca, Keynote Speaker on “Taj 
Pa Chani” (Everyone and Everything) at the Fifth Annual CAF-LSE Conference on “Leadership, Resilience and 
Development in an Era of Instability”, London Friday 19 January 2018 
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 When Fernando Huanacuni was removed as Bolivia’s foreign 
minister, by President Evo Morales, in September 2018, he issued 
a similar reflection: 
“I am a faithful servant of the process of change, an Aymara Indian, 
I am not a Marxist nor a communist, but I do respond to my 
indigenous principles and this enables me to have values for living 
well. I respect communism and Marxism, but we differ a lot in the 
methodology of struggle, as living well is a process of 
complementation. Marxism and Trotskyism are confrontational, 
while complementarity is not like that". (Los Tiempos, 2018: 5 
September) 
This chapter will examine the reasons and the implications of 
Filemón Escóbar’s radical new determination by assessing aspects 
of and his role in the 1952 National Revolution led by the 
Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (MNR) and the Process of 
Change started by the MAS-IPSP in 2006. The linkages he 
developed are extraordinary as they represent a break with the 
established class-based theory and practice of Bolivian left-wing 
leaders and political parties. The penetrating potential of his 
thought is widely acknowledged, and he has been described as 
“vital for understanding the second half of the 20th century in 
Bolivia” (Galindo, 2014) and portrayed as a key figure of “history in 
the strict sense of the word” (Mesa, 2017). 
Former president Carlos Mesa describes Escóbar as a militant of 
his country and people. Militant given his worker background, 
political wisdom and unwavering commitment to the miners and 
their Federation; but, also a “volcano, who lucidly perceived the 
errors of a left seemingly enamoured in committing political suicide 
and for discovering the vitality of the cocalero movement”. 
(Escóbar, 2014: 9) 
His life-long political activism also speaks to this potential. Escóbar 
was a miner, iconoclastic trade union leader, one-time head of the 
Bolivian Miners Federation (FSTMB) and Catavi miners’ union. 
Filippo’s half-brothers were Guillermo Lora, Trotskyist leader of the 
Partido Obrero Revolucionario (POR) - author of the influential 
Tesis de Pulacayo - and Cesar Lora, a Catavi mine leader 
murdered in July 1965. Accompanied by Simón Reyes of the 
Bolivian Communist Party, “Filippo” led the 1986 “March for Life” to 
avert mass redundancies, closure of the mines and possible 
demise of the Central Obrera Boliviana (COB) and FSTMB. 
Escóbar obsessively tracked the vicissitudes of Bolivian miners, 
left-wing political leaders, and 23,000 relocalizado, redundant 
miners who embodied the legacy of those who had lived and 
worked in the mines since colonial times. Starting 1986 these 
miners and their families migrated to the Chapare to become 
small-holders organized into trade unions around lucrative 
cultivation of the coca leaf. Wearing his emblematic woven ch’uspa 
coca leaves bag, he accompanied them on this journey and 
engaged with Amazonian indigenous communities at the Isoboro 
Secure National Park (TIPNIS). 
Complementarity of Opposites and the Andean Cosmovision 
Filemón Escóbar openly admits that he and the left are responsible 
for very damaging processes, hoping this will not be repeated in 
the current Process of Change. For Filemón this means the 
MAS-IPSP should remain faithful to its founding ideology of the 
Complementarity of Opposites, and not reproduce the politics and 
ideology of confrontation of the traditional left, as this would lead to 
political suicide of the MAS and Evo Morales. 
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"The “ch'ullas3 of the traditional left, known today as "indigenous 
left" are pushing us towards confrontation with the other Bolivia, in 
wanting to wipe it out. On the other hand, the traditional right is 
seeking the same objective because it is also radically ch'ulla. It is 
One and never accepted parity, the Yanantin.4 Both ch'ulla are 
seeking to wipe each other out." (Escóbar, Filemón, 2013: 380)
Escóbar declares confrontation does not exist in the 
Complementarity of Opposites, quoting the XIX century Aymara 
intellectual Vicente Pazos Kanki who believed the indigenous and 
Spanish cultures could come together to forge a grandiose 
civilization and do away with confrontation. The XX Century 
Aymara intellectual Fausto Reinaga envisioned One Nation and 
One Bolivia emerging from the organic, spiritual and psychological 
fusion of both nations. Therefore, Andean and Amazonian 
civilizations know not the concept of inclusion, as each civilization 
contains within itself the other civilization, in a subordinate or 
minimized mode, Filemón comments with reference to Fausto 
Reinaga. (See concept of Ayni below). 
Filemón Escóbar’s other referent is Pablo Zarate Willka, the XIX 
Century Aymara federalist rebel who issued the "Proclama de 
Caracollo" (Caracollo Proclamation)5 calling for mutual respect for 
the complementarity of differences between the Indian (Andean - 
Amazonian Civilization) and the white (Western Individual 
Civilization). 
3 Ch’ulla = bad luck. Not a pair, but an odd number. A person without a partner. A missing or odd sock. 
4 The union of opposing yet interdependent energies described in the complementarity of opposites 
5 “Publíquese por bando solemne a todos los propietarios por lo Federación i por la Libertad que deseamos 
hallar la Regeneración de /…/ Bolivia, como todos los indígenas i los blancos nos lebantaremos a defender 
nuestra República de Bolivia, porque quieren apoderarse el traidor asqueroso Saco Alonsismo bendiendonos a 
los chilenos (…). 2. Con grande centimiento ordeno a todos los indijinas para que guarden el respeto con los 
besinos i no agan tropelías (ni crismes) porque todos los indígenas /han/ de lebantarse para el conbate i no 
para estropear a los besinos/;/ tan lo mismo deben respetar los blancos o besinos alos indijinas porque somos 
de una /misma/ sangre e hijos de Bolivia i deben quererse como entre hermanos i con indianos.” Zarate, el 
“Temible” Willka y La Rebelión Indígena de 1899 de Ramiro Condarco Morales por Luis Oporto Ordóñez, 
Pagina 59, FUENTES, VOL 5, No 15, La Paz, agosto 2011 
Zarate Willka proclaimed the "Regeneration of Bolivia", with 
Filemón pointing to the "Refounding Bolivia" as its XXI century 
equivalent.6
Filemón Escóbar declares the time has come for the ayni 
collaboration between both civilizations, again stressing the need 
for high level political consciousness. He rebukes the bad luck 
Ch'ullas of the traditional left and traditional right for being unaware 
that we are living through a transition period where the myth of 
revolution will be replaced by the myth of Pachacuti which is not a 
Western style revolution. Andean people are renowned for their 
communitarian social practices and vibrant live philosophy despite 
the absence of philosophical texts or identifiable philosophers, thus 
the veritable or real philosophical subject have become the 
anonymous and collective runa / jaqi, to achieve a fullness of 
human attributes. While Western philosophy has long searched for 
the origin arje, of what exists, that fundamental and irreducible 
principle of "reality". In Andean philosophy arje is present as 
relation, and not as a substantial "entity". Everything is relation and 
relata at the same time. 
The arje of Andean philosophy is the relationship with everything, 
the network of nexii or links representing the vital energy of 
everything that exists. "A stone for example isn't simply a separate 
"entity" that exists on its own, in the Andean world a stone is the 
point of concentration of certain relations of "force" and "energy". 
(Estermann, 2012:109). Reality for the runa/jaqi unfolds or is 
"revealed" through celebration, a reproduction or recreation of that 
reality "becomes more intense and concentrated through 
celebration," something considered "magical" or "numinous" from a 
western perspective. (Estermann. 2012: 115)
6 Filemón also admired Andres Ibanez the first white man to propose an egalitarian and radical Federalist state 
for Bolivia in 1876. Ibanez’ federalists seized control the eastern lowland region of Santa Cruz for nearly six 
months, before being executed.	
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Two key principles in the Andean Cosmovivencia are relationality 
and complementarity. Relationality is a holistic principle that 
indicates everything is related (connected) in some way or other 
with everything. Complementarity in turn, emphasises the inclusion 
of complementary opposites into a complete and integral entity. 
“In the West, formal "contradiction" is conceived as "absolute" or 
exclusive, in such a way that (A) excludes the other (B) and vice 
versa. Andean philosophy, on the other hand, interprets the formal 
contradiction as a material contrariety. A is different to B, B is 
different to A, but A and B can "coexist", (with possibility) as 
complementary parts of a third entity, that then strictly speaking, 
becomes a “whole” (entity). ". [...]"The Andean ideal is not one of 
"extreme" opposition, but the harmonious integration of both". 
(Estermann. 2012: 142) 
Oppositional complementarity is a "celebratory mediation", 
whereby complementary positions achieve integration through 
celebrative rituals which are so common in the Andean 
communities. It also posits the question whether the recourse to 
violence and confrontation, “’is endogenous to the Andean region, 
or is perhaps the result of the conflict arising from the cultural, 
social, ethnic and economic impact of the Spanish conquest". 
(Estermann. 2012: 143) 
Andean Ayllu communities and families use energy interactions to 
reconcile the material with the spiritual, both privately for their 
families but also in communal forms. This is made possible through 
ayni -- collaboration mentioned earlier by Escobar -- a ritual for 
reciprocal sharing or correspondence that reproduces a diversity of 
energies and common feeling of belonging to a solidary society, 
that Simón Yampara calls “cosmovivencia” or cosmic experience. 
(Yampara,2008: 8) 
Pachakuti similarly represents permanent or ongoing change, the 
renewal of energies coming and going over time. The Quechua 
and Aymara indigenous people have long been searching for such 
renewal, beyond what has been offered through mere changes of 
government. 
Non-confrontation and the revolutionary left 
Although he advocated a non-confrontational politics of 
complementarity, Escobar valued the institutions of the left and of 
the revolution. He underscored the need to safeguard the political 
independence, credibility and integrity of the COB7 and FSTMB by 
permanently encouraging, be it the miners or the cocaleros, to 
consider lessons learned in social and political struggles, and chart 
politically creative ways forward to avoid repetition of mistakes. 
Supported by the COB, Filemón Escóbar entered the Chapare in 
1986 to help found the Movement for Socialism–Political 
Instrument for the Sovereignty of the Peoples (MAS-IPSP) and 
organized over 600 workshops and seminars in the 1990s -- 
teaching the cocaleros Bolivian and labour movement history, to 
not repeat the mistakes made by the traditional left, and dissuaded 
some cocaleros planning to establish a guerrilla movement in the 
Chapare tropics.
The Trotskyist Pulacayo Thesis (1946), was his initial referent for 
advocating “direct mass action and electoral struggle.”
 
7 The COB has currently (2018) lost its independence by toeing the MAS-IPSP government line. The COB's 
political and trade union credibility was based on a plural representation because as a labour organization it 
provided a space for a myriad of political positions to be heard and represented. It was this plurality that granted 
the COB a capacity to convene because political independence was guaranteed, and this was reflected in the 
executive committee which was very inclusive of all social and political currents expressed by trade union 
members and their organizations. Nowadays the COB does not represent other trade union and political 
currents different to the majority stance taken in support of the MAS, and the executive committee does not 
foster discussions and debate as part of its decision-making process.
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“VIII. Direct Mass Action and Electoral Struggle. We reiterate the 
pre-eminence of direct mass action among the various methods of 
proletarian struggle. We know very well that our liberation will be 
the fruit of our own work, and that to achieve it we cannot wait for 
cooperation with forces outside our own. Therefore, in this stage of 
the workers' movement our chosen method of struggle is direct 
mass action; more explicitly, strikes and mine take-overs. […] 
Electoral politics are important, but in the ascendant stages of a 
revolutionary movement they play a secondary role. To become 
important, electoral work must be subordinated to direct mass 
action. Above all, congressional struggles must be directly linked to 
direct mass action. Worker deputies and miners must act under 
only one authority-the principles that are laid out in this Thesis.”8 
The coca leaf, in turn, became the symbol of the Andean - 
Amazonian Civilization in marches and blockades, but also in 
elections. Inspired by the symbolism of the coca leaf, Filemón’s 
political thinking began to change after 1990. His mentor in the 
tropics was Jose Mirtenbaum, a Bolivia born half German 
anthropologist who developed the notion that ”coca is not cocaine” 
and invited Filemón to participate in the August 1990 “March for 
Territory and Dignity” to also draw a red line to prevent coca 
growers and settlers from moving into the Tipnis."The coca leaf 
interconnected the Andean symbolic system and paved the way for 
new paradigms for us in the Third millennia, which have nothing to 
do with the traditional left”(Escóbar, 2008: 267) 
8 Pulacayo thesis. https://nacla.org/article/thesis-pulacayo 
The Suma Qamaña in Aymara (or Sumaj Kawsay in Quechua) 
notion of a moral and correct life based on a strong sense of 
community and relationship with Mother Earth (Pachamama), but 
also involving spiritual and material balance in human beings and a 
harmonious relation with all forms of existence, was developed by 
Aymara intellectual Simon Yampara, but also in extensive studies 
by Javier Medina and Fernando Huanacuni, Bolivia’s former 
foreign minister, and his predecessor David Choquehuanca9. 
In the workshops Filemón Escobar organized in the Chapare 
tropics, he also referred to the lesson to be learned from the 1947 
election results, when the miners’ federation FSTMB, founded 
three years earlier, formed the Bloque Minero Parlamentario (BMP) 
to secure two Senators and 7 Deputies. A qualitative leap for the 
labour movement during the rule of the “Rosca” mining and 
estate-owning oligarchy, as the FSTMB miners federation secured 
parliamentary representation. This election became a referent, as 
Filemón bet the MAS could achieve a similar result in the 2002 
elections10. 
9 Current secretary general of the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of our America (ALBA). 
10 1947 Election Results: Lesson to be learned
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On 5 January 2002 Evo Morales and José Antonio Quiroga were 
chosen candidates for the 2002 General election, at an assembly 
held in La Paz11. Then Quiroga surprisingly declined the 
Vice-Presidential candidature and was replaced by Antonio 
Peredo, who took Evo to Cuba to meet Fidel. Introducing Peredo 
to the MAS was, Filemón says, the biggest mistake in his political 
career as he handed over the Instrumento Politico (the MAS-IPSP) 
to the old-fashioned traditional left.
"This left makes no commitment, it instead integrates as political 
leadership, displacing the Indian power and opening up the 
Instrumento Politico to a western rooted socialism, which is just 
like capitalism: homogenizing, industrialist, with the vision of 
‘dominating nature'". [....] This left that has taken control of the 
Instrumento Politico, never understood the meaning of community, 
reciprocity, Suma Qamaña and the complementarity of 
opposites."(Escóbar, 2008: 264) 
The MAS came second in the 2002 elections with 20.9% of the 
vote, just 43,000 votes short of winning, but secured 27 out of 130 
Lower House seats and 8 out of 27 Senate seats. The election 
result enabled the MAS to rise from the political periphery to 
rapidly establish alliances with other peasant, indigenous, settlers, 
cooperatives, mining and left-wing groups, and gravitate towards 
the political centre stage. The Chapare cocaleros resorted to smart 
radio station broadcasts to establish nationwide common ground 
with other marginalized groups. (Grisaffi, 2019: Chapter 7) 
11 Nephew of Marcelo Quiroga Santa Cruz, the minister of hydrocarbons who in 1969 nationalised the Gulf Oil 
Company and went on to establish the Bolivian Socialist Party (PS-1). Marcelo Quiroga was murdered and 
disappeared following the siege of the COB headquarters during the 1980 military coup led by General Luis 
Garcia Meza.
In a cocalero assembly in Lauca Ñ in the Chapare, Filemón 
forecast Evo Morales would win the 2005 elections, as the MAS 
was the only party standing following the 2003 resignation and 
flight of President Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada. Knowing this, 
Filemón sought cocalero commitment that if Evo won the 2005 
elections – “Not a single coca leaf will remain planted in the 
Chapare." Filemón went on to add, “Just as Evo Morales is a 
symbol of the coca leaf headed to become President, beware the 
coca leaf does not slit his throat". This resolution was approved at 
the Lauca Ñ assembly after the MAS-IPSP came second in the 
2002 elections. However, after winning the 2005 elections, when 
the MAS-IPSP became the first political party since the return to 
democracy in 1982 to secure a majority, Filemón said Evo Morales 
did not honour the Lauca Ñ assembly eradication resolution, but 
instead legalized the Cato of coca (1,600 square meter plots).
Filemón charges that this decision undermined the political 
consciousness of the cocaleros, who started to believe that 
entering the drugs trafficking supply chain would be the solution 
moving forward.12 Escobar noted that this would be a betrayal of 
both traditional left and Pachacuti virtues:
"There should be no coca in the tropics, it is not traditional, it is a 
business venture within a classic capitalist framework (drugs 
trafficking)", (Escóbar, Filemón, August 2014).13 
12 When Filemón was standing as candidate for Senator of the Green Party (Partido Verde) in 2014, he pointed 
out that the Ley 1008 anti-drugs law introduced in July 1988 did not advocate forced eradication of coca 
plantation, but voluntary eradication with a right to compensation and an alternative development program to 
provide the coca growers a similar level of income to that earned from coca planting. Filemón proposed Morales 
comply with the Ley 1008 to prevent coca from the Chapare being used for drugs trafficking and pay coca 
growers US$10,000 for each cato. Escobar reasons that if no surplus coca was produced for drugs trafficking, 
the price of coca would not rise, and there would be no crime to punish. "I proposed we pay each family 
US$10,000 a year for ten years, which is what the cocaleros earn every year from planting coca. US$10,000 a 
year - based on one cato of coca, and not the three that they already hold -- until all the coca is cleared from the 
Tropics. But we maintain the Yungas coca as it is traditional coca.” (Escóbar, Filemón, 2013) 
13 Winston Moore interview with Filemón Escóbar August 2014
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Filemón Escobar was unable to pursue his plan to eradicate the 
non-traditional coca leaf in the Chapare through a compensation 
program, as Evo Morales had him expelled from the MAS on 24 
May 2004 for allegedly receiving payment to enable the Senate to 
approve, in his absence, a law granting immunity from prosecution 
for US military personnel in Bolivia. (Escóbar, Filemón, 2008: 270 – 
276). The MAS – IPSP went on to win the 2005 general election 
with 54% of vote. According to Filemón, who was particularly 
concerned about the implications for coca production, Evo Morales 
and the MAS -IPSP entered “the Palacio Quemado (Presidential 
Palace), unencumbered, with no ties, although these would 
emerge in due course. This is one of the most dangerous risks in 
the current process, led by an Aymara at the start of the XXI 
century"(Escóbar, Filemón, 2008: 297 – 298). Anthropologist 
Thomas Grisaffi, who spent a decade doing field work in the 
Chapare noted, “coca growers are tied to the international cocaine 
trade through the production and selling of coca leaf and the 
processing of coca paste” (Grisaffi, 2019: 4), and cocaleros admit 
that “a great deal of their crop is used to manufacture cocaine.” 
(Grisaffi, 2019, 2)14 
14 Barely 10.7% of Chapare coca is estimated to be legally commercialized (El Deber, 20 July 2017). The 
United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime (UNODC) reports 94% of Chapare coca does not pass through the 
legal market. Furthermore, drugs traffickers continue to operate under government noses as the number of 
people detained for illicit drugs production between 2005-12 fell by 79%, while those detained for trafficking fell 
by 42.11% (Cardozo Lozada “La Hoja Milenaria”, Pagina 7, 19 June 2018). 
UNODC latest report says 67% of cocaine factories and 50% of cocaine laboratories destroyed in 2018 were 
located in the Chapare (Pagina 7, 26 January 2018), and that in 2017 and 2018 over 469 foreigners and 7,529 
Bolivians were detained for drugs trafficking activities in Bolivia. (Pagina 7. 25 January 2019). 
Also, most of the coca chewed in the Chapare, as well as the departments of Santa Cruz, Tarija and Oruro, 
highland mining centres, as well as coca leaf consumed in Northern Argentina comes from the Yungas region. 
President Evo Morales admitted this when promulgating the General Law on Coca in March 2017, “Some 
comrades said that only the coca from Yungas was chewed (pijchea) in the Chapare Tropics. Comrades you 
know, we salute and respect the Yungas coca leaf, but we don’t have the same economic possibilities. In the 
countryside, in rural areas, given that the coca from the tropics is cheaper more people buy it (...) those who 
have money purchase coca from the Yungas." (Correo del Sur, 8 March 2017) 
http://correodelsur.com/politica/20170308_evo-asegura-que-en-el-area-rural-se-pijchea-mas-la-coca-del-chapar
e-por-ser-mas-barata.html 
After becoming president in 2006, Morales shifted from the violent 
confrontation strategy of forced eradication implemented for over 
two decades by the US Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), to 
safeguarding cocalero livelihoods through top-down provision of 
development assistance (education, health and road building) , 
reducing coca cultivation through a new regulatory structure, 
identifying alternative uses for coca crops and control of the 
cocalero unions to prevent them becoming illegal organisations. 
The cocaleros continued, however, to demand their right to 
cultivate unlimited coca, but were limited by the MAS government 
to cultivating only one cato per family. 
As a result of this policy, the cocaleros became disillusioned and 
felt betrayed by Morales and the MAS, claiming he no longer 
looked after them, that he and other high-level leaders no longer 
pursued cocalero union goals and “lead by obeying”. Cocaleros 
also complained that their grass root democratic ideals had been 
corrupted and that the MAS was implementing top-down instead of 
bottom-up government. 
The cocalero trade unions that Filemón Escobar helped establish 
through his workshops followed the unique deliberative and 
politically independent approach of the Central Obrera Boliviana 
(COB) and the FSTMB miners federation (see f.n.7), a legacy 
noted to this day: “the organization of the union is based on 
Andean self-governing principles mixed with Marxist traditions 
inherited from the miners who migrated to the Chapare”, (Grisaffi, 
2019: 25). Coming from a tradition of Andean community practices 
reliant on the complementarity of opposites, the cocalero forms of 
democratic deliberation also differ from Liberal democracy as, 
“unions pursue direct participatory democracy whereby all 
members of the community meet to decide and enact their laws 
[…] with strong pressure for leadership to remain deferential and 
collective, to “’lead by obeying””. (Grisaffi, 2019: 1) 
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Conclusion: Pachacuti as permanent change beyond class 
struggle 
The ongoing dynamic of political change in Bolivia has been one 
where the left replaces the right or vice versa, be it to introduce 
state control or free-market neo-liberal policies in pursuit of a 
Western centred dialectical logic that is confrontational as indicated 
by Filemón Escóbar, yet despite successive changes in 
government (or guard) much remains the same. Simón Yampara 
proposes the possibility of real change at a deeper level through 
the Suma Qamaña principles and a Pachacuti crisis, also posited 
by Filemón Escóbar by renouncing class struggle confrontation to 
embrace the complementarity of opposites as a guiding principle. 
Escóbar charges that the Bolivian Communist party in 2009 
delivered to the Constituent Assembly over 400 articles for a new 
Plurinational State Constitution, in the name of the 36 nationalities 
in country listed in Jorge Ovando Sanz’s “National and Colonial 
Problem in Bolivia”, a paraphrase of nationalities from the Soviet 
Union, removing at a stroke, the concept of Republic. By 
accentuating the identity of these 36 nationalities, he warned, the 
Plurinational State represents a philosophy of confrontation. This 
prompted concern among Aymara intellectuals that the government 
of President Evo Morales is not seeking Pachacuti, and hence: "It 
is not an Indian government, but one that has become prisoner 
and colonized by ideologies of the left. Bolivia has only witnessed 
discursive shifts from right to left in politics, and from polyclassism 
to plurinationalism." (Yampara, 2008: 5) 
Yampara and other Aymara and Quechua intellectuals and leaders 
express concern over how the study of processes and 
interconnections between civilizations, that is the inter-learning and 
harmonization of energies, will be tackled. One of the reasons for 
this is that the Left over-simplified Suma Qamaña, to only mean 
"live well". Suma Qamaña should not be reinterpreted to mean “live 
better" instead of "living well", because living better implies 
comparison, suggesting some will live better than others. There is, 
however, optimism that the intercultural processes stimulated by 
successive political parties and governments over the last thirty 
years, and resultant rise of Indian self-esteem prompted the 
re-emergence of another system of values that needs to be 
seriously examined, as there is no historical understanding of this. 
These ethical values were until recently treated as heritage value 
from times immemorial, can now be drawn out through the Andean 
notion of Ayni, which involves both conviviality, as well as 
complementarity and reciprocity, stimulates mobilization for the 
dignification and decolonization of the Andean people and can be 
generated at will by society. More importantly these values can be 
augmented as and when the matrices are updated. 
The mission of Aymaran intellectuals, including Escobar and 
others, to recover ancestral practices will enable these rituals, over 
time, to augment by bringing them into the present, opening the 
spiritual and reterritorializing and decolonizing, in an imperative 
political project that Filemón Escóbar embraced by advocating the 
complementarity of opposites, reciprocity in a Pachacuti vision of 
transformation, rejecting confrontation and class struggle. 
Escobar’s vision received further political support, particularly from 
those critical of the MAS for abandoning its indigenous roots in 
favour of a modernisation project. According to Javier Medina, the 
MAS-IPSP government has been shamefully silent on this issue 
and was unable to implement a single project based on the Suma 
Qamaña principles. The agenda for national development also 
shifted to tension between the Pachamamist Indians in the foreign 
ministry (like foremer foreign ministers David Choquehuanca and 
Fernando Huanacuni) and extractivist left wingers in the Vice 
Presidency and their related networks of influence. A stalemate 
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that resulted in the ongoing application of the neo-liberal model. 
(Medina, p.2) 
The Qullana of the Andes, through their vision of Pachacuti want to 
live together or coexist (convivir) with diverse worlds "including the 
world of people who are different to us, including the system of 
capital". (Yampara, 2011: 16). But, the Qullana also seek mutual 
respect for their model of organization, economy and diversity. The 
question of how to make this possible politically however remains. 
Based on Escobar’s political experience, knowledge of Bolivian 
history and the failed realisations of Left and Right-wing political 
projects, he sees the need for a new imperative to bring closure to 
an enduring confrontational embrace by opening up to what the 
Aymara and Quechua vision of Pachacuti, reciprocity, UTA, ayni, 
and the complementarity of opposites can offer. 
In societies like Bolivia which are culturally and demographically 
indigenous, a unique opportunity is emerging to explore shaping a 
social, economic and political agenda where both the West and the 
Quechua and Aymara communities can, despite inherent 
differences, engage in harmonious tension to realise their 
complementarity. 
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Revolutions in Toracari: Memorable Stories of Duty and Attachment
Political analyses abound of the rise to power of the indigenous 
president Evo Morales and the political party he represents, the 
Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS). These have been written about 
extensively, both within Bolivia (e.g., Mayorga 2011) and outside 
(e.g., Pearce 2011): hopeful (e.g., Crabtree 2008), partisan (e.g., 
García Linera et al. 2010), inspired (e.g., Soruco Sologuren 2011) 
and highly critical (e.g., Lazarte R. 2010). All such scholars and 
commentators, though, appear to agree structural change is 
happening in contemporary Bolivia destabilising the entrenched 
interests of an accommodated elite.
The last time political events generated so much excitement 
among progressive activists and policy wonks, and so much 
despair among their conservative counterparts, was the Bolivian 
Revolution of 1952. The government that emerged after this 
revolution was led by the Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario 
(MNR) putting into practice its revolutionary promises, many of 
which were radical for the continent in its time: universal suffrage, 
nationalisation of the major mining companies, education for all 
including the indigenous population, and land reform. Accordingly, 
most scholars agree on the demise of the Bolivian landlord classes 
(e.g., Kohl 1978: 259; Albó 1979: 19, 79; Dunkerley 1984: 74; 
Malloy 1989: 421; Whitehead 2003: 49 n.13); although some 
small-scale ethnographic research by Healy (1982: 53-54, 
278-279, 355-356), Izko (n.d.), and Rivera Cusicanqui and her 
team (Rivera Cusicanqui et al. 1992: 69-70) shows how landlords, 
shop owners, truck drivers and other traditional powerbrokers in 
Bolivia consolidated their positions, taking advantage of the newly 
established power structures. These studies emphasize the 
expediency for local elites to join the MNR and to display 
allegiance to the sindicatos, the rural labour unions it created in the 
countryside.
But how are such ‘revolutions’ and ‘structural changes’ locally 
experienced? Here, I will give some tentative answers to this 
question focusing on the Andean valley of Toracari where I have 
carried out anthropological fieldwork, on and off, since 2002. 
Toracari forms the uppermost part of the large San Pedro valley 
lying in the chawpirana (or taypirana) of North Potosí, an 
intermediate ecological zone between the Andean highlands and 
the warmer valleys of Bolivia. This location is significant as it 
represents a wider region in the country where for centuries ayllus 
(corporate indigenous groups), haciendas and small-scale mestizo 
landlords have co-existed. At present, landlords continue to own 
land in 14 of the valley’s 21 communities; in Yaykunaqa, the 
community that hosts me during most of my research, three of 
every 10 indigenous households work on landlords’ lands, all 
sharecropping.1
At the centre of the valley lies the town of Toracari, a typical 
Andean pueblo with a Catholic church, a town square with a 
bandstand, a small hospital, a high school with boarding facilities, 
a few small shops, the public registrar, the recently constructed 
municipal district office, several chicherías (bars selling maize 
beer), and a couple of water mills where farmers from the valley 
come to grind their grain. The cobbled streets of the town are lined 
by one- and two-storey adobe houses including a few old 
crumbling buildings which, with fancy balconies and large wooden 
doors that open up to spacious courtyards, are reminders of more 
prosperous times. These are the vestiges of the turn of the 19th to 
the 20th centuries when Toracari experienced its last economic 
boom owing to the new tin mines around Llallagua. These boosted 
demand for local products such as wiñapu and muk’u (main 
ingredients for maize beer) and triggered a renaissance in the 
nearby town of San Pedro de Buena Vista increasing local 
commerce for all kinds of goods.
1	In line with my hosts’ suggestions, I decided not to name the specific community where I lived and carried out 
fieldwork for most of the time. I do not want this community to become emblematic in any kind of public debate. 
I have called it Yaykunaqa.
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Today commerce has dwindled. Approximately 40 families still live 
in town, almost all of them mestizo landlords, surrounded by a 
countryside of indigenous communities populated by subsistence 
farmers.
Both indigenous farmers and landlords in Toracari would tell me 
fascinating stories about the aftermath of the 1952 Revolution that 
are interesting to compare with their more recent experiences of 
Evo Morales and the MAS. Of course, the MNR, more than 60 
years ago, and currently the MAS changed the political playing 
field in places such as Toracari. However, if the local narratives of 
the 1952 Revolution and Evo Morales are anything to go by, they 
evoke more a sense of continuity than radical, let alone, structural 
change leading to the demise of the traditional elites; in particular, 
when listening to the stories of the local indigenous population. 
Landlords looking back at the 1952 Revolution2
Landlords in Toracari experienced the period of the 1952 
Revolution more intensely than the indigenous farmers, and talk 
about the resulting upheaval in more detail. Between the 
mid-1950s and mid-1960s they clearly felt the strain of forces that 
were partially out of their control. During the most conflictive 
period, the landlords would refer to a kind of siege, surrounded by 
a violent and hostile countryside. In general, they could still go to 
their fields but they never went out without a gun (cf. Carter 1971: 
236). In bad times, even this was felt to be too dangerous. The 
landlords with houses in the indigenous communities abandoned 
them, deciding to live in town more permanently or migrate to the 
cities (cf. Buechler 1969: 199). 
2 The sections on landlord and indigenous memories of the 1952 Revolution come from my book Deference 
Revisited: Andean Ritual in the Plurinational State (Goudsmit 2016: 202-210).
The family of landlord Uldarico Campoverde had ignored the 
advice to leave for town or city. They belonged to a group of small 
landlords who lived and owned lands in Yaykunaqa. At that time 
don Uldarico worked for the Servicio Nacional de Caminos 
(National Road Service) repairing and building roads in northern 
Potosí. He was a heavy machinery operator and had returned 
home after a few weeks of work on the nearby road to Sacaca. 
Arriving in Yaykunaqa, he was informed that his mother had been 
taken hostage by indigenous farmers. She was locked up in the 
house of the old community leader Tomás Chajmi, in the very 
same place where I had spent so many hours venerating the gods, 
drinking and laughing during the wakes for almas (souls) of the 
deceased. Don Tomás had brought Mrs. Campoverde to his house 
to force Uldarico, or one of his brothers, to give himself up. This 
duly happened, leading to the release of Uldarico’s mother. Don 
Uldarico thinks he eventually escaped his lethal fate due to internal 
strife and disagreements among the sindicato leadership in 
Toracari.
That is not to say that the small-scale mestizo landlords of Toracari 
experienced the 1952 Revolution as a historical watershed. 
Landlords would usually mention the successful defence of the 
nearby town – and municipal capital – of San Pedro de Buena 
Vista when asked about the Revolution. While most towns in the 
region – Acasio, Yambata, Torotoro, Carasi etc. – were overrun 
and sacked by indigenous troops, the landlords of San Pedro de 
Buena Vista bucked the trend. They successfully defended their 
houses, goods and families. Landlords in Toracari also 
remembered the revolutionary blockade at Churuma that cut San 
Pedro off from the train station at Higuerani, the main commercial 
route in and out of the province (leading through Toracari). 
Their favourite stories, though, were thoroughly local, focused on 
the valley. Somewhere between 1953 and the final attack on San 
Pedro de Buena Vista in 1958 – nobody was able to indicate the 
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exact year – Toracari got ‘visitors from Ucureña,’ well known for its 
early and successful struggle against the haciendas in the upper 
valley of the department of Cochabamba, just north of North Potosí 
(Dandler 1969; Langer 1989: 200). Two smaller trucks and a heavy 
Leyland truck arrived full of farmers from outside the region. The 
town of Toracari had been expecting them because the residents 
had found notes on their doorsteps announcing that their town was 
next on the list of ransack and plunder. Consequently, the female 
population had taken refuge in the church while the men had 
started collecting weapons and making grenades. The church bells 
were taken down and destroyed as scrap metal was needed to fill 
the shells. Frenetic cooking activities added a good meal to the 
maize beer that was already waiting for the Ucureños. The 
weapons would be used as last resort. San Pedro de Buena Vista 
seemed to have been the main target of the Ucureños, who found 
Toracari town on their way. It was described to me that at the first 
bend in the River San Pedro past Toracari, the peasant-soldiers 
were stopped by a ‘sound.’ An explosion? A crack of thunder? The 
sound had pushed the Leyland over on its side, severely 
hampering the Ucureña advance. Landlords assured me that it had 
been the Lord of Sak’ani, the patron saint of Toracari, who had 
protected his flock. On this occasion the troops led by Ucureña 
leaders did not make it to San Pedro de Buena Vista. That same 
night they were back in Toracari, without the ‘guts’ to pillage the 
town. Some people told me that the Ucureños slept in Toracari’s 
church, afraid of imminent attack; others assured me that they did 
not dare enter town, setting up camp in the riverbed below. All 
agreed the townspeople had been bolstered by the protection of 
the Lord of Sak’ani refusing the strangers dinner and maize beer. A 
couple of landlords finished their story indicating that by then the 
town’s authorities and the majority of its population had been dead 
drunk. Miraculously Toracari had escaped from imminent disaster.
Most importantly, most landlords stress the fact that the nearby 
indigenous communities never rebelled against them. They 
concede that the rural population participated in mobilisations to 
reclaim lands and that they were involved in acts of violence. 
However, the new sindicato leadership was to blame (cf. Qayum, 
Soux and Barragán 1997: 86-87), a leadership that included alien 
miners, peasant authorities from outside the region, the 
exceptional local farmer and, ironically, quite a few landlords from 
Toracari and San Pedro de Buena Vista. Local indigenous people 
did everything their leaders commanded, according to the 
landlords. In addition, the relationship between landlords and ‘their’ 
sharecroppers remained mostly intact. Indigenous farmers 
continued sharecropping on landlord lands and they did not fail to 
renew the bonds of godparenthood with landlords. The landlords 
highlighted stories of indigenous loyalty. With the self-assured 
gesture of his fist in the air, landlord don Pablo assured me that 
they had sent ‘their’ (indigenous) people to San Pedro de Buena 
Vista, smuggling weapons for the town’s defence.
Landlords agreed that as a group they had been able to preserve 
most of their landed properties. They reiterated that the Revolution 
had not fundamentally changed the Toracari valley. A few big 
landlords and their haciendas were affected but the large majority 
of small-scale landlords either came through unscathed or were 
able to buy new lands in the dismantled haciendas and from 
landlords leaving town. Accordingly, the blurred picture that 
emerges from the memories of the landlords indicates that the 
1952 Revolution was as much about individual landlords adjusting 
and taking advantage of the new forces and opportunities created 
by the revolutionary reforms, as about some indigenous farmers 
being able to acquire lands and rise through the ranks of the 
sindicatos. The landlords did not attribute any degree of agency to 
the local indigenous communities, representing them as a play ball 
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of external forces. Order was fully restored with the ascent to 
power of General Barrientos in 1964, according to landlord stories. 
Indigenous Experiences of the 1952 Revolution
When asked, older men in the communities of the Toracari valley 
were happy to tell detailed stories about the 1952 Revolution and 
the agrarian reform it ushered. In fact, prompted by a concomitant 
interest in landlords – patrones in their words – their stories would 
often start with Gualberto Villarroel, Bolivia’s president between 
1943 and 1946. Don Pedro reminisces:
Ñawpa karqa abusasqa karqanku. Lluqsimuq jistamanta 
jap’irqukuytawan apakapuq kanku uwijata, gallusta, wallpata, 
jap’irqukuytawan apakapuq kanku abusu karqa. Mana noqaykupaq 
ley karqachu kanpupaqqa. Entoncesqa laqha, laqhata uwijata 
ayqichina kaq, tutan ayqichina kaq. Mana usqay ayqichiqta 
jap’ichikuqtataq a punta maqay apakapuq kanku. Kunan 
chaymanta Gualberto Villarroelmanta chaymantaqri yasta 
libertasqa kayku, recien libertasqa kayku. Maypichá jap’iwaq 
kayku, puru garrote, mana sayarikunachu kaq burrutajina 
garrotewaq kayku… jina karqayku. Recien namanta Gualberto Villa-
rroel kasqanmantari… recien chay garroteqa manaña recibiyku-
chu.
In the past there used to be abuses. [Landlords] disappeared from 
a feast and took a sheep, some roosters, a chicken, after they had 
caught them; after they had caught them, they took them, it was an 
abuse. For us [small-scale indigenous farmers], for the 
countryside, there was no law. So, when it was still dark one had to 
free the sheep, in the early morning one had to make them 
escape. He who did not get away quickly and got caught, they 
carried him off at gunpoint to beat him up. Now, from Gualberto 
Villarroel onwards, from that moment, we are free, only then, we 
are free. Wherever [a landlord] caught us, only the whip, one 
should not stand up, like a donkey he lashed at us… like this we 
were. Only from Gualberto Villarroel’s time… only since then we do 
not receive that whip anymore (Toracari, 10 February 2003).
Events on the ground, a state sanctioned school curriculum and 
other developments conspired for don Pedro to remember 
president Gualberto Villarroel bringing ‘law’ to the countryside. Don 
Florencio pointed out that three apoderados from the region – 
representatives of indigenous communities – had visited the 
government in La Paz in the years leading up to the agrarian 
reform, denouncing landlord abuses. The most tangible impact of 
Villarroel’s presidency was the construction of the first school for 
children of indigenous descent in the Toracari valley. In Yaykunaqa, 
its adobe remains still stand, provoking don Julián to share his first 
memories of learning how to write his own name. The worst of 
landlord abuses abated, checked by imagining just government. 
Nevertheless, this government was known to be distant, its 
decrees and its aspiration to education hardly effective in 
challenging the landlords’ position of authority, both in practice and 
in the local farmers’ mind – despite president Villarroel’s 
progressive zeal (Heath 1969: 41; Dandler and Torrico A. 1987; 
Gotkowitz 2003: 166– 168).
If anything, the stories of the Revolution told by key indigenous 
informants in Toracari evoked stability. Probed by insinuating 
questions alluding to discontent and conflict, they definitely 
remembered violent clashes between landlords and indigenous 
communities (and within these groups as well) but they would 
emphasise that those were exceptional and temporary. Of course, 
the indigenous population noticed that the Toracari landlords were 
afraid and on guard. They had heard tales of landlords killing and 
being killed in areas outside the valley: for example, in Churuma, 
downstream the River San Pedro, where the emerging indigenous 
movement of northern Potosí had concentrated its first operations 
(Harris and Albó 1984: 75-76). As I previously mentioned, 
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Churuma is strategically located controlling the trade flows to and 
from the town of San Pedro de Buena Vista. With the dramatic 
gestures and polished sentences of a story often told, don Julián 
recounted the words of the wife of Churuma’s principal leader, 
ex-miner Narciso Torrico. She had reported to the sindicato 
‘general assembly’ how the landlords had forced her to carry her 
husband’s severed head into the town of San Pedro de Buena 
Vista after they had murdered him. In one of the communities I was 
told in gory detail how the landlords in San Pedro played football 
with Narciso Torrico’s head on the town’s main square. The failed 
attack on San Pedro de Buena Vista by hundreds of indigenous 
farmers in 1958 was mentioned as well (Harris and Albó 1984: 
80-81). However, for all but the communities that were nearest to 
Churuma, violent confrontations were downplayed. Few Toracari 
farmers participated in the early mobilisations of Churuma and the 
attack on San Pedro de Buena Vista. No stories were dished up 
involving the killing of Toracari landlords by the indigenous mob. 
Instead I was told the intriguing tale of a local indigenous family 
hiding a landlord from persecution (cf. Gareca Oporto 1989: 
169-170, 180).
The sense of relative calm in the countryside must have been 
furthered by a feeling of continuity, though of a rather abrasive sort. 
The newly created FETCNP (Federación Especial de Trabajadores 
Campesinos del Norte de Potosí, Special Federation of Rural 
Workers of North Potosí) to which the newly established local 
sindicatos belonged, was at the heart of such continuity; a 
continuousness of external assertiveness. In 1955 its leader 
Narciso Torrico appeared in the libro de actas (record book) of 
Yaykunaqa, signing the minutes of a communal meeting. 
Yaykunaqa’s record book also testifies the emergence of Pedro 
Carita Chamaco, showing his name and signature for the first time 
in 1961 (although he was illiterate). Once in charge of the Special 
Federation, Pedro Carita moved the Federation’s headquarters 
from Churuma to adjacent Quchu, the hacienda where he had 
worked as a colono for most of his life labouring the lands of his 
patrón. He is one of the main characters whom older people in the 
communities of Toracari talk about when asked about the 1952 
Revolution and its agrarian reform. They consider him extremely 
abusive, a person who uses his whip without remorse, killing 
people and ‘driving us like sheep without explanation.’ He was 
known to own substantial land holdings, and have many horses 
and livestock which he had expropriated from landlords in Quchu. 
In many ways he had become another patrón, landlord, people had 
to cope with, reinforcing their sensation of continuity after the 
agrarian reform.
Pedro Carita affected the lives in communities such as Yaykunaqa 
most directly through the regular visits of his comisiones 
demanding sheep, goats, potatoes and the like for his men in 
Quchu. Most commented upon was the forced sale of cattle by 
indigenous farmers to buy rifles for the cause of the rural 
sindicatos. A rifle cost a full-grown bull, a substantial capital for any 
subsistence farmer household. Communities would also take turns 
sending two of their members to Quchu to serve as Pedro Carita’s 
guards. There was no escaping from these kamachis, obligations. 
A regular of Carita’s commissions was Quli (Quechua, clotted 
hair).3 He was widely known in the region, as the most vicious of 
the lot. Don Julián’s memories of him may be atypical for the 
wealth of details but they graphically picture the general 
sentiments I encountered in the valley’s communities. He was most 
vividly remembered by the local population. Quli was of indigenous 
descent and donned an immense mop of hair, which gave him his 
nickname: hair ‘long like that of a woman’ and ‘flaky’ like the bark of 
the qiñwa tree according to don Julián. 
3 His real name was probably Máximo Choque.
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People attributed ritual powers to Quli as his hair allegedly 
contained human bones and jatun jampis (great medicines), teeth 
of Chullpas (anthropomorphic creatures which lived on earth 
before humankind). With a subtle sense of showmanship don 
Julián would continuously scratch his skull behind his ears as he 
told about Quli mimicking the sindicato leader. Lice and other bugs 
must have plagued his head. In the early 1960s, Quli and his band 
visited Yaykunaqa at the request of the aforementioned Tomás 
Chajmi, the first and long-serving post-Revolution leader of the 
community. Tomás Chajmi had had problems with don Julián, his 
brother in law. In front of the whole community Quli brought don 
Julián into line, whipping him and beating him with a wooden rod. 
Don Julián related how Quli banged his knees, and how he burst 
out in tears lying on the floor in the midst of the gathering. A few 
years later Quli got arrested in the town of Sacaca in the 
neighbouring province of Alonso de Ibañez. As soon as don Julián 
got wind of the message, he set off on the nine hours walk. Arriving 
in Sacaca, the main square was packed with people receiving the 
apprehended Quli with loud tumult. Don Julián tells me that he 
made his way to the front coming eye to eye with Quli. Requesting 
the whip from the carabinieri, soldiers, he lashed out at his former 
tormentor. Quli reacted nonchalantly, almost amused by the 
lashes, recognising don Julián. ‘Quli was a man after all,’ don 
Julián conceded. The province’s deputy prefect ordered his 
soldiers to cut Quli’s hair, and insisted for Quli to eat it. The latter 
indignantly refused, arguing that his hair was ‘full of animals.’ 
In different communities different and often contradictory tales of 
different leaders of the post-revolutionary period emerged. Heroes 
in one community could be villains in others. All the same they are 
remembered as acting like patrones, landlords, and they often 
were patrones. Don Emilio Ledezma was frequently mentioned: 
landlord, MNR party member and long serving leader of the 
Toracari branch of the Special Federation. Don Emilio remained 
leader of the Toracari sindicatos until the mid-1990s, grooming his 
son, Moisés, as a school teacher and eventually director of the 
Toracari school district. The person who don Julián most admired 
was newcomer Agapito Vallejos. He was a prominent rural leader 
and MNR militant from around Ucureña (Gordillo 2000: 68-71), 
where the first sindicato in Bolivia was created (in 1936). In 1953, 
Agapito Vallejos became deputy prefect of Charcas, the highest 
government authority in the province to which Toracari belongs. In 
this capacity he signed in the same year the first minutes of the 
Yaykunaqa record book by which the community turned from 
indigenous ayllu into rural sindicato. The community of Yaykunaqa 
visited him once in his office in the town of San Pedro de Buena 
Vista. On this occasion Agapito Vallejos scolded local landlord 
Evaristo Rendón, who by then had become the most important 
landowner in Yaykunaqa. The deputy prefect told him that he 
himself should labour his lands or lose these to his sharecroppers. 
These words, this posture must have impressed don Julián but 
remained without concrete consequences. Never again did his 
community return to Agapito Vallejos to claim the lands of the 
landlords. Some years later don Julián started sharecropping on 
Evaristo Rendón’s lands.
In 1953 indigenous authorities also received a typed message from 
Agapito Vallejos. Don Julián had carefully kept it. It stated that the 
‘compañeros campesinos’ (peasant comrades) should not carry 
out services anymore for the landlords. With big letters was added 
in handwriting: ‘No more kamachis.’ In this respect the memories of 
indigenous farmers and landlords may diverge. Where the latter 
stress the fact that the agrarian reform did not affect their hold on 
the lands, the former emphasise the diminishing grip of kamachis. 
No more need to work for days on end in the landlords’ houses and 
on their lands whenever requested; collecting their firewood and 
transporting their produce from the fields to the landlords’ houses 
in town or to the main road appeared to suffice (to be picked up by 
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a truck on its way to a Bolivian city). The landlords hardly talked 
about the kamachi obligations, my indigenous hosts only 
sporadically mentioned the lands. Paradoxically, the nationalisation 
of the mines in 1952 by the MNR may have primarily been 
responsible for the reduction of kamachis – though not their 
disappearance – as it caused the intensification of migration by the 
population of Toracari town. Landlords became ever more 
absentee.
Yet landlords and sharecropping are still very much part of today’s 
life in the rural communities of the Toracari valley. Comparing 
indigenous experiences and landlord reminiscences, then, a 
shared experience of continuity stands out. The 1952 Revolution 
may have generated memorable stories, both groups may have 
highlighted different tales, but none of them expresses a 
fundamental rupture with the past. The memories of both groups 
confirm the longstanding dominance of landlords. The narratives 
that allowed for alternatives to the existing power relations present 
new actors such as Pedro Carita and Quli acting just like landlords. 
If anything, it was Gualberto Villarroel as a precursor to the 
Revolution and the agrarian reform, who provided the local farmers 
with an imagery of a supportive government reigning in the most 
abusive aspects of their relationship with landlords.4 
4 Indigenous farmers in Toracari considered their elevation to the ranks of campesinos, the most radical change 
of the 1952 Revolution. The MNR government, for the first time in Bolivia, actively promoted the equal status of 
the despised indios, indians, of colonial times by officially turning them into campesinos, a class of smallholder 
individual farmers. They acquired the rights to vote and to go to school. All the same, these campesinos 
continued to experience the patrones, landlords, as critical actors safeguarding community and individual 
well-being (Goudsmit 2016: 119-143).
Evo’s Revolution?
Twelve years of MAS government and Evo Morales in the 
presidency may be too short a period to generate polished tales of 
memorable events and accomplishments. Nonetheless, it is not too 
difficult to find signs of friction and, most of all, continuity 
considering the local authority of the patrones as experienced in 
the indigenous communities. I will explore a few contemporary 
political and social practices to get a sense of these experiences.
The prospect that Evo Morales, an indigenous small-scale farmer 
like them, could have a chance of becoming government, was 
already causing excitement in the communities of Toracari when I 
first entered the Andean valley in the Bolivian winter of 2002. Since 
his electoral victory in 2005, president Evo has generated the 
increased sense of indigenous self-esteem that Bolivian intellectual 
Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui witnessed in other parts of the country (in 
Zegada et al. 2011: 259). Don Julián most lucidly expressed the 
mood of indigenous confidence when he pointed out that ‘one of 
us’ – the president – has the intelligence (Quechua, umayuq) to tell 
the doctores (lawyers, government officials) what it is they should 
be doing. As a consequence of this enhanced confidence local 
patrones in Toracari complained about the ‘rebellious’ farmers and 
their current lack of ‘humility’ – although the landlords did not 
experience the sense of siege they had endured after the 
Revolution of 1952. Accordingly, the (MAS) mayor of San Pedro de 
Buena Vista was prosecuted and removed from office in 2008 
reinforcing the justification of her dismissal by stressing the fact 
that she was a patrón. In fact, she was a landlord from the Toracari 
valley.
Municipal politics may be an obvious context to look for change. 
Indeed, considering the local political arena, it becomes clear that 
since 1999 the majority of municipal councillors in San Pedro de 
Buena Vista – the municipality to which Toracari belongs – has 
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been identifying as indigenous or rural. In 2003, the MAS hailed its 
first electoral win in the municipality ruling it ever since. However, 
indigenous and MAS political primacy does not reveal the extent of 
landlords’ ability to remain in control. Similar to what happened to 
the MNR after the 1952 Revolution, local landlords managed to 
become party members of the MAS. Accordingly, two recent 
mayors were landlords, one of them starting his career as a 
regional coordinator of a Spanish NGO operating in the area. 
Other landlords would hold the decisive vote in an evenly balanced 
council or be elected president of the municipal council.
More markedly, landlords dominate and form the majority of the 
local teacher corps, as is not uncommon in the Andes (Gose 2001: 
70). In 2012, the school director – Emilio Ledezma’s son, Moisés – 
and 16 of the 26 teachers working in the nine schools that make up 
the Toracari school sub-district were related to landlord families 
(from Toracari and San Pedro de Buena Vista). These numbers 
had not changed much since 2003 when the school director and 
19 of 25 teachers had landlord roots. This is important, because 
indigenous farmers experience the teachers as gatekeepers of a 
better (urban) future based on educación, education. This concept 
includes a certain refinement in knowledge, robustness in 
behaviour, and capacities such as being able to read Spanish and 
speak well in public (Howard, Barbira-Freedman and Stobart 2002: 
2; Yapu and Torrico 2003: 309, 341). The indigenous population of 
Toracari feels they need educación in order to progress, while 
many teachers reinforce a condescending attitude towards the 
students’ indigenous way of life (Canessa 2012b: 184-215).
And let us not forget that the relations between landlords and 
indigenous farmers in Toracari may be exploitative but they are 
also steeped in indigenous respect and affection. This is most 
prominently expressed by fictive kinship: relations between 
godparents (padrinos) and their godchildren (ahijados) and, 
importantly, between godparents and the parents of their 
godchildren (compadres). Godparenthood and co-parenthood were 
introduced to the Andes during the colonial period but it is highly 
likely that the latter, compadrazgo, has Andean roots as well 
establishing key inter-household relations (Isbell 1977: 102; 
Spedding 1998: 116). In the present-day valley of Toracari 
indigenous families continue to establish bonds of godparenthood 
and compadrazgo resulting in critical social and economic 
relationships; more important than blood relatives (Harris 2008). 
They craft relations of fictive kinship at baptism and marriage, in 
misa de salud (Mass ‘for health,’ consecrated by the priest) and by 
the ceremony of the child’s first haircut (at the age of two to three 
years), the uma ruthuku or rutucha (Mayer 1977: 66). 
Co-parenthood in the Andes creates bonds between godparents 
and a wide variety of groups such as close relatives, neighbours, 
landlords and strangers, including the anthropologist. In 2013, 
about 90 percent of Yaykunaqa households had established 
relations of co-parenthood by marriage or baptism with the 
patrones. Alternatively, twenty percent of Yaykunaqa relations of 
co-parenthood sanctioned by marriage and about 35 percent 
endorsed by baptism, involved landlords assuming the roles and 
responsibilities, and the feelings of affection, associated with 
padrinos and compadres. Hence, an average middle-aged couple 
of Toracari landlords has at least forty and often many more 
godchildren, the huge majority of whom are rural and indigenous. 
The profusion of these relationships of fictive kin between 
landlords and local farmers reinforces the reciprocal and affective 
features of social relations that bridge social and cultural 
distinctions in the valley. 
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Conclusion
Listening to the intriguing and revealing stories told by the 
indigenous subsistence farmers and landlords of Toracari, neither 
the 1952 Revolution nor the revolutionary intentions of the Morales 
government seem to have caused the structural changes that 
many political analysts identified. Local elites in places such as 
Toracari have often been more successful than the indigenous 
population in exploiting the changing political and economic 
environment. Of course, such changes are happening and political 
pressures on the landlords have waned and waxed, but 
landownership, the memories of the Revolution, present-day 
municipal politics, the teacher corps and compadrazgo show the 
resilience of landlord authority as lived by the local farmers. 
The social obligations of indigenous farmers – kamachis – have 
gradually declined, though they are by no means defunct. 
However, the huge number of indigenous ahijados and compadres 
maintained by Toracari landlords, shows that this decline has not 
been accompanied by an equal drop in kariñu, affection. Kamachis 
and kariñu – duties and affection – are two sides of the same coin 
defining the asymmetrical but reciprocal relationship between 
landlords and indigenous farmers. No wonder I would overhear 
conversations of my indigenous hosts in the cantinas of Toracari 
town commenting on their day’s labour on the lands of god- and 
co-parents: landlords. They would have been working these either 
for free or for compensation well under the market value. No 
wonder, landlords put their houses in town at the disposal of their 
indigenous compadres in times of want and ritual celebrations, 
reproducing a relationship that in the end both groups consider to 
be mutually beneficial.
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New Bolivia: state of many nations or indianised nation-state?
Since the promulgation of the new constitution in 2009 the new 
Bolivian state project has been based on the concept of the 
Plurinational State, fully recognising the ethnic diversity of society 
and incorporating thirty-six indigenous nationalities on equal terms, 
apparently without subjugating them to a dominating ethnicity nor 
its cultural/organisational patterns. This has been reflected in a 
new legal-administrative architecture of state.
The new state project is strongly promoting indigenous identities 
as a response to the historical exclusion of native cultures in 
Bolivia - through promoting indigenous cultural events, 
popularising native cultures in national TV broadcasts and 
incorporating indigenous symbology and beliefs into official state 
ornamentation. The incorporation of indigenous identities into the 
new concept of society and state is leading to the construction of a 
new nation based upon plural ethnic identities, but merged into a 
broad political nation, ‘indianised’ by traditions, values and 
practices of newly incorporated citizens. This new indianised 
Bolivian nation is intended to be inclusive and universal, and 
generalised indigenous culture is promoted as national culture.
The Plurinational State is discursively and symbolically 
pro-indigenous, but the implementation of indigenous rights 
fundamental to the plurinationality has been limited.  These include 
rights to self-determination, self-government, parallel judiciary 
systems, and indigenous models of development (following the 
perspective of various indigenous peoples’ organisations and 
scholars, I understand the plurinational state as a project based on 
the equal relations between all the indigenous peoples and 
non-indigenous sectors within common state, and with indigenous 
peoples’ self-determination rights set as its fundamental organising 
basis and principle [Rojas 2018; Cordero 2018). The existing 
tensions, conflicts and contradictions of the plurinational state 
project prompt the question of whether the new state and society, 
prominent in the rhetoric of the MAS government, represent a 
genuine shift towards plurinationalism, or do they reinforce the 
practices of the old nation-state project of the 1952 National 
Revolution, decorated with indigenous imageries?
Nation-state building and the ideologies of the political nation
In Bolivian history we can distinguish three great revolutions: the 
anticolonial insurgency resulting in the foundation of sovereign 
republic in 1825, the 1952 National Revolution and, recently, the 
Democratic and Cultural Revolution of the Plurinational State1. 
Each of these profound historical transformations dealt not only 
with the question of a political project, but also envisioned a new 
version of political-cultural community: a nation.
The creole elites forging their republic in the 19th century excluded 
indigenous majorities and even worsened their situation in 
comparison to the late colonial period. The landlords, together with 
the large mine owners, formed the cornerstone of the oligarchic 
regime, increasingly encroaching on indigenous communal lands, 
justifying such practice with the arguments of ayllus’ (local 
communitarian political, administrative, economic and social 
systems with a territorial base) backwardness and their alleged 
archaic structures contradicting the fundamental tenets of liberal 
thought and obstructing the progress of the country (Platt 1984; 
Irurozqui 1993, 2000). Through the drastic restrictions on 
citizenship rights (literacy and income requirements) the oligarchy 
created an exclusive political model reserved for a small group of 
accommodated creole elites (Barragán 2006). They developed a 
vision of the indigenous as naturally unable to assimilate the 
virtues of liberal citizenship rejecting them from the country’s 
project, building a national community. 
1 This is official name of the current political project, used by state authorities together with the denomination 
“process of change” (Schavelzon 2012). The Day of the Democratic and Cultural Revolution is celebrated every 
18th December (that day in 2005 Evo Morales won presidential elections for the first time, 
http://www.diputados.bo/prensa/noticias/la-revoluci%C3%B3n-democr%C3%A1tica-y-cultural-permiti%C3%B3-i
ncluir-sectores-eternamente). To commemorate the historical process the Museum of the Democratic and 
Cultural Revolution was built in 2017 in Orinoca, a place of Morales’ birth.
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The dominating ideology until the 1952 National Revolution drew 
on the “scientific” racism imported from Europe, including the 
measuring of skulls to prove the biological degeneration of natives. 
The intellectuals and politicians claimed not only the inferiority of 
“indigenous race”, but even the necessity of its physical elimination 
as the ultimate solution of the so called “Indian problem.” José 
Manuel Pando, the president of Bolivia from 1899 to 1904, argued:
a meagre brain of an Indian cannot develop as a muscle even 
through an intellectual training (...) How much money would we 
need to educate them? How much time would be enough? This 
would be an infeasible task. It would be much more pragmatic to 
eliminate them (...) the Indians are inferior beings and their 
elimination is not a crime but a “natural selection” (in Zavaleta 
2008, 140; my translation).
Alcides Arguedas, one of the most prominent Bolivian intellectuals 
in the first half of the 20th century and active politician in the 
oligarchic era (he was national deputy, senator, leader of the 
Liberal Party and the minister of agriculture) wrote in 1905:
The animals and the Indians (be certain that I do not establish any 
difference between them) do not ask for anything else but to satisfy 
their organic necessities... it is also just to not to establish any 
gradation between them (…) an Indian is equally brute as 
whatever beast that grazes in a meadow (...) in certain period of 
the year when the current of the river grows, it is a custom in the 
municipality to give the dogs bread snacks filled with strychnine, in 
order to liberate us from this harmful and useless plague in an 
easy, comfortable, cheap, hygienic and edifying way. I propose that 
with the Indians we use the same method (in Piñeiro Iñíguez 2004, 
121; my translation).
The physical elimination of indigenous majorities was not possible, 
even if it was desired by some, due to their crucial role in the 
economic, and thus political maintenance of the oligarchy, living 
from cheap indigenous labour in the haciendas and mines. 
Moreover, till the late 19th century the Bolivian government was 
extremely dependent on indigenous taxes (tributo indígena) paid 
by communities (Klein 1993, 113-5). The project of the oligarchic 
republic could not achieve the ideal of a nation-state, because it 
was based upon the economic exploitation and political 
subjugation of vast indigenous majorities deprived of any rights 
and excluded from the national community. 
By contrast, in the era of the 1952 National Revolution, the Bolivian 
nation, as envisioned and promoted by the state, was based upon 
the narrative of cultural homogenisation of diverse ethnicities. The 
“Indian problem” was going to be resolved through a complete 
synthesis of Spanish and native elements, which in practice meant 
the assimilation of indigenous peoples and their cultural 
subjugation to the absolute dominance of the creole culture. 
Notwithstanding, and in contrast to the oligarchic period, this 
problematic and imposed incorporation permitted for the very first 
time the foundation of the Bolivian nation-state (Tapia 2009, 38). 
The process was never completed and the inner contradictions of 
the revolutionary project caused an indigenous ethnic revival of 
which the Plurinational State is one of the most contemporary 
expressions. This ethnic revival was partially and indirectly fostered 
(or rather provoked) by selective ideological and mainly symbolic 
use of some elements of indigenous culture and heritage by the 
National Revolution that sought this way to legitimate Bolivian 
mestizo nationalism, which has been contested by the indigenous 
Katarista/Indianista movement´s counter-narrative since the 1970s 
(Nicolas and Quisbert 2014). But above all, the emergence of an 
indigenous movement and the general empowerment of the 
indigenous peasant majority in the long run, were the fruits of the 
ambiguity and contradictory effects of social and political reforms of 
the national revolutionary era (agrarian reform, enfranchisement 
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and universal education) and the disillusionment of Aymara 
activists with the false narrative of national integration and equality 
and with the whole revolutionary project (Powęska 2013).
However, in fact the integrationist rhetoric of mestizo nation did not 
end until the rise to power of Evo Morales in 2006 and it was 
continued only slightly altered in the era of multicultural 
neoliberalism of the 1990s. The partial reforms recognized Bolivia 
as multiethnic and pluricultural and in a very limited and superficial 
manner recognized some indigenous social and cultural rights. At 
the same time, decentralisation reforms were introduced, that 
together with the neoliberal economic model assimilated 
indigenous peoples into state structures and neoliberal machinery. 
These measures in no way changed the power relations between 
the state and indigenous peoples nor undermined the state’s 
colonialist character. (Powęska 2013).
The Plurinational State and the promotion of indigeneity
If the revolutionary nationalism of the post-1952 state sought the 
wide incorporation of the indigenous majority through their 
assimilation and the process of building an inclusive mestizo 
nation, since Evo Morales´ coming to power the indigenous 
peoples were central to the nation-building process. The 
Plurinational State postulates the equal recognition of all 
indigenous nationalities without subjugation to a dominating culture 
via the state. This was to be complemented by a new 
legal-administrative architecture of state pursuing inner 
decolonisation, with territorial indigenous autonomies, indigenous 
justice, and direct political representation of indigenous 
nationalities in national parliament (special indigenous 
constituencies).
The new state project strongly promotes indigenous identities as a 
response to the historical exclusion of native cultures. It is normal 
now to watch Aymara speaking broadcast presenters on tv. 
Traditional Andean rituals, for example ch'alla (offering) for 
Pachamama, were incorporated into official state events, 
accompanied by yatiris or jampiris (Aymara and Quechua 
wisemen, respectively). The ch’alla was performed, for example, at 
the teleférico (cable railway) construction site in La Paz, when 
building was about to start.  The ch’alla has also taken place 
numerous times in the presidential palace. The inauguration 
ceremonies of Bolivia’s new president Evo Morales had many 
Andean elements and it was organised in the pre-Columbian ruins 
of Tiwanaku. But not only elements of Andean tradition were 
incorporated into state ceremonies. Some typical indigenous social 
events also now receive state patronage. For example, in 2011 the 
Viceministry of Decolonisation organised a mass traditional 
Andean wedding ceremony for 350 couples, led by amautas 
(Andean philosophers, thinkers and wisemen) and with president 
Morales as padrino (godfather) for all the matrimonies. The 
willkakuti or machaq mara celebrations, the Andean New Year on 
21st June, became an official national holiday. All the 
administrative buildings are decorated not only with la tricolor, the 
official Bolivian flag, but also with the wiphala, an Andean flag that 
has become an official state symbol as well. Indigenous languages 
have got official status in the areas where they predominate. All 
public facilities have names and signs not only in Spanish, but also 
in local indigenous languages. For example, the regional airport in 
Trinidad has bilingual denominations in Mojeño Trinitario and 
Spanish, and La Paz public places like hospitals or cable railway 
stations have denominations in both Spanish and Aymara. Finally, 
the employment of anticolonial heroes Tupac Katari and Bartolina 
Sisa in state ideology, symbolism and narratives is prominent. It is 
interesting to see how Evo Morales is discursively presented as an 
incarnation of Katari, and the Morales' government entire 
antiimperialist and decolonizing policy is presented as a 
continuation and fulfilment of Katari's political legacy. This is 
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expressed, for example, in the posters presenting Tupac Katari 
together with Evo Morales, both watching in the same direction as 
two incarnations of the same person or the same political project, 
coming to fruition more than two centuries after its inception. Such 
an idea is being explicitly expressed in the annual celebrations of 
Tupac Katari’s death in Peñas, Department of La Paz, on 14th 
November, where a theatrical drama narrates the joint story of both 
leaders. 
Notwithstanding the general recognition and incorporation of all 
Bolivian indigenous cultures, the dominance of Andean, mainly 
Aymara, cultural references is striking. It reflects the actual 
prevalence of Andean peasant sectors' influence in the 
government structures, together with the huge ideological influence 
of the urban Aymara intellectuals on the indigenous movements in 
Bolivia. This can be understood if we consider the state as a site 
for the interplay of economic and political influences of key groups 
that are differently situated in the system of power and thus have 
more or less influence on the state. The more powerful indigenous 
nations have a more prominent position within the common 
Plurinational State than others (Powęska 2017a).
Turning our attention to the implementation of structural and 
administrative reforms, the analysis becomes even more 
complicated. The Plurinational State is pro-indigenous, at least 
discursively, but in terms of the implementation of crucial 
indigenous rights, the results are limited. The recognition of 
indigenous justice is partial, and the Ley de Deslinde Jurisdiccional 
permits indigenous authorities to deal with only selected kinds of 
cases or affairs. Moreover, indigenous justice institutions cannot be 
applied to judge suspects that do not belong to the indigenous 
territorial jurisdiction, including persons from outside the 
community that break local indigenous law. In this way the act 
subjugates the communitarian justice to the ordinary judiciary, 
although the constitution stipulates their equal status, dismantling 
the notion of judiciary pluralism; it goes against the original 
proposals of indigenous peoples´organisations and contradicts the 
will of the constituent (Guery and Escobar 2012; Albó 2012). The 
limits put by this act are even considered to be more restrictive to 
indigenous justice than the previous neoliberal regulations 
(Tamburini 2012). 
The indigenous autonomous institutions are officially known as 
autonomias indígena originario campesinas, indigenous originary 
peasant autonomies. This is an aggregate term invented in order to 
grant the same set of rights to collectivities that for historical 
reasons use different identity denominations.  Up to date there are 
only three such autonomies in Bolivia (Uru Chipaya in Oruro 
department, Raqaypampa in Cochabamba and Charagua in Santa 
Cruz; in May 2019 Salinas de Garci Mendoza in Oruro approved in 
referendum its autonomy statute and awaits the inauguration of the 
fourth indigenous originary peasant government in the country), 
and generally the process of acquiring official recognition is highly 
complex and difficult. And as many activists and researchers say, 
"there is no Plurinational State without indigenous autonomies" 
(Exeni Rodríguez 2015; Vargas Rivas 2016), as they are crucial for 
the true change of power relations between the central state and 
indigenous territories, being the basis for indigenous 
self-determination.
The reasons for this failure of autonomies are manifold, related in 
part to the internal conflicts within indigenous communities, but the 
government’s failure to adequately promote and support 
indigenous autonomies has complicated the problem. The primary 
reason of this failure can be found in the legal-administrative 
design of autonomies which put huge limits to indigenous 
self-determination. The competences of indigenous autonomies 
are mostly similar to those of municipal autonomy and the 
difference lies essentially in the design of the autonomous 
governmental structures and their nomenclature. For example, 
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indigenous autonomies cannot decide what to do with the subsoil 
resources in their territories, thus they cannot genuinely decide 
their own models of development (Powęska 2017a, 2017b). In 
addition, the free prior and informed consultation, a fundamental 
aspect and one of the key indigenous rights related to the 
self-determination (it gives the indigenous peoples right to be 
consulted about any legal, administrative decision that relates to 
them or any kind of project, e.g., infrastructural, planned to be 
undertaken in their territories, before any measure is taken), is yet 
another unachieved objective (Powęska 2017a, 2017b). The result 
is that the change of power relations between the state and 
indigenous nations and of their legal hierarchies has been 
obstructed with very little to show for. So, we have the Plurinational 
State limited to rhetoric and symbolism, while its 
structural-administrative aspects related to territorial power and 
politics, the main site for indigenous self-determination, is in its 
minimal expression. 
Indianised Bolivia, a renewed nation-state?
There is a common element linking this weak governmental 
performance regarding the plurinational structural reforms and the 
question of a new national identity, or nation project. For María 
Teresa Zegada and George Komadina (2017), it is a strategy of the 
current government of the MAS-IPSP of building political 
hegemony. According to these authors, in structural-administrative 
terms, this strategy relates to clientelist relations seeking to secure 
political loyalty of local territories. There is also a question of 
clashing models or visions of development and manipulation of 
free prior and informed consultations, given that the revenues from 
hydrocarbons are crucial for the whole apparatus of power 
(Powęska 2017b). The Bolivian state holds absolute control over 
the subsoil and indigenous peoples have very limited power to 
decide about the development of non-renewable resources in their 
territories. Not even officially recognised indigenous autonomies 
have the authority to deal with this matter.  All these aspects can 
be seen as facets of state centralism, despite the pro-autonomy 
rhetoric (Powęska 2017b). The need to control the system of 
power and the model of national development based on 
extractivism involve the construction of a coherent nation, or better 
said, a hegemonic nation/political community project that deters 
potential political counter-powers or political pluri-communities 
residing in indigenous nations. In other words, political domination 
is being achieved not only through winning elections, but at the 
same time through the construction of unifying identity.
And indeed, there is a top-down narrative of the new nation. Since 
the indigenous discourse became an inherent part of the state 
narratives and their symbolic machinery, the state tries to secure 
monopoly on indigeneity and its meanings that would not leave 
much room for bottom-up built plurinationality. 
First of all, as Komadina and Zegada point out, if revolutionary 
nationalism was rhetorically based on the contradiction between 
nation and anti-nation, the MAS-IPSP tends to underline the 
antagonism between the colonialist, racist republic and the 
indigenous peasants as a revolutionary subject and a true basis for 
a new nation project, a new national identity (Zegada and 
Komadina 2017).  But given the strategy of hegemony, that is, a 
broadening of incorporated groups of voters, the narrative had to 
be amended in order to put in the same category indigenous and 
peasant peoples, workers, miners’ cooperatives, entrepreneurs, 
intellectuals, and urban sectors as a whole (Zegada and Komadina 
2017). This wide political platform corresponds to the rhetoric of 
anti-neoliberalism, and sovereign control of natural resources, as 
well as other prominent features of the MAS campaign.  Another 
example of patriotic, unifying reference is Bolivia’s campaign to 
reclaim access to the sea, although it was always a useful unifying 
political topic, irrespective of the political force in power. Thus, in 
the newer narrative the indigenous peasants are not 
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antagonistically juxtaposed to other sectors anymore. The 
antagonism has yielded to the rhetoric of common cultural roots 
and characteristics shared by the whole society. This is possible 
because of the indigenous roots of the vast urban sectors and the 
state promotion of indigeneity furthering ethnic revaluation and 
permitting the recuperation of ethnic self-esteem. If the indigenous 
peasants remain as a core and foundation of a nation, this became 
a basis for a building of a hegemonic, that is, inclusive and 
universal concept of nation, constructed around indigeneity.
This is reflected in the words of Vice-President Álvaro García 
Linera, the most prominent intellectual of the current state project:
In parallel to the recognition of indigenous national identities, the 
indianisation not only of the State but the indianisation of Bolivia. It 
is a double game (…)The right to indigenous national identity is 
recognised, but whosoever assumes this recognition right 
becomes internally indianised.    (…) This is called strong or 
hegemonic plurinationality (…) the recognition of national identities 
and the indianisation of Bolivian identity (…) The nation has 
strength, the identity has very powerful cultural-historic strength 
that crosses classist identities, but which at heart is a form of 
long-term hegemony. Are they asking us what is nation? The 
nation is a form of durable hegemony. The language, culture, 
identity, traditions, all that makes us participate in a community of 
destiny, is a form of durable, centenary hegemony (…) Ultimately, 
the Indianists were right. The Indians are not the problem, the 
Indians are the solution. Only that the way proposed by the 
Indianists was powerless. They did not understand the social 
differences inside the Bolivian community, already consolidated 
with the workers’ movement, urbanization, with the accumulation of 
traditions, symbols, educational system, that was impossible to 
erase. The Indianism did not understand this (García Linera 2017, 
keynote speech at the Vicepresidency of State, 21st November; 
author’s translation).
So, for García Linera, borrowing from Gramsci, nation is a form of 
durable, long-lasting hegemony, a clear political project that 
(re)organises power relations in a society, drawing on cultural 
patterns of one ethnic/cultural/class sector adopted and 
popularised as “national culture” as the tool of this sector’s political 
domination. The originality of the new nation project is a "dialectic 
game", a "double game" of "recognition of the indigenous nations 
on the one hand, and the simultaneous indianisation of Bolivia, of 
the Bolivian identity" on the other. For him, it is a "hegemonic 
plurinationality" with the fundamental role of indigenous peasant 
originario nations and peoples as a true and constitutive essence 
of the unified Bolivian nation (keynote speech at the 
Vicepresidency of State, 21st November 2017).
This discourse is also seen in García Linera’s ealier thought:
In didactic terms, we can say that the 1952 Revolution awakens 
the beginning of a citizenry, but it tries to dilute it in a mestizaje 
marked with the hegemony of the whiteness of the oligarch elites, 
and it does not give the citizenry more possibilities of political 
development. In this new stage, fifty years later, the Indian is 
already an autonomous political subject that proposes a new 
model of expansive nationalism, a multicultural nation that 
underlines the “unity in diversity”, as Evo Morales has repeated it 
so many times in his electoral campaigns (Garcia Linera 2006, 28; 
author’s translation and emphasis).
This discourse has hence been developed and repeated for more 
than a decade. To describe the idea of new national identity that 
comes from the Plurinational State as envisioned in the new 
Constitution, the Vice-president uses words like amalgama 
(amalgam, cultural fusion, melting-pot), ensamble (assemblage): 
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We have not only a new sum or assemblage of social classes, but 
we have also a new assemblage of political, technological, 
cognitive practices, as much in health, education, technology, 
festivity, as in democracy, elections, study, teaching. So, we have 
an assemblage of different social classes and different collective 
interests, but also an assemblage of distinct civilisations. Every 
civilisation is an institution, this is the second component of the 
Plurinational State, the amalgam, the articulation, the assemblage 
of a diversity of organisational logics of the society, the new 
Constitution says it in many places (García Linera 2009, 13; 
author’s translation).
In both fragments cited above the use of some particular words is 
striking – amalgam, assemblage, multicultural nation – and it is 
disputable to what extent it befits a vision of plurinational state as a 
project of radical change (alignment) of power relations between 
the central state and indigenous nations within the framework of 
inner decolonization and the right to indigenous self-determination.
The multiculturalist stance (granting cultural rights without real 
changes of power relations) of the new state project seems to be 
obvious if we look at the perspective of García Linera:
The Plurinational State materialises in the equality of rights, in the 
equality of cultures and peoples, in the suppression of colonialism 
and discrimination. (…) the Plurinational State is translated into the 
practical, institutional recognition of the equality of opportunities of 
peoples, of official languages, recognition of all the identities, 
possibility of being educated in one’s own language if someone 
desires it and if not, only in Spanish, the recognition of indigenous 
languages in the equality of conditions in school, high school, 
university and public institutions of the State. The incorporation and 
articulation of heroes, proposals and symbologies of the peoples 
around the national statal symbology that unites us. This is the 
idea of the Plurinational State: equality of cultures, suppression of 
colonialism, of discrimination for language, skin colour or surname, 
equality of opportunities between an indigenous and mestizo and 
between a mestizo and indigenous, absolutely for all positions, 
appreciation of who we are, if someone is mestizo, OK; if someone 
is aymara, quechua, mojeño, trinitario: OK; we all are in the 
equality of conditions before the State, before public servant, 
before the law, before justice, but first of all, the recognition of the 
equality of the peoples. This is the idea of Plurinational State 
(García Linera 2009, 17; author’s translation and emphasis). 
The Vice-president claims it even more explicitly elsewhere: “What 
is plurinationality? It is the equality of rights of the peoples, of 
cultures in our country. It is nothing more than this. All in the 
framework of the sole Bolivian national identity. We are a nation of 
nations” (García Linera 2010; author’s translation). So, what we 
deal with is a concept of the Plurinational State with the unique 
“state nation” embracing various cultural nations and peoples: 
“There is no alternative proposal to that of the decolonising 
plurinationality that consolidates a unique statal nation in which 
numerous cultural nations and peoples coexist” (García Linera 
2011, 12; author’s translation and emphasis).
In summary, thanks to the incorporation of indigenous identities 
into the new concept of society and state, a new nation is being 
constructed in Bolivia - based upon plural ethnic identities that are 
being merged into a broader cultural-political community, and a 
political nation, indianised by traditions, values and practices of 
newly incorporated citizens. This new indianised Bolivian nation is 
inclusive, all-embracing, integrating and universal, and its 
indigenous character is expected to be shared by the whole 
society; a generalised indigenous culture is to be established as 
the national culture (García Linera 2015). Alluding to René 
Zavaleta´s concept of lo nacional-popular (the national-popular), a 
term for the articulation between the process of democratisation by 
popular/subaltern classes of the Bolivian society and its statal 
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formation (Zavaleta 2008, 9), in the Plurinational State its updated 
version would be lo nacional-indígena (the national-indigenous). As 
we see, this vision of a new nation is greatly based upon the 
concept of “unity in diversity”, a 1990s multiculturalist fashion of a 
liberal nation-state, in which the political dimension of state 
(unifying model of political nation) is separated from its cultural 
dimension (cultural nations of indigenous peoples within the unitary 
and highly centralist state), and the political relations within the 
power structures are maintained. 
Nevertheless, this project of inclusive, indianised “state nation” will 
still have certain characteristics of what Zavaleta coined as 
sociedad abigarrada (motley, clashing, variegated society), or if we 
prefer a more Andean conceptualisation, we can use the word 
ch'enko (from quechua), meaning "a mess or disorganised 
intersection, intertwining of objects and processes" (Laserna 
2004). As the state is a site for the interplay of economic and 
political influences of different groups, more or less favourably 
oriented towards central power and thus more or less influential on 
the state, the presence and position of different indigenous nations 
would differ within the common Plurinational State (Powęska 
2017a). The new Bolivian nation would be disorganised, irregular, 
chaotic and incomplete, but still a fusion.
Two interesting examples of building national hegemony around an 
inclusive and integrating indigeneity – with mostly Andean cultural 
references – relate to symbolic elements of Tupac Katari. The 
launching of the first Bolivian communication satellite in 2013, 
named after this anti-colonial hero, is presented as the great 
national achievement that unites all the society in its march to 
modernity and sovereign development. “Now the Bolivians we 
have a star in the sky” – said the official tv spot. “We are millions!” 
– hailed another official press release, alluding to Katari’s famous 
phrase he said before he was killed - “I will return and I will be 
millions”. Another intriguing reference is a poster presenting Evo 
Morales together with Tupac Katari and the slogan: “We have got 
back the resources. Now we have homeland. It is going well for 
us!” (my translation), referring to the nationalisation of 
hydrocarbons in 2006 and that the country for the very first time in 
modern history belongs to the Bolivian people (the period before 
the Plurinational State is described commonly as the time of state 
without nation and nations without state). The suggested 
connection between the state control of natural resources, national 
sovereignty and the sense of belonging to the homeland is striking 
here. This, with strong emphasis on economic and development 
sovereignty, together with redistribution, social programmes and 
presidential construction works programme “Evo cumple”, and the 
campaign to reclaim access to the sea, stresses the unity and 
national pride within the Plurinational State, provoking to coin it 
“plurinational nationalism”. 
Another interesting example of adaption of various indigenous 
symbolic or identity elements to build a unified nation is the official 
use of Aymara New Year celebration. Although it is quite recent 
tradition re-invented in 1981 by a group of young Aymara activists 
as a symbolic tool for decolonialisation of Aymara people 
(Gutierrez Rojas 2019), with Evo Morales and the Plurinational 
State project it became official part of state cultural activities. 
Curiously, this celebration was recognised as “Intangible, Historic 
and Cultural Patrimony of the Nation” yet by Carlos Mesa in 2005 
under the name “Aymara New Year” (Derechoteca), but in 2009 it 
was declared national holiday with suspension of public and 
private activities on every 21st June (Gaceta Oficial del Estado 
Plurinacional de Bolivia 2009). Moreover, last year the Senate 
changed its denomination and from now on the celebration is 
called officially “Andean Amazonian Chaco New Year”, underlining 
the unifying character of the event for all the indigenous sectors of 
society (Cámara de Senadores 2008).
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An additional though no less crucial outcome of this project of 
“state nation” is that if the new nation is an indigenous nation and 
the plurinational state is an incarnation of such a new nation, the 
state has the power to define not only national interests and 
priorities, but also the meaning of indigeneity and scope of 
indigenous rights. The interest of the majority can be presented as 
the interest of all the indigenous peoples. We return here to the 
question of power, already mentioned before, embedded in 
top-down visions of society and national community. This way the 
rhetoric of indianised Bolivia and universalising national identity 
tends to hide the ongoing conflicts between various indigenous 
and peasant sectors, especially those that claim specific territories. 
One example of this can be the case of Isiboro Sécure Indigenous 
Territory and National Park (Territorio Indígena Parque Nacional 
Isiboro Sécure, TIPNIS), where the local people opposed the 
government project of building a highway through the middle of this 
reserve, arguing that this infrastructure would provoke extensive 
deforestation, further settlements of outsiders and expansion of 
coca cultivation, and ecological devastation. The indigenous 
sectors better oriented towards state power (Aymara and Quechua 
peasant communities, cocaleros, colonisers, indigenous 
middle-class etc.) and often in alliance with the government can 
impose their interests on some minority indigenous groups 
underrepresented in state power structures and marginalised by 
state policies, especially regarding land use, exploitation of 
resources and environmental protection in the indigenous 
territories (see Powęska 2017b).
Conclusions and final remarks
Now we can return to our main question - to what extent has the 
MAS administration been able to implement a project of a genuine 
pluri-national state, and to what extent does it represent a renewed 
version of an old nation-state project (inaugurated by the 1952 
Revolution), only decorated with indigenous ornaments? 
Silvia Rivera provides an interesting observation on Bolivian 
politics that can be useful in this regard:
In Bolivia, we can observe a sort of dissimulation of the elites that 
seem to respond to a great extent to the challenge of the 
indigenous insurgency, but who after some time finish in 
expropriating and deforming its demands, up to converting them 
into a tool of new state engineering. In the 1990s the official 
multiculturalism ... re-created an image of the indigenous as a 
rhetorical ornament of power, which served to legitimate [the] 
monopoly [of official power] (2008, 203; author’s translation).
This fragment can be easily applied to describe also the current 
situation in Bolivia. Even if there are important differences 
regarding the projects of nation between the post-1952 state and 
the recent vision, especially regarding the subject of the nation, 
there is not much substantial difference between the neoliberal 
multicultural version of a nation-state of the 1990s and today’s 
plurinational project. We are witnessing another version of a 
nation-state, eventually, a project of a political community 
undermining the premises of plurinationality that features 
indigenous nations with equal status to central state power. This 
project assumes a unity around shared elements made common, 
in typically nation-state fashion of a national community integrated 
under the common state power. It is an identity based on a fusion 
and built from diverse elements, but unifying the whole political 
community, a narrative of indianised, but unified Bolivian nation. 
Nicolas and Quisbert comment on this:
The Plurinational State considers, perhaps correctly, that the 
colonial republican state did not manage to build a nation; the 
paradox is that the Plurinational State is achieving it through the 
subordination of the indigenous nations to the great state nation. 
Perhaps there is nothing more emblematic of this paradox than the 
famous “military/indigenous parade” in which (…) indigenous 
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peoples walk in file in front of the state authorities and symbols to 
the rhythm of tirelessly repeated song “The Fatherland” (2014, 
108; my translation). 
This project can be successfully explained by the need of 
maintenance of the unity of the state and society, derived from 
centralist political-structural relations, counter to the officially 
declared pro-autonomous stance of the new state. Such relations 
are complementary to the economic and development model with 
key roles for the central state, dependent on the control of natural 
resource exploitation and resource export revenues.
Bolivia has witnessed three great revolutions: the anticolonial 
insurgency and the foundation of the Republic in 1825, the 1952 
National Revolution and the present Democratic and Cultural 
Revolution. In general, each of these historical stages shows social 
forces pushing ahead with their own political projects, and social 
groups that benefit indirectly, in complex and often contradictory or 
at least ambivalent ways, leading to a new cycle of social and 
political upheaval. Although the creole elites dominated at the 
expense of the subjugated and exploited indigenous majorities, the 
republican project indirectly opened a way to the advance of 
mestizos. Culminating the contradictions of republican 
opportunities and limits to the mestizo incorporation, the latter 
stood behind the 1952 National Revolution as its decisive force. 
Being mestizos both promotors and main beneficiaries of change, 
their project indirectly and in the long run was crucial for the 
empowerment of the indigenous peasant majority. Now, we are 
witnessing the indigenous peasant Democratic and Cultural 
Revolution. If the indigenous peasantry is the engine and fuel of 
the last Bolivian revolution, who will be its indirect beneficiary?
In the above-mentioned keynote speech in 2017, García Linera 
said that the Indianistas were wrong in their understanding of the 
Bolivian society and thus failed with their political project. But the 
Aymara people constitutes the sector that probably benefitted most 
from the changes in Bolivian society today. They reap the rewards 
from steady economic growth and simultaneous promotion of 
indigeneity, many of them becoming prosperous entrepreneurs. If 
in symbolic and cultural terms the “process of change” and the 
Plurinational State have greatly contributed to the improvement of 
their socio-political position, economically the Aymara keep 
expanding as one of the most powerful and influential groups more 
in spite of than thanks to the active State policy (see Arbona et al. 
2016). However, the prosperity and cultural openness in Bolivia 
today, with simultaneous disappointment about yet unfulfilled 
decolonisation among the Aymara nationalists and indianista 
movement, raise expectations about their own Aymara 
nation-state. Will they be the next proponents of change in the next 
cycle of political-social refurbishment of the Bolivian state?
The answer remains open. Important updates to the situation are 
the ongoing conflicts of interests and different positioning of 
indigenous and peasant sectors toward government policy, 
especially extractivism, and the implementation of plurinationality. 
Moreover, the integrationist, hegemonic rhetoric of the Bolivia 
indianizada (the indianised Bolivia) has been recently openly 
contested.  It was provoked by the political conflict around the 
highly controversial issue of repostulación, Morales' re-nomination 
as official candidate to the presidency in 2019 elections. Although 
the Bolivian constitution permits only one consecutive re-election 
of president and Morales is finishing his second term in office, in 
November 2017 the constitutional court declared this restriction 
non-applicable. In particular, the reactions of the non-indigenous 
middle-class seem to reactivate ethnic or rather racist prejudices 
and, accordingly, to discredit the idea of plurinationality, associated 
with indigenous peasant sectors and for many, being personalist 
project directly dependent on the figure of Evo Morales.
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To borrow from the title of James Malloy's book, we deal again with 
an "uncompleted revolution" (Malloy 1970), and similarly, the 
process of building a political community in Bolivia is incomplete.  
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Whose Autonomy is it anyway? Tensions between class and ethnicity in the 
formation of collective citizenship and self-determination in Plurinational Bolivia
The construction of the indigenous autonomy and the 
indigenous originary peasant subject
In 2009 Bolivia was refounded as a plurinational state with 
autonomies.1  Central to Bolivia’s redefinition as plurinational was 
the recognition of the existence of indigenous nations and peoples 
with a pre-colonial connection to their territories and the right to 
self-government (Asamblea Constituyente 2009).2 This article 
examines the implementation of this recognition of the right to 
self-determination of indigenous peoples in practical terms, 
through constitutionally recognised ‘indigenous autonomies’. The 
article draws on ethnographic fieldwork conducted between 
February 2012 and March 2013 in the municipality of Charazani, in 
the north of the department of La Paz, one of eleven municipalities 
in December 2009 to vote to begin a process of conversion to an 
indigenous autonomy.
‘Indigenous autonomy’ is a shorthand, often used since the 
passing of Bolivia’s 2009 constitution, to refer to autonomía 
indígena originario campesina (AIOC). The term indígena 
originario campesina (indigenous originary peasant) as a collective 
term, emerged through the writing of Bolivia’s 2009 constitution in 
a constituent assembly in 2006-2008, to be inclusive of the 
collective identities of all of Bolivia’s rural subaltern peoples 
whether living in indigenous communities in Bolivia’s highlands 
(where the term ‘originario’ is favoured), the lowlands (identifying 
as ‘indígena’), and rural people who identify as peasants 
(campesinos) rather than belonging to an indigenous community.
 
1 In article one of the 2009 constitution, Bolivia is defined as ‘a unitary social state of plurinational 
communitarian law, free, independent, sovereign, democratic, intercultural, decentralized, and with autonomies’.
2 Article two recognises ‘the pre-colonial existence of indigenous originary peasant nations and peoples and 
their ancestral control of their territories, their free determination in the framework of the State, consisting of the 
right to autonomy, self-government, their culture, recognition of their institutions, and the consolidation of their 
territorial entities’
The term came about in a compromise between the highland 
federation of originary communities CONAMAQ (Consejo Nacional 
de Ayllus y Markas3 de Qullusuyu [Council of Ayllus and Markas of 
Qullusuyu]), the lowland indigenous peoples’ federation CIDOB 
(Confederación de Pueblos Indígenas de Bolivia [Confederation of 
Indigenous Peoples of Bolivia]) and the national confederation of 
peasant workers, the CSUTCB (Confederación Sindical Única de 
Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia [United Union Federation of 
Peasant Workers of Bolivia]) to find a unifying term to describe 
rural Bolivian communities. The constitution uses the term indígena 
originario campesina as a catch-all, to describe a variety of 
identities, political organisations and histories. Despite this, I argue 
(following Cameron 2013) that the legislation creating the political 
vehicles through which the state will recognise self-government by 
indigenous originary peasant nations and peoples underestimates 
the internal political and ethnic diversity within municipalities that 
decide they wish to become AIOCs, a diversity which can threaten 
the indigenous autonomies as collective projects. The inclusion of 
both nations and peoples in the full term naciones y pueblos 
indígena originario campesinos (NyP IOC) emphasises the 
recognition of all collectivities able to trace their history as a group 
prior to the Spanish colonial period, regardless of size or local 
terminology (Albó and Romero 2009, 5). The constitution does not 
sate how many nations and peoples it recognises, though article 5 
does recognise 36 official indigenous languages of the state, and 
so that number is often colloquially taken as the number of NyP 
IOCs in the Plurinational State.
3 An ayllu is the traditional socio-territorial kin-based unit in the rural Andes, and a marka is the Aymara term for 
the hierarchy of two or more connected ayllus.
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Articles 289-296 of the constitution laid out the provision for the 
creation of AIOCs, as the most significant manner though which 
the plurinational aspect of the state would be enacted in practice. 
AIOCs would allow indigenous originary peasant nations and 
peoples to follow their own culturally-specific judicial and electoral 
practices. Article 289 of the constitution defines an AIOC as ‘the 
self-government of indigenous originary peasant nations and 
peoples, whose population shares a territory, culture, history, 
languages, and their own legal, political, social, and economic 
organisations and institutions’. This assumption of shared identity 
seems to be predicated on the idea that an ‘indigenous peasant 
originary people nation and people’ contains internal unity because 
it is either indigenous, peasant, or originary, though the ambiguous 
nature of this composite adjective allows for the possibility of 
crossover between the constituent identities. In practice, one 
municipality may contain communities affiliated to different rural 
federations, with different relationships to the national governing 
party, and differentiating themselves as indigenous, originario or 
peasant. This article reflects on the practical consequences for the 
construction of an indigenous autonomy project of just such a 
political fragmentation at municipal level. 
Indigenous autonomies were proposed through a Unity Pact 
between originary, peasant and indigenous confederations that had 
called for the convocation of a Constituent Assembly to write a new 
national constitution. However, since Bolivia’s constitution was 
passed, the different confederations, in particular CONAMAQ and 
the CSUTCB in highland Bolivia, have taken increasingly differing 
stances. For CONAMAQ, the self-determination of originary 
nations through AIOCs is part of their raison d’être and without 
which they believe there would be no plurinational state. 
Meanwhile, the CSUTCB is part of the grassroots of the MAS party 
itself, and has offered the government unwavering unconditional 
support (Salazar-Lohman 2015, 296). This ‘passive subordination’ 
of the social movements with ties to the MAS party has been 
likened to the military-peasant pact (Salazar Lohman 2015, 218), 
and has often left the CSUTCB out of step with other social 
movements at times of social unrest. Although law 3364, 
convoking the Constituent Assembly, was one of the first 
promulgated by Evo Morales after his election as President in 
2005, many in the MAS party asked what the point of the 
indigenous autonomies was now that they were governing the 
country (Schavelzon 2012, 462, citing a conversation with Pablo 
Stefanoni), seeing indigenous autonomies as a threat to their 
political hegemony. As MAS activists and politicians have 
expressed scepticism of the AIOCs as a possible threat to their 
national hegemony, so the enthusiasm of the CSUTCB towards the 
construction of AIOCs has waned. 
While this article will show local concerns to have been influenced 
by national politics and discourse, it also makes clear the 
limitations of assuming that national-level conflicts between the 
organisations are simply transposed to the local level. I found that 
the use of the discourse of the national-level confederations in 
othering one another has exaggerated local cultural and political 
differences. As each of the national confederations of rural groups 
has performed their collective identity, strategically, emphasising 
the differences between themselves and the rival federation 
(Lucero 2006, 39; Powęska 2013), they have effectively created 
the differences in identity that they perform (see Goffman 1990). 
Although class and ethnicity are fluid, rather than essential 
categories in Bolivia (Fontana 2014, 438), the performance of 
essential identities in relation to rival federations jeopardises the 
unity of the indigenous originary peasant as a collective subject, 
and form of collective citizenship in Bolivia. As I will show, this can 
undermine the project of AIOC self-government itself.
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Inter-Federation tensions in the construction of Charazani’s 
AIOC project
Charazani was one of 12 municipalities on the 6th of December 
2009 to put to a referendum the question ‘are you in favour of your 
municipality adopting the condition of Indigenous Originary 
Peasant Autonomy, in accordance with the principles established in 
the Political State Constitution?’4 and one of eleven to vote in 
favour of the proposition. Charazani is home to the Kallawayas, 
one of the thirty-six indigenous nations implicitly recognised in the 
Bolivian constitution through their language Macha-jujay, which in 
article 5.1 is declared one of the official indigenous languages of 
the state. The Kallawayas are well-known in Bolivia as itinerant 
healers, but through their project to convert their municipality to the 
status of indigenous autonomy, they have increasingly been 
identifying as a nation. 
For Charazani to undertake the referendum, they first had to 
satisfy the Ministry of Autonomies that they met the criteria set out 
in the constitution (for example, article 289, which emphasises the 
shared ‘territory, culture, history, languages’, and the ‘legal, 
political, social, and economic organisations and institutions’ of a 
NyP IOC) for an AIOC. After documentation is presented to the 
Ministry of Autonomies (which has been a Vice Ministry under the 
Ministry of the President since January 2017), emphasising, in 
particular, the inhabitants’ historical connection with the territory, 
and the Ministry accepts that the municipality has met the criteria, 
a referendum can take place. From then, if the referendum is 
approved, an autonomy assembly is formed to write the statute by 
which the autonomy would be governed, and which must approve 
the statute itself in principle and in detail, before sending it to the 
Plurinational Constitutional Tribunal (TCP) in Sucre who would 
4 ¿Está usted de acuerdo en que su municipio adopte la condición de Autonomía Indígena Originario 
Campesina, de acuerdo con los alcances y preceptos establecidos en la Constitución Política del Estado?
check that the statute met legal requirements, and then sent back 
to the municipality for a final local approval of the statute in a 
second referendum.
In the municipality of Charazani, the initial autonomy referendum 
was approved by 86.6%5, and an autonomy assembly was 
convoked whose mission was to write the statute by which it would 
be governed once its AIOC status was formalised. The autonomy 
assembly was initially formed in early 2010, with 37 members. 
However, the autonomy assembly was reformed towards the end 
of the 2005—2010 period of the municipal government, to make its 
composition more representative of the municipality’s 68 
communities. Despite the outcome of the referendum, in April 2010 
the municipality had been obliged to hold further municipal 
elections, for which a candidate from the community of Amarete 
representing the MAS party was elected as mayor. At Autonomy 
meetings, he would make a point of emphasising that he was 
supporting the AIOC project, unlike mayors in other municipalities. 
Indeed, in other municipalities MAS activists actively campaigned 
against the AIOC (Tockman and Cameron 2014, 53-58), viewing 
the AIOCs as a loss of spaces of power (Exeni 2015, 68). As 
Schavelzon (2012) makes very clear in his ethnography of the 
constituent assembly in which Bolivia’s plurinational constitution 
was written, the AIOCs were not a MAS project, and even in the 
first municipality to go through all steps and begin governance as 
an AIOC in 2015, Charagua, MAS supported the project very 
grudgingly, and at times the support of other rival political parties 
had to be strategically solicited, as Postero (2017) describes in her 
ethnography of “The Indigenous State”.
When the Autonomy Assembly was reformed in August 2011 its 
composition took into account both the population of the 
5 Charazani was one of eleven of the initial twelve to vote in favour.
52
municipality’s communities, and a division of these communities 
between three provincial federations. The highland communities 
(above 3,800 metres in altitude) are members of CONAMAQ, the 
valley communities (roughly 2,800-3,800m) are members of the 
CSUTCB, known locally as la Única (‘the Only’), and the 
coca-growing communities of the tropical area of the municipality 
(below 2,800m) are members of their own provincial federation 
FOYCAE (Federación Originario Yungas Carijana Agro-Ecológico 
[The Agro-Ecological Federation of the Original Peoples of 
Carijana]).6 It had taken until August 2011 for the Autonomy 
Assembly to be reformed, in part, because of a lack of agreement 
over its composition, and a general unwillingness of the three 
federations to which Charazani’s communities belonged to 
cooperate with one another locally. 
The communities at the different altitudes of the municipality were 
jointly part of the same peasant political organisation from 1953 
until the 1990s (what in 1953 was the provincial branch of the 
Departmental Federation of Peasant Workers of La Paz [FTDCLP], 
and is now the provincial branch of the Federación Departamental 
de Trabajadores Campesinos de La Paz-Bautista Saavedra 
[FDTCLP-BS][see footnote 6]), and there is a common 
identification between communities of the different federations to 
Kallawaya culture and the Kallawaya Nation. Syndical communities 
throughout the municipality were officially reconstituted as ayllus in 
6 Following 1953 Agrarian Reform all of Charazani’s communities in the highlands, valley and lowlands became 
part of the provincial branch of the Federación Departamental de Trabajadores Campesinos de La Paz 
(FDTCLP, Departmental Federation of Peasant Workers of La Paz), and the Confederación Nacional de 
Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia (CNTCB, National Confederation of Peasant Workers of Bolivia), as the 
Federación Departamental de Trabajadores Campesinos de La Paz-Bautista Saavedra (FDTCLP-BS). By the 
1980s, the departmental federation and national confederation became the Federación Sindical Única de 
Trabajadores Campesinos de La Paz – Tupaj Katari (FSUTCLP-TK) and the Confederación Sindical Única de 
Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia (CSUTCB) respectively. The coca-growing communities in Charazani’s 
lowlands (below 2,800m) left the CSUTCB in 1994 to form their own federation FOYCAE (Federación Originario 
Yungas Carijana Agro-Ecológico), which is affiliated to the CSCIOB (Confederación Sindical de Comunidades 
Interculturales Originarios de Bolivia, representing Andeans who have migrated to tropical areas) at national 
level. In 1999 Charazani’s ayllus and markas (above 3,800m) left the provincial branch of the FSUTCLP-TK to 
reconstitute as ayllus and become members of CONAMAQ. This left the FSUTCLP-TK only representing the 
municipality’s valley communities (2,800m-3,800m in altitude).
the mid to late 1990s with the help of the Bolivian NGO Taller de 
Historia Oral Andina, regardless of their history as ex-hacienda 
communities (most of those located in the valley) or as pre-colonial 
ayllus (most of those in the high valley and highlands). What has 
united the Kallawayas as one people is the shared veneration of 
the same mountains, related to as ancestral deities (see Alderman 
2015). However, as I have related elsewhere (2015), since the 
break up of the different Kallawaya communities into different 
federations, despite their shared local political history and rituals, 
representatives of communities belonging to the three federations 
no longer find a common political space to meet together, and 
certain rituals which once joined the Kallawayas as one people are 
no longer performed. Local political rivalries were alimented by the 
fractious break-up of the unity pact of their national-level 
organisations due to their differing responses to the MAS 
government’s plan to build a road through the TIPNIS national park 
(Laing 2015; Salazar Lohman 2015, 282). The politics of 
competition between three rival local federations therefore stymied 
agreement over how to conform the Assembly.  
The provincial leaders of the three federations eventually agreed 
that there would be 65 autonomy assembly members, based on 
the density of population of the communities belonging to the three 
federations. This resulted in the CONAMAQ-affiliated communities 
having 30 assembly members, the CSUTCB communities with 20, 
and FOYCAE 15. A six-man executive board was elected by the 
Assembly, composed of two members from each of the three 
federations. 
In January 2012, the Autonomy Assembly met in the village of 
Chajaya, where it wrote the first draft of the autonomy statute, in 
which the phrase Nación Kallawaya would be ubiquitous. The 
Assembly divided into six commissions to write the different 
sections of the statute. Five of the six presidents of the 
commissions were from Amarete, a community affiliated to 
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CONAMAQ. This combined with the number of Assembly members 
representing each federation, meant that the first draft of the 
statute was seen by communities affiliated to the other federations 
(particularly those affiliated to the CSUTCB) as representing the 
perspective of CONAMAQ.  
In February 2012, members of the executive board of the 
Assembly embarked on a series of meetings7 from the lowlands to 
the highlands of the municipality, over the space of ten days (one 
meeting was scheduled in a different community each day). 
However, though the two meetings in the tropical communities of 
Sotopata and Carijana took place as arranged, as did those in the 
four communities affiliated to CONAMAQ—Kaata, Amarete, 
Moyapampa and Qotapampa, not one of the four meetings 
scheduled to take place in communities affiliated to the Única, went 
ahead as planned. The first meeting, in Chullina, was cancelled in 
advance because of the opposition of the local union to the 
autonomy project; the next day, a meeting planned to take place in 
the community of Chari, around an hour’s walk from the town of 
Charazani, was cancelled when no community member turned up 
to the meeting. The following day, in Chajaya, there were more 
people present to publicise the statute than there were community 
members (the latter certainly didn’t reach double figures), and this 
event also had to be cancelled, with the blame for the lack of 
attendance placed at the assembly member for Chajaya by the 
authority of the local branch of the union. 
The next scheduled meeting, in the community of Inca Roca (in the 
district of Charazani), went ahead, but the strength of feeling of the 
community authorities from Inca Roca and the other nearby 
communities towards the autonomy project, was not just was one
7 Members of the executive board of the Assembly were accompanied by a case worker from the Ministry of 
Autonomies, and a technician, employed by the municipal government, as well as workers from an NGO, 
employed by the Ministry of Autonomies to assist in the writing of the statute, and myself and a sociology 
student from Cochabamba.
of disinterest, but of downright hostility. When the meeting began, 
the Secretary of Relations, representing the union office of the 
district of Charazani, launched into a furious diatribe against the 
autonomy project and the way that it was being run, without 
allowing the Autonomy Assembly president to present the draft of 
the statute. When he had finished speaking, he handed the 
President two letters stating the position of the local union of the 
district of Charazani, and stormed out, followed by about half of the 
community members. Somewhat comically, he had to return five 
minutes later to tell the rest to come too, though they had 
appeared to want to stay to find out more for themselves.
The first letter made clear that the reason why the communities 
were hostile to the autonomy project was that they feared 
domination by communities affiliated to CONAMAQ. It stated that 
in a sectoral meeting of the ‘ayllus and sullk'a ayllus8 Valle 
Unificada Charazani9’ on 4th March 2012, after extensive analysis 
of the redaction of the project of the AIOC statute, it had no 
legitimacy, nor sufficient participation of the organisations and 
institutions of which the communities in the district of Charazani 
were affiliated. Secondly, it stated that the project was being 
manipulated by the leaders of CONAMAQ who were being advised 
by people from the neoliberal right, and made specific reference to 
two members of the consultancy which was assisting the 
assembly, one an ex-regional leader of CONAMAQ, and the other 
an ex-mayor of Charazani from Cochabamba. The second letter 
was from the community of Jatichulaya, informing the executive 
board that the assembly member from their community would be 
resigning from the assembly (Jatichulaya was the community of 
8 A sullk’a ayllu is a smaller ayllu, an ayllu within an ayllu, an ayllu being a homologous structure a bit like 
Russian dolls.
9 In Charazani the CSUTCB was made up of communities officially identifying as ayllus. 
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the secretary of relations of the district of Charazani). The letter 
from the district of Charazani encapsulated two themes that would 
be present time and again in Única protests about the autonomy 
project: that the communities had not been sufficiently 
well-informed about autonomy,10 and that the project was being run 
by CONAMAQ and the neoliberal right. 
Despite minimal participation of the peasant union communities 
close to the town of Charazani, the writing of the statute continued 
to progress.  However, local Única leaders did their best to stymie 
the project. In the autonomy assembly held in Charazani on the 
24th of March disagreement with the process was expressed in 
several letters read aloud by the Assembly President which he had 
received from local authorities of peasant union communities in 
Charazani, including one letter from members of communities in 
the district of Chari stating that they had read the statute and that it 
did not truly represent Kallawaya culture, and another from leaders 
of the Chajaya union branch denouncing the presence of “right-
wing” parties such as the MNR, MIR and MSM in the autonomy 
process (this seems to have been a reference to the 
Cochabambino ex-mayor). Then at the next assembly one 
well-known healer entered the hall to hand the Autonomy 
Assembly President a letter denouncing the autonomy project 
currently underway and complaining that they had not been 
properly informed about it. The complaints about the lack of 
information at the time suggested a lack of organisation on the part 
of the assembly members, whose role it supposedly was to inform 
their communities; however, when I later attended general union 
meetings, both at community level in Charazani and Chullina and 
also at provincial level, I found that the topic of the autonomy
10 One of the problems in this respect was clearly the change in authorities. I had been told by an ex-authority of 
the community of Chari, that when initial workshops had been held by the NGO Kawsay in his and neighbouring 
communities, those present had been very enthusiastic towards the autonomy project as it had been presented 
to them. However, when the next set of authorities took their turn in the positions of leadership, they were not 
well-informed, having not attended the workshops.
project was put last on the agenda, and that often when someone 
did want to raise it, they were shouted down by others who 
preferred to imagine that if they did not acknowledge that the 
autonomy process was happening then it would simply stop. 
Although at the time this seemed like wishful thinking, such 
behaviour was actually surprisingly effective.
At a provincial meeting of the peasant union on the 22nd of April 
2012, the union leaders from the four communities in the district of 
Charazani belonging to the Única all expressed their intention to 
officially withdraw their members from the assembly and prohibit 
them from attending further assemblies. One union leader 
proclaimed that all assembly members who continued to attend the 
assembly should be considered accomplices to a fake statute (‘un 
estatuto chuto’) and be made ‘persona-non-grata’ in Charazani. It 
was not spelt out what this would have meant practically for the 
assembly members, though the union does regularly threaten 
members with fines for non-compliance, and, at least in theory, a 
community member’s land could be confiscated by their 
community. At another meeting a week later, two of the four 
assembly members for the town of Charazani officially handed in 
their resignations, and a letter expressing the Única’s rejection of 
the autonomy project was written. The provincial executive of the 
Única took the letter to the assembly meeting in Amarqha two days 
later, where it was read aloud by the Autonomy Assembly 
President in front of the assembly members. It accused the 
assembly of acting in the interests of a handful of people, and of 
not representing the Kallawayas, particularly objecting to what it 
said was CONAMAQ trying to represent the Kallawayas. The 
rejection of right of the communities affiliated to CONAMAQ to 
speak for the Kallawayas stems from a divergence of meaning 
over the term Kallawaya. While the Autonomy Assembly had been 
attempting to write into the statute an inclusive notion of what it 
meant to be Kallawaya, connected to territory, the representatives 
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of communities from valley favoured an exclusive definition of 
Kallawaya, as meaning only the itinerant healers, who traditionally 
come from around half a dozen communities in the valley of 
Charazani, all of which are affiliated to the CSUTCB, rather than to 
CONAMAQ.11
The leaders from the ayllus and markas affiliated to CONAMAQ 
were apoplectic, and made clear their independence as a 
provincial organization from its national-level in La Paz. The 
Mallku12 of the Suni (the term in Aymara for the highlands) 
emphasised that ‘there is no CONAMAQ in this province’. The 
Kuraq13 Mallku of CONAMAQ for the Nación Kallawaya was 
equally vehement, declaring that they may be affiliated to 
CONAMAQ, but that CONAMAQ does not have a single assembly 
member. He angrily told the provincial and departmental heads of 
the peasant union that the time had come for them to stop arguing 
amongst themselves and declared that the only thing they were 
really defending was the haciendas. After the assembly in 
Amarqha in a conversation with the Autonomy Assembly President, 
he similarly emphasised to me that ‘we are not CONAMAQ, we are 
the ayllus and markas of the Suni’. Although I found this 
defensiveness curious at the time, when I analysed it later, it 
seemed to me that these local leaders from the ayllus were 
emphasising the organic nature of the organisation. As has been 
noted by Powęska (2013, 219), CONAMAQ activists do not view 
the organisation as an artificial superstructure, but as simply the 
11 Louis Girault (1988, 403) and Thierry Saignes (1985, 193) specify that there were only six Kallawaya 
villages: Curva, Chajaya, Khanlaya, Huata Huata, Inca and Chari (all of these except Curva are in the 
municipality of Charazani); these being the communities specialising in medicine. Meanwhile Oblitas Poblete 
(1963, 13) identifies five Kallawaya communities (the same as the above mentioned, minus Inca).
12 ‘Mallku’ is the name for the Aymara authority at the level of a marka (the term for a group of Ayllus in 
Aymara). It is also the Aymara word for Condor. In pre-colonial Aymara communities, according to Choque and 
Mamani (2001, 211) authority was held in the figure of the mallku, who governed various ayllus or markas. 
However, during the colonial period the function of the mallku came to be that of an intermediary between his 
ayllu and the colonial structures of power.
13 A higher authority, representing all of the markas of the Kallawaya Nation.
natural national manifestation of the ayllus and markas (which they 
contrast to the union model of the CSUTCB they portray as 
foreign). The ayllus and markas of the Suni also appeared to be 
trying to distance themselves from the critical stance of the 
national body of CONAMAQ towards the national government. The 
mallku of Amarete later informed me that having received support 
from the state in the form of public works, as well (I was pointedly 
told) as being the first destination within the province of Evo 
Morales once he became President, they felt no reason to be 
critical towards the government. As Pallares  (2002) shows with 
reference to Ecuador, particularist ethnic movements are often at 
odds with national confederations, which can become a source of 
internal tension.  has argued that one thing that makes CONAMAQ 
distinctive from the CSUTCB is their coherence as an organisation 
at all levels. However, my ethnographic data suggests that the 
authorities of ayllus can also found themselves at odds with the 
national leadership of the organisation.
In Amarqha, many of the assembly members who had been 
prohibited by the leaders of their union branches were nonetheless 
in attendance. However, by the time of the next assembly meeting 
to finalise the second draft of the statute in Carijana on the 17th—
18th of May, few assembly members from peasant union 
communities made the trip, and no more than five of the twenty 
Única assembly members were present when the statute was 
approved en grande (in principle) in Amarqha on the 15th of June 
2012. Although the decreasing numbers of assembly members in 
attendance at assemblies caused the leaders of the assembly 
some discomfort, they resolved to continue with the project, and an 
assembly to approve the statute in detail was tentatively scheduled 
for August. However, the lack of cooperation between the 
federations combined with conflict over the location of the seat of 
government of the autonomy (see Alderman 2018) made arriving 
at agreement to convene further assemblies difficult. The tension 
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within the municipality became increasingly apparent to the 
Ministry of Autonomies through the multitude of letters that they 
received rejecting autonomy, both from mestizo residents of 
Charazani living in La Paz (who apparently saw the AIOC as a 
potential threat to their private properties in the town), and from the 
local leadership of the Única. The Ministry allowed a cuarto 
intermedio (a break in proceedings) because, according to the 
Autonomy Assembly President, they became scared by the 
complaints from the Única. Indeed, such was the hiatus, with the 
leaders of the three provincial level organisations failing to come to 
agreement, even after the Única and FOYCAE had had a change 
of provincial leadership at the end of 2012, that no more autonomy 
assemblies were planned to take place until April 2013, and the 
approval of the statute in detail was re-scheduled for July 2013. 
Although meetings took place in 2013, the three organisations 
have still not come to an agreement for the statute to be approved 
in detail. At the time of writing in mid 2018, the process is still in 
limbo.
Conclusion
This article has demonstrated the multi-layered nature of tensions 
between class and ethnicity-based organisations in Bolivia, and the 
tensions inherent in the composite IOC subject. While projects to 
create AIOCs are based on assumptions of shared histories and 
legal and political institutions, it is precisely the lack of political 
unity in a municipality in which different communities belong to 
separate federations that can undermine any unity of purpose and 
the entire local AIOC project itself.
Powęska (2013) identifies each national organisation as 
strengthening the content of their own identity by direct comparison 
with their rivals. The same appears to be occurring at a local level 
within Charazani. However, it is very likely, as Blanes (2000, 7) 
suggests, that the affiliation to different federations accentuates 
existing rivalries previously suppressed within the single structure 
of the peasant union.  The discourse of local community leaders 
did not mirror then exactly the national-level discourse of their 
confederations. Evo Morales and his MAS party had retained 
widespread support amongst members of both CONAMAQ- and 
the CSUTCB-affiliated communities throughout the process of 
writing the autonomy statute. The fact that the mayor was from a 
CONAMAQ-affiliated community and a member of the MAS party 
(and therefore well-placed to bring the President to the municipality 
on several occasions), seemed to play some part in bridging the 
gap between CONAMAQ’s contestatory position towards the 
government and the feeling that Evo Morales was their President.
As much as the different communities were members of different 
provincial and national bodies with different priorities towards the 
government and the state, and which (certainly since 2011) have 
deliberately distanced themselves from one another, what was at 
stake in Charazani were local power relations. While for the 
CONAMAQ ayllus, the conversion of the municipality to an AIOC 
represented an opportunity to govern autonomously their way, for 
the outnumbered communities in the valley below in particular, this 
was precisely the problem. This is why the significant question 
around the autonomy project of Charazani became whose 
autonomy it was anyway. 
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Whose autonomy and autonomy from what/whom?  
Insights into the nationalist revolution and pluri-national refoundation through 
demands for autonomy
Writing this essay on two highly complex and different historical 
events, the 1952 nationalist revolution and the 2009 pluri-national 
refoundation of Bolivia, it is crucial to start thinking of ways to tie 
both scenarios together - revealing their similarities, differences 
and connections, while fully recognising the specificity of each 
revolutionary scenario. I suggest that the concept of autonomy, 
which I use here interchangeably with self-determination, provides 
us with a promising vantage point for such a comparison. 
When we speak of social revolutions or moments of revolutionary 
change, we usually refer to some kind of transformation in power 
relations within a given society (Latin: revolutio, ‘a turn around’). A 
formal change in power (for example, a regime change) is 
commonly triggered by uprisings against and/or for emancipation 
from conditions of oppression. Here, the demand for autonomy 
becomes a powerful lens, focusing 'a deep desire to expand 
collective capacity for self government' (Chatterton 2010, 899). 
However, autonomy itself can refer to a multitude of very different 
projects – one can ask what or who the ‘self’ or ‘public’ is and to 
what and whom ‘government’ refers. In the past 25 years, the ways 
in which scholars have reflected on the concept of autonomy has 
changed with debates on the subject broadening. A critical event in 
shaping this new style of political discourse was the 1994 Zapatista 
uprising, which famously challenged the logic of modern ontology 
by creating a unique set of autonomous relations. Unlike separatist 
autonomous movements, the Zapatista’s aim was not to separate 
people but to bring them together. For them, autonomy refers to 
‘[a] different way of imagining life, to an other mode of existence’ 
(Escobar 2011, 139; italics in the original). Self-determination is 
here closely connected with respect for traditions and customs and 
the exercise of power at the community level. In this new world in 
which many new worlds fit, the universe is replaced with the 
pluriverse.
At the same time, the 2009 refoundation of the Bolivian state 
cannot be understood without paying attention to the notion of 
plurinationalism/-ity, which is in turn closely linked to autonomy. 
Following the pluri-national state idea, the state does not only 
recognise the existence of different cosmologies, but also 
facilitates the autonomy of peoples, understood as nations in their 
own right, and promotes their participation in decision-making on 
matters that concern them all (Garcés 2011). For Tapia Mealla, ‘in 
order to be democratic, it is not enough that it is co-government of 
representatives of different cultures but co-government in and from 
the bosom from each of those [cultures]’ (Tapia Mealla 2007, 174; 
author's translation), which is impossible without peoples’ 
self-determination. The pluri-national horizon is hence predicated 
on an aspiration for a different kind of state reflecting a different 
mode of existence. Looking at the scenarios of 1952 and 2009 
through the concept of autonomy, therefore enables the 
incorporation of the pluri-national idea, an idea  that goes beyond 
the struggle for state power (Quijano 2006). 
In the following section, I briefly look at the key demands for 
autonomy in the struggles that helped to bring about the 1952 
nationalist revolution and 2009 pluri-national refoundation. As the 
state and its power are crucial in both scenarios, I will not focus on 
autonomous practices, as such, but focus on three demands for 
autonomy related to the state and their roles in the 1952 
Revolution and the 2009 refoundation. These are ‘autonomy as 
(pluri-)national self-determination’, ‘peoples’ self-determination2’ 
and ‘deepened decentralisation’. Making reference to different 
intellectual traditions, I then show how these demands became 
2 Peoples’ self-determination and indigenous self-determination are generally used interchangeably throughout 
the text. While I sometimes use ’indigenous’ to ensure clarity, I prefer the notion of peoples’ self-determination, 
because in the ’Pact of Unity’ (see footnotes 8 and 9), representatives of highland organisations refused to see 
themselves as ’indigenous’ and advocated the notion ’originals’. This was because ’indigenous’ was seen as a 
label introduced by others and giving the peoples’ a passive role. ’Originals’ would in turn enable seeing the 
connectedness of struggle of ’originals’ around the world, leading to empowerment and unity.  
61
(dis)articulated in the state and translated by the respective 
governments. This analysis draws on fieldwork, which I undertook 
in 2015 and 2016 as part of my PhD research and involved data 
collection in seven of Bolivia’s nine departments. 
Demands for autonomy prior to the 1952 revolution and 2009 
refoundation
Autonomy as ‘(pluri-)national self-determination’ in the 1952 
revolution and in the 2009 refoundation
The first idea of autonomy discussed here is that of ‘national 
self-determination’ – a key principle of international law, commonly 
considered ius cogens and, for example, enshrined in the UN 
Charter from 1945. It was a crucial stake in the struggles leading to 
the 1952 revolution and in contemporary struggles for ‘pluri-
national self-determination’, recognising the diversity of Bolivians. 
As I will describe in some detail in the following paragraphs, both 
scenarios were about redefining the Bolivian pueblo (in the case of 
the 1962 revolution) or pueblos (in the case of the 2009 
refoundation) and realising sovereignty of the Bolivian pueblo(s)3 
through control of the state and ultimately, the destiny of the 
(pluri-)nation. To achieve this, not only inclusion and participation 
were crucial, but also working towards an end to Bolivia’s 
dependency on the boom and bust cycles of the international 
markets, which has characterised the country’s economy since the 
conquista. In what follows, I first summarise the struggles for 
national self-determination feeding into the 1952 Revolution and 
secondly, the presence of a very similar idea in the times predating 
the pluri-national refoundation in 2009. 
3 With pueblo(s), I refer to the 1952 scenario, in which the pueblo was emphasised as well as the 2009 
refoundation, in which pueblos is used to highlight the diversity of the Bolivian population and peoples. 
The social struggles which resulted in the 1952 revolution were 
fundamentally struggles for inclusion and participation in the state 
which at that time formally excluded the vast majority of indigenous 
population. The ‘Chaco War’ (1932-35) led to a 'disintegration of 
the established order' (Klein 2003, 178) in which nation and state 
became disarticulated. Young, literate veterans, also known as 
Chaco generation, who were often not recognised as 'citizens', 
held the traditional political parties and hydrocarbon firms 
responsible for the war and began setting up more radical parties 
as alternatives to the established ones, for example, political  
groupings such as the Revolutionary Nationalist Movement 
(Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario, MNR) (Mesa Gisbert 
2003a). The existing system of political representation, which had 
for the previous decades been dominated by the two established 
parties, the Liberal Party (Partido Liberal) and the Conservative 
Party (Partido Conservador), was increasingly incapable of 
containing the struggles emerging from the Chaco generation and 
other excluded and increasingly mobilised sectors of society. Yet, 
powerful players and supporters of the established system were 
not in favour of the mobilisation of the increasingly urban working 
and middle classes, a mobilisation which had been fuelled by 
intensifying repression (for example, the massacre in Catavi, 
Potosí in 1942).
Meanwhile, World War II increased the demand for tin, and the so 
called ‘Tin Barons’ became wealthy and powerful mining magnets; 
they were responsible for almost 80 per cent of Bolivian tin 
extraction in the 1940s (Romero Bonifaz 2005). Despite this, state 
taxes on mining profits did not rise significantly, even though the 
greater revenue generated for the public purse could have been 
crucial in responding to the demands of the Chaco generation and 
other disaffected sectors of the population. Frustrated by their 
formal exclusion from the state, the Chaco generation and others 
demanded a redistribution of land and wealth, (better) education 
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and more progressive social policies be provided by the state. With 
the end of World War II, the demand for minerals dropped 
dramatically and the power of the mining oligarchs weakened. This 
opened up a window of opportunity for rapid change, which 
culminated in the 1952 revolution. 
The idea of the recovery of national self-determination also played 
a key role in the struggles predating the pluri-national state. In the 
second half of the 1980s and early 1990s, growing resistance to 
the first wave of neoliberal reforms and their socio-economic 
effects, alongside the dominant role of the US and frustration with 
a recently re-established democracy, that suffered a 
‘representation deficit’ (Assies and Salman 2005, 269), found 
expression in the growing strength of the Cocalero unions. The 
emphasis on sovereignty is seen already in the name of the then 
latterly established ‘Political Instrument for the Sovereignty of the 
Pueblos’, the MAS-IPSP founded in 1998 (Harten 2011). As with 
the earlier nationalist revolution, self-determination was associated 
with self-determination vis-à-vis the external world – control over 
the state and the course of development - yet, unlike in 1952, the 
diversity of the Bolivian pueblos to be included in and represented 
by the state was foregrounded. I therefore refer to this idea as 
‘pluri-national self-determination’. 
Two more sets of struggles for autonomy predating the 2009 
refoundation
Autonomy, though, can mean more than national 
self-determination. In Bolivia’s recent history, autonomy has turned 
into a buzzword for different projects and ideas. Here I focus on 
two sets of struggles which I perceive as crucial for understanding 
the pluri-national refoundation: ‘Peoples’ self-determination’ and 
‘autonomy as deepened decentralisation’.
First, the idea of ‘peoples’ self-determination’, which has become 
increasingly relevant and concrete in Bolivia in since the second 
half of the 20th century and which cannot be understood without 
reference to the memories of 1952 revolution (Svampa 2007). 
Partly in reaction to the 'campesinación' (Albó 2009, 31) that took 
place during and after the 1952 revolution, where indigenous 
people were only recognised by the state as peasants and not as 
ethnic subjects, the Katarista-Indigenista movement emerged in 
the highlands of Bolivia in the 1970s. Given the large percentage 
of Aymara and Quechua people in the population, they envisioned 
a hegemonic project that would change the state altogether. In his 
'Tesis India', the intellectual father of this movement, Fausto 
Reinaga, argues for a transition towards a style of governance 
inspired by traditional peoples’ systems (Reinaga 2006 [1971]). 
Such ideas fed into the 1973 Tiwanaku Manifesto, which 
envisioned, alongside cultural, political and economic 
decolonisation, a pluri-national state in and through which peoples’ 
autonomy could be recovered (Choque Canqui 2010). This 
demand for autonomy was made at an ontological level – it was 
not a struggle for state power, but the search for a different kind of 
state in which many ‘worlds’ would fit. Yet, the strategies and 
approaches to these highly contested aims varied.
Meanwhile, in the lowlands, indigenous peoples voiced a desire for 
self-determination, a desire that had gained prominence at the 
international level as a result of the decolonisation processes in 
Africa (see UN General Assembly Resolution 1514/1960). The 
demand for autonomy expressed by lowlands peoples appears to 
be primarily one for state recognition, seeking protection vis-à-vis 
big landowners and the extractive industries, which has 
increasingly posed a threat to their livelihoods since the second 
half of the 20th century.
After democracy was restored in 1982, hope grew for achieving 
recognition and self-determination, but the 1980s and 1990s 
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proved disappointing. Certainly, during the early 1990s, Bolivia was 
the first Latin American country to ratify ILO Convention 169 (i.e. 
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention) and in the aftermath of 
the indigenous ‘March for Territory and Dignity’ (1990), Bolivian 
president Paz Zamora granted the first 'Original Peoples’ Lands' 
(Tierra Comunitaria de Origen TCO) to lowland communities. While 
these advances were initially celebrated, it became apparent that 
‘land’ (tierra), not ‘territory’ (territorio), was the legally recognised 
concept. While ‘land’ is associated with the bio-productive system 
that can be seen as a mercantile object, ‘territory’ refers to the 
concrete occupation of space conveyed through social and cultural 
structures (Valenzuela 2009). In other words, ‘land’ is a far 
narrower and more restrictive concept than ‘territory’. The 1994 
Constitution recognised the TCO, yet not as a formal territorial 
state organisation dividing Bolivia into smaller entities like 
department and municipalities. This also applied to the traditional 
type of Aymara and Quechua community in the highlands, ayllus, 
the recovery of which had been supported by Vice-President 
Cárdenas (1993-1997, the first self-identified indigenous to hold 
such a high political post (Mesa Gisbert 2003b). 
The famous Law of Popular Participation (Ley de Participación 
Popular, LPP, 1994) brought about the municipalisation of Bolivia 
and included: the granting of competences to the (partly newly 
established) municipalities; the transfer of 20 per cent of state 
budget to the municipal level (Mesa Gisbert 2003b, 770), and the 
recognition of indigenous communities and organisations.4  
However, this legal recognition resulted in the imposition of borders 
which did not necessarily correspond with the ‘territories’ claimed 
by various indigenous peoples. 
In addition, after continued and intensifying pressures from lowland 
groups, the long-awaited land reform law INRA (Instituto Nacional 
4 See Faguet (2012) for an in-depth study of the Law of Popular Participation
de Reforma Agraria) was enacted in 1997. This ordered a review of 
all properties and titles, to differentiate between those who could 
prove that they had obtained their land legally and used it for 
socially or economically productive purposes from those who had 
not obtained it legally) and / or used it solely for the purpose of 
speculation; and proscribed the latter (Colque 2014). Within ten 
years, all large, illegal landholdings were to be recovered by the 
state. Yet, the law bureaucratised and slowed titling down (Albó 
2009) and according to the most recent available documentation 
by 2007, less than ten per cent of the land had been reviewed 
(Barragán, Colque and Urioste 2007). 
As a result, while some aspects of the struggles of peoples in the 
highlands and lowlands had entered the state agenda, their 
promise remained unfulfilled. The state did not become a 
fundamentally different one, nor did it protect the autonomy of 
indigenous peoples, many of whom faced increasing threats to 
their ways of life. Instead, the multicultural reforms can be 
perceived as part of the cultural project of neoliberalism, which 
‘may celebrate cultural pluralism’, but fell ‘short of addressing 
issues of the redistribution of power and resources’ (Assies and 
Salman 2005, 269). For example, the above-mentioned LPP is 
often seen as a government strategy to diffuse the struggles of 
peoples and redirect them to the local level (Garcés 2013). Critical 
scholars such as Hale (2002) argue that the shift of focus towards 
cultural rights has served to redirect political energy away from 
opposition to neoliberalism itself. Yet, despite their limitations these 
largely disappointing experiences were crucial in germinating the 
growing mobilisations, which opened the door to the pluri-national 
refoundation (Assies and Salman 2005).
The second additional set of struggles predating the refoundation 
of the Bolivian state by the 2009 Constitution, relate to what I term 
‘autonomy as deepened decentralisation’. Struggles for and 
against de-centralising power have been a vital aspect of Bolivian 
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history as shown, for example, by the Federal Rebellion in the late 
19th century and the struggles for the eleven per cent of 
hydrocarbon royalties5 (GAD Santa Cruz n.d.). With the rapid 
development of the lowlands, especially Santa Cruz, in the second 
half of the 20th century and the growing agro-industrial and 
hydrocarbon sectors, voices for decentralisation of power and 
resources became louder from the lowland departments of Santa 
Cruz and Tarija.  Under President Banzer (1971-1978), who 
strongly identified with the lowlands, regional development 
corporations were established in all departments and their major 
source of income came from hydrocarbon royalties, with Santa 
Cruz especially benefitting (Céspedes Cossio 2005).
In the context of democratisation, some influential actors, including 
politicians and academics, pushed a model of decentralisation 
towards the municipal level (i.e. the local level) (Molina Saucedo 
2015), while others, closely associated with the powerful lowland 
families, advocated strengthening the departmental level (i.e. the 
regional level) (Urenda Díaz 2007). With the abovementioned LPP 
from 1994 it became clear that Sánchez de Lozada’s government 
(1993-1997) had opted for municipalisation. The 1995 
Administrative Decentralisation Law (Ley de Descentralización 
Administrativa, LDA), which regulated the role of the departments 
in the new model of state organisation, confirmed this decision: 
Disappointed regional actors complained that the ‘departmental 
level’ functioned as no more than an extended arm of the central 
government; as transferred powers and resources were severely 
limited and, for example, the departmental prefects were directly 
appointed by the president. 
5 These should be given to the regions, in which hydrocarbons were extracted. As there are nine departments 
in Bolivia, a share of eleven per cent would mean an equal redistribution. However, the point of reference of the 
eleven per cent changed and today it is usually referred to eleven per cent of revenues from hydrocarbon 
extraction in the department and not from the whole of Bolivia.
For those who had pushed for a stronger regional powers vis-à-vis 
central government, the term ‘decentralisation’ became associated 
with the disappointing experience of the LDA and as a result, the 
notion of ‘autonomy’ became more prominent among them. This 
was not a new concept as, for example, Juan Carlos Urenda, 
lawyer from Santa Cruz had advocated since the 1980s a model 
based on autonomous regions inspired by the Spanish Constitution 
of 19786. While there have indeed been sometimes separatist 
voices in the struggles for regional ’autonomy ’, backed by local 
elites in the first decade of the 21st century, it has mainly been a 
struggle about increasing leverage vis-à-vis the central state. 
Autonomy, here, fundamentally meant deepened decentralisation 
to the departmental level, including the direct election of 
departmental prefects, and the a greater devolution of 
competences and resources.
In brief, ‘autonomy’ in the struggles for the 1952 revolution 
primarily stood for the idea of ‘national self-determination’. The 
recovery of national self-determination, yet this time emphasising 
the diversity of the pueblos, hence ‘pluri-national 
self-determination’, was also was a key feature in the struggles 
leading up to the pluri-national state. In the lead up to the 
pluri-national refoundation two more sets of struggles for autonomy 
were crucial: ‘autonomy as peoples’ self-determination’ and 
‘autonomy as deepened decentralisation’, for both of which the 
earlier nationalist experience of the mid-twentieth century was 
again a key impetus. 
6 The Spanish Constitution of 1978, divided Spain into politically and administratively semi-autonomous 
communities (and cities). This aimed at guaranteeing limited autonomy to the regions and nationalities of which 
Spain is comprised.
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Translation of demands in and after the 1952 revolution and 
2009 refoundation
Autonomy as (pluri-)national self-determination: Unfinished or 
impossible?
Assessing how the demands for (pluri-)national self-determination 
were integrated into the state and mediated by the government, I 
first look at the quest for inclusion and unity (i.e. being included in 
the state and united as an integral part of the (pluri-)nation), which 
aimed to enhance the control of the pueblo(s) over the state both 
after the 1952 revolution and in the 2009 refoundation. I then focus 
on Bolivia’s sovereignty in the global sphere. Finally, I point to the 
limitations of the nationalist revolution and pluri-national 
refoundation, both in terms of the quest for inclusion and unity and 
self-determination vis-à-vis international markets.
The demand for national self-determination entered the public 
agenda following the 1952 Revolution which had intended to 
create a sense of inclusiveness and pride among Bolivians (Albó 
2009). The introduction of universal suffrage was a key measure to 
enhance the control of the pueblo over the state. This was to go 
hand-in-hand with the introduction of a state-led modernisation 
strategy, which aimed to break up the provincial fiefdoms of local 
elites who controlled the large agricultural estates and lucrative 
mining businesses7, change existing social relations, and build a 
modern, industrial, and more egalitarian society (Dunkerley 1984).
The pluri-national transformation involving the 2009 Constitution 
and other critical policies implemented by the MAS-IPSP set about 
diversifying political and judicial representation. For example, in 
several of the nine departmental assemblies, seats are now
7 The powerful elites, above all the ‘tin barons’ were, unlike previous more nationally-oriented elites in outlook, 
orientated towards international markets. They influenced national politics rather indirectly through pressure 
groups.
reserved for representatives of minority groups belonging to 
indigenous sectors of the population and are elected following the 
group’s own practices and customs. This is particularly relevant in 
those departments where the representation of indigenous groups 
is not expected to automatically take place (as it is in the highland 
departments where Aymara and Quechua groups make up a large 
share of the population). At the same time, an innovative measure 
included in ‘Article 179 II’ of the 2009 Constitution places ordinary 
and peoples’  legal jurisdiction on an equal footing. This legal 
pluralism also insured that representatives from both jurisdictions 
serve as judges in High Courts (‘Article 197’). In addition, the 2009 
Constitution states that all public servants speak at least two of the 
country’s official languages, which enhances the accessibility of 
the state for the indigenous population. Yet, how effectively these 
rules have been translated into practice needs careful elaboration, 
which is beyond the scope of this paper.
Regarding the second aspect of the renewed demands for 
self-determination – Bolivia’s sovereignty in the international 
marketplace – state-led development projects were key to the 
government agendas in both the 1952 Revolution and the 2009 
re-foundation. A key feature on the agenda of the first government 
of the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento 
Nacionalista Revolucionario, MNR) was enhanced state control 
over the economy to both enable redistribution and facilitate 
industrialisation. The nationalisation of the largest mines served as 
a first key measure, which should fill the public coffers and facilitate 
investment in other sectors. Policy-makers in the Global South, 
often perceive Industrialisation as a crucial means for improving a 
state’s position in the world market and ending dependency on the 
export of a few primary materials which are vulnerable to the 
booms and busts of the international commodity markets. 
The social-communitarian model, introduced by the MAS-IPSP 
government during the first term (2005-2000) goes in a similar 
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direction and is a response to and a break away from 
neoliberalism. Following the model developed by members of the 
Grupo Duende, most notably the long-term Minister of Economy 
and Public Finance Luis Arce, together with Vice-President García 
Linera, the state’s share of revenues from key strategic sectors 
(mining and hydrocarbons) has increased. These revenues have 
then been invested in social policies and other sectors which are 
considered crucial for job creation and the diversification of the 
economy (Arce Catacora 2011).
However, the 1952 revolution and 2009 refoundation remain 
'unfinished' (Finot 2016), and have been  contested from both 
within and outside the state. This reflects disagreement over who 
the pueblo is and for whom the government speaks. In the 
aftermath of 1952, severe tensions arose within the MNR over the 
course of the revolution and lead to deepening divisions within the 
movement (Mesa Gisbert 2003b). Likewise, since 2009 tensions 
have emerged within both the pluri-national state (see below) and 
the MAS-IPSP.
As noted above, the Katarista-indigenista movement challenged 
the idea of the strong united nation, promoted by the governments 
of the 1952 revolution, in which indigenous peoples were only 
included as a homogeneous class of peasants. In Santa Cruz, on 
the other hand, the abovementioned struggles for the eleven 
percent intensified in the early years of the 1952 revolution (GAD 
Santa Cruz n.d.). Regarding the pluri-national refoundation, the 
unity of Bolivians is also increasingly contested as shown by the 
rupture of the ‘Pact of Unity’8. In 2011, two key organisations that 
had supported the process leading to the 2009 Constitution
8 With the erupting of social conflicts of the early 2000s, peoples’ from high- and lowlands as well as peasant 
organisations united in their rejection of neoliberalism and the established political parties to found the 2004 
‘Pact of Unity’ (Pacto de Unidad). In this forum, a joint proposal for a constitution was developed,  which 
became a key reference point for the MAS-IPSP in the constituent assembly (Böhrt Irahola 2015, 12).
withdrew from the Pact. Additionally, and most significantly, on the 
21st of February 2016, Morales lost a national referendum where 
he asked the Bolivian public to extend the limits of presidential 
re-election from three terms to four. By exposing the new 
constitution to such specific amendments so early on in the 
development of pluri-national Bolivia, Morales clearly revealed an 
attempt to consolidate his position as revolutionary leader of 
Bolivia. 
Economically, the 1952 Revolution dismantled the oligarchic-feudal 
power relations, but it did not increase productivity and 
consumption (Mesa Gisbert 2003b). In other words, the aspiration 
to rebuild Bolivia as a ‘modern’ and productive nation did not take 
shape. This was reflected in the country’s relatively unchanged 
position on the global marketplace as provider of raw materials 
(Romero Bonifaz 2005). The economic upheavals led to increasing 
pressures on the MNR’s regime and played a crucial role in 
triggering another regime change. In 1964, a military junta 
overthrew the MNR government.  
Over the 12 years since the MAS-IPSP took power and after 
almost a decade of the pluri-national state, the diversification of the 
economy has not advanced as many had hoped. Pointing to the 
increased importance of China, Achtenberg (2017) assesses that 
‘[b]ehind the discourse of financial sovereignty, the reality is one of 
greater dependency on extractivism and foreign capital’. While it is 
without doubt too early to pronounce the failure of the project after 
such a short period of time, it nevertheless seems unlikely that 
structural and sustainable changes in Bolivia’s economy are 
underway (see also, Webber 2016). This lack of profound change 
towards diversification can be understood in terms of Bolivia’s 
position on the world market, which also allows reflection on how 
far this could eventually change through state-led reform. 
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Three types of autonomy in the pluri-national state: Impossible 
reconciliation in and after the 2009 refoundation
The social-communitarian model described above signals how the 
demand for pluri-national self-determination entered the 
pluri-national state and is found in government and development 
plans. However, due to a lack of emphasis on the diversity of the 
Bolivian population, the model still seems to focus primarily on 
national rather than pluri-national self-determination. This is visible 
in the 2009 Constitution, which declares that the pueblo (not 
pueblos) has ownership of natural resources and that the state 
administers it in their interest (Art. 348 II, Art. 349 I CPE). 
Hydrocarbons are then found among the competences of the 
central state level (Art. 298). 
The other two demands for autonomy – peoples’ self-determination 
and deepened decentralisation – have also entered the 
pluri-national Constitution and legislation and are reflected in the 
administration of the pluri-national state and government policies 
and discourse. ‘Article 2’ of the Constitution grants peoples’ 
self-determination. Next to peoples’ right to free, prior, and 
informed consent (FPIC), the most important concrete category of 
how this has been translated into polity and policy is the 
Indigenous Peasant Originals’ Autonomy9 (AIOC, Autonomía 
indígena originario campesina) which is part of the ‘autonomy 
regime’ introduced in the third part of the Constitution and 
developed in more detail in the ‘Framework Law of Autonomies 
and Decentralisation’ (Ley Marco de Autonomías y 
Decentralisación). Municipalities and Peoples’ Territories (TIOCs, 
Territorios Indígena Originario Campesinos, previously TCOs) can 
undergo a transition process which will see them redefined as 
9 In Bolivia and in academic texts in English, ‘indigenous autonomy‘ is often used to refer to AIOC. The notion of 
the ‘IOC‘ goes back to the ‘Pact of Unity‘ and translating it as ‘indigenous‘ is not unproblematic (see footnotes 2 
and 8). 
AIOCs, in which – within the limits of existing norms and law – a 
traditional mode of governance is possible. In the (Vice-)Ministry of 
Autonomies,10 the Vice-Ministry/Directorate of AIOC accompanies 
the transition processes.
The demand for ‘autonomy as deepened decentralisation’ is also 
recognised by the pluri-national state. In contrast to the previous 
LDA, regional and departmental territories, like municipalities, are 
granted competences, resources and the right to elect their own 
authorities. As such, the system resembles a more or less classic 
model of decentralisation. Staff in the (Vice-)Ministry of 
Autonomies, many of whom already worked on the LPP inspired 
drive for municipalisation in the 1990s, support these so called 
autonomous territorial entities (entidad territorial autónoma, ETA) 
exercising their competences. Following the Framework Law, the 
National Autonomy Council, chaired by the President, was founded 
for political coordination and a ‘State Service of Autonomies’ that 
can be consulted by public servants from departments and regions 
as well as from the local level, is responsible for the technical 
coordination and facilitation of the management of the ETAs.
These three kinds of autonomy – (pluri-)national, peoples’ (i.e. 
indigenous) and decentralisation – found in the pluri-national state 
do not just coexist, but are in conflict with one another. Firstly, 
tensions between pluri-national self-determination and 
decentralisation came to the surface in the heated debates on the 
generation, distribution and spending of public resources through 
the ‘Fiscal Pact’, negotiated among representatives from 
government and territorial autonomous entities. 
Over recent decades, the share of resources going to the various 
departments has fallen and exacerbated by declining hydrocarbon 
10 In 2010, the Ministry of Autonomies was founded. Yet, in early 2017, President Morales degraded it into a 
Vice-Ministry within the Ministry of the Presidency.
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prices, the total revenues of the departments has been reduced, 
putting them under significant fiscal pressure. Yet, the 
Vice-President argued that the fiscal pact ‘has to contribute to, 
maintain, sustain and make the successful pluri-national 
development model better, it has to take place in the framework of 
the government plan for a strong presence of the a redistributive 
state…‘ (García Linera, cited in Chávez 2015, author's translation). 
For him,the camouflaged neo-neo-liberals which are in some 
gobernaciones try to take from the central state, which has 
transformed itself into the motor of development, production, 
equality, they want to eradicate it while the attitude should be how 
do we produce more wealth (García Linera, cited in Erbol 2015, 
author's translation).
As such, the clash seems to be one between centrifugal and 
centripetal logics of organising the state and distributing power.
Secondly, within the (Vice-)Ministry of Autonomies and other public 
bodies dealing with the matter, the tensions between ‘autonomy as 
decentralisation’ and ‘autonomy as peoples’ self-determination’ are 
apparent. For a former Director of the AIOC,
there are different strands and visions […] we experience this in 
the Ministry of Autonomies; there are people with a developmental 
vision, municipalista and occidental, and there is the indigenous 
autonomy, which are the weird creepy-crawly [bichos raros], who 
work on something else and propose decolonisation. (La Paz, 
04/04/2016)
For the Director of Municipal Autonomies, who has, like most of his 
senior colleagues, supported the municipalities since the Law of 
Popular Participation, strengthening the municipalities would be 
more important than the departmental or AIOC processes since, 
they argue, the municipalities are closer to the people than the 
departments and unlike the AIOC are concerned with all, rather 
than merely some, of the people. There is a limited willingness to 
grant the AIOC specificity, which would allow it to go beyond the 
idea of autonomy as decentralisation. As a state employee, mainly 
involved in municipal and departmental autonomy asserts:
They are the state, too; they are an indigenous autonomy, but they 
are [part of] the state and they have to give the information [to the 
state], it is not impossible that they receive money and you do not 
know what they did with it. (La Paz, 31/03/2016)
The staff working for the AIOC however argue that those working 
for the municipalities and departments do not (want to) understand 
the idea of peoples’ autonomy. While in both visions of autonomy, 
emphasis is put on local control, it seems that the ideas clash at a 
deeper level, meaning that they seem to speak of different realities 
- which are hardly compatible. 
Thirdly, clashes between national self-determination and peoples’ 
self-determination are illustrated in the conflict around the TIPNIS 
(Isiboro Secure National Park and Indigenous Territory). In May 
2017, the government enacted a law authorising the building of a 
motorway through the TIPNIS, which was based on the 2012 
consultation process with local people. While the government 
argues that the road will benefit all Bolivians as it will bring greater 
development, many observers pointed out that in this process the 
right to FPIC was violated and that the road would severely restrict 
the self-determination of peoples living in the area. When in 2015 
decrees were enacted, which had a detrimental impact on peoples’ 
self-determination (by limiting the time for FPIC, opening up 
national parks for oil and gas exploration and exploitation), the  
President of the Pluri-national Assembly explained that this was 
‘just an interpretation of what the Constitution prescribed and that 
the Bolivian pueblo has the right to utilise its natural resources in 
order to create a welfare state’ (Arce, cited in Layme 2016; author's 
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translation). This indicates how the government prioritises 
pluri-national self-determination over peoples’ autonomy. 
Revising the tensions between the three ideas of autonomy found 
in the pluri-national state has clearly shown that there are 
contradictions within the state that cannot be reconciled. The 
clashes are inherent in the pluri-national state and not ‘creative 
tensions’ (García Linera 2011) in its consolidation. Even if the 
government prioritises pluri-national self-determination over 
decentralisation and peoples’ self-determination, the latter two still 
remain part of the pluri-national state, its constitution, legislation 
and bureaucracy.
Finally, what happened to the idea of the different state, i.e., a state 
that not only recognises the existence of different cosmologies, but 
also facilitates peoples’ autonomy and fosters their participation in 
the making of decisions that affect them all (Garcés 2011)? When 
looking closely at the incorporation of the demand for peoples’ 
autonomy into the ‘autonomy, which is without doubt a major 
achievement of the struggles, it becomes apparent that the 
aspirations for a different state were little more than an 
afterthought. A different state would require a turning around not 
just of some elements of the workings of the state but a 
decolonisation of the state as such. For a different state that lives 
us to the pluri-national idea, it is, for example, not enough to 
ensure representation of indigenous groups if the decision-making 
rules remain unchanged (Tapia Mealla 2007). The limited 
achievements in the Bolivian case can understood through the 
lenses of decolonial thinkers like Grosfoguel. He argues that the 
modern state is in its essence deeply colonial, as modernity and 
coloniality are two sides of the same coin (Grosfoguel 2009).  
Hence, a decolonisation of the modern state is impossible and is 
also beyond what can be achieved through revolutionary change - 
with the state still at its centre, however ambitious the goals. 
Concluding remarks
In this essay, I used the concept of autonomy as a lens through 
which we can explore the nationalist revolution and pluri-national 
refoundation in Bolivia. While inclusion in the nation and control 
over the state and the nation’s destiny was a main priority for the 
1952 nationalist revolution, a key aspect in the pluri-national 
refoundation of Bolivia was recovery of (pluri-)national sovereignty, 
while simultaneously emphasising the diversity of the Bolivian 
populations. In both scenarios, profound formal changes took 
place at the state level, which only a decade before seemed 
unachievable. 
In both scenarios, though, the quest for social unity was inherently 
limited and a variety of tensions among those who had backed the 
respective revolutions became apparent. Moreover, in both cases, 
the state-led development strategy, seeking to promote a 
diversification of the economy, has failed to end Bolivia’s 
dependency on international commodity markets.
The rearticulation of Bolivia as a pluri-national state invites us to 
add two more ideas of autonomy to the discussion: ‘autonomy as 
(indigenous) peoples’ self-determination’, closely connected with 
the pluri-national state idea, and ‘autonomy as deepened 
decentralisation’. These two sets of struggles, which have a long 
history, but gained significant strength after democratisation in the 
1980s, are found alongside the idea of pluri-national 
self-determination in the pluri-national state; reflected, for example, 
in the Constitution, legislation, bureaucracy and policies. Yet, the 
three ideas of autonomy are in tension with one another. Even 
though the government has prioritised ‘pluri-national 
self-determination’ over the others, this has not led to a mitigation 
of these tensions. 
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While the Bolivian state has become more plural through its 
refoundation, which includes progress in the recognition of 
peoples’ rights, it has not turned into a different state, which 
facilitates self-determination. This process shows the limitations of 
the decolonisation project as embodied in the contemporary 
Bolivian state.
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Just another protest cycle? Bolivia’s indigenous peasant movement 
and “their” government
A ‘process of change’?
The famous ‘process of change’ that we have so closely witnessed 
in Bolivia emerged on the shoulders of indigenous, peasant and 
other popular social movements, to coalesce around several 
goals—including natural resource nationalisation, land 
redistribution, and recognition of indigenous identities and 
autonomies—and the overarching demand to fundamentally 
re-structure the political system. As Sian Lazar and Ana Dinerstein 
have pointed out, together with other scholars, Bolivia’s recent 
history is as much a story of hope as it is that of unfulfilled 
expectations (Dinerstein, 2015; Lazar, 2017). Bolivia is thus a 
perfect case to examine how movements came from the ‘street’—
Bolivian social movements have achieved notoriety given the 
strength and impact of social mobilisation—to put forward 
alternatives for a different world, and how successful they have 
been in achieving this.
Although indigenous peasant struggles in Bolivia need to be 
understood in the context of the material realities of indigenous 
communities and a history of peasant union organising (that is 
redistribution struggles), they cannot at the same time be divorced 
from alternative visions of ‘living well’ and the distinct indigenous 
cosmovisions in which these expectations are embedded, and the 
associated struggles for identity recognition and anti-discrimination 
(Fraser, 2003; Hale, 2002; Yashar, 2005). In this context, I 
investigate how successful different elements within the indigenous 
peasant movement in Bolivia have been at getting their voices 
heard and demands met. Have they been co-opted, 
institutionalised, marginalised? Should we study key transformative 
moments, or trace the ongoing resistance of different indigenous 
and peasant actors under a self-proclaimed indigenous 
government? 
This paper is based on a chapter of a doctoral thesis completed at 
the University of Oxford, which examines indigenous movements 
in Latin America from both quantitative and qualitative 
perspectives. The chapter itself investigates the strategic choices 
of five nationally important indigenous and campesino (peasant) 
organisations in Bolivia. They are the two recognition-focused 
indigenous “twins” of CIDOB (Confederation of Indigenous Peoples 
of Bolivia, Confederación de Pueblos Indígenas de Bolivia) and 
CONAMAQ (National Council of Ayllus y Markas de Qullasuyu, 
Consejo Nacional de Ayllus y Markas de Qullasuyu), and the more 
class-based indigenous-peasant “triplets” of the CSUTCB (Unified 
Union Confederation of Bolivian Rural Workers, Confederación 
Sindical Unica de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia), 
CNMCIOB-BS (National Confederation of Peasant Indigenous 
Original Women of Bolivia-Bartolina Sisa, Confederación Nacional 
de Mujeres Campesinas Indígenas Originarias de Bolivia-Bartolina 
Sisa), and CSCIOB (Union Confederation of Intercultural 
Communities of Bolivia, formerly the Colonizers Confederation, 
Confederación Sindical de Campesinos Interculturales Originarios 
de Bolivia). 
Logos of the five organisations studied 
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The chapter then traces the impact they have had on government 
decision-making before (2000-2005), during (2006-2010) and after 
(2011-2016) the constituent assembly process that promised to 
radically reform the republic after Evo Morales was elected 
President in 2005. This analysis, a shorter version of which is 
presented below, challenges the protest cycle conceptualisation of 
social movement outcomes, and questions the usefulness of the 
concept of co-optation for understanding the impact of social 
movements, especially once “their” government comes into power. 
It is common knowledge that much has changed in Bolivia since 
2005, despite the ongoing debates about how radical these 
transformations have been (e.g. Kohl, 2010; Postero, 2017; 
Svampa & Stefanoni, 2007; Svampa et al., 2010; Webber, 2008). 
What is clear is that the recent story of Bolivia is a story of both 
unprecedented inclusion and of new exclusions. It also highlights 
the contradictory notions of what political indigeneity means. It 
illustrates how the unity of cultural and material focused indigenous 
organising—the combining of recognition and redistribution—has 
now largely been eclipsed in Bolivia. In this context, how can we 
make sense of the recent trajectories of these organisations, and 
to what extent do general theories of social movements help us 
understand their successes and failures? 
Social movements in theoretical dialogue
The narrative of Latin American popular and indigenous protest in 
the last two decades, retold so frequently in recent academic 
writing as a story of dramatic protest cycles and key transformative 
moments, corresponds to Tarrow’s classic protest cycle 
hypothesis, which conceptualises movement trajectories into 
emergence and mobilisation followed by partial institutionalisation 
and the side-lining of more radical demands, resulting in 
co-optation and eventual decline (Tarrow, 1993, 1994). At first 
glance, this seems to have happened in Bolivia. Indigenous and 
popular movements that had thrown their weight behind Morales 
are now going through a process of both inclusion and 
institutionalisation, and exclusion and radicalisation (della Porta, 
2013). This is not the full story, however. The social movements 
organisations studied here have been both heard and had many of 
their demands met, and in this evolving context continue to devise 
new strategies to maintain their influence. As such, I argue that the 
story of Bolivia’s ‘process of change’ is rather more complicated.
In order to start to analyse the trajectories and outcomes of 
Bolivia’s indigenous movements, an interdisciplinary approach was 
needed. This theoretical take emerges from putting into dialogue 
the general sociological literature on social movements, and the 
regional studies of identity politics in Latin America. In the former, 
there has been a renewed interest in analyses of the successes 
and failures of social movements. Yet despite this recent surge in 
interest, the determinants of success of social protest remain 
contested (Amenta, 2014; Biggs & Andrews, 2015; Bosi et al., 
2016; Giugni et al., 1999; Kolb & Tarrow, 2007; Suh, 2012). Some 
studies even suggest that the direct influence of overt protest, 
especially on public policy, is minimal, if not sometimes 
counterproductive (Giugni, 2007; Olzak & Soule, 2009). This is 
another reason why Latin America in general and Bolivia in 
particular present perfect cases to study, as we know from the 
literature from and about Latin America that popular and 
indigenous movements have brought countries to standstill, forced 
multicultural reforms and even deposed presidents (Aguilar & 
Escárzaga, 2014; Lazar, 2008; Postero & Zamosc, 2004; Svampa, 
2008; Van Cott, 2005; Yashar, 2005; Zibechi, 2012). 
Neither strand of scholarship relevant for making sense of social 
movements in Bolivia has, however, engaged in direct dialogue 
with each other. What emerges out of attempting such a 
North-South dialogue, among other insights, is the need to pay 
attention to the ongoing everyday strategies of social movement 
actors beyond iconic ‘transformative’ moments of mass 
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mobilisation (Svampa, 2008, 2017; Tarrow, 1995, 2011; Zibechi, 
2007, 2012). The protest cycle conceptualisation does highlight the 
importance of the state in influencing the trajectory of social 
movement activity. However, rather than assuming that the state 
always responds predictably—meeting less radical demands at 
first, then repressing the more radical sections of the movement 
that remain—it is more analytically fruitful to see the relationship 
with the state as a factor that can have different consequences 
under different circumstances, ranging from institutionalisation and 
co-optation to radicalisation and decline. 
Investigating social movement outcomes 
In order to explore those strategies, I conducted my latest research 
in Bolivia in the summer and autumn of 2016, following a previous 
stay in 2011. I collected a) semi-structured interviews with 
movement leaders and activists, past and present, other civil 
society actors and government representatives, as well as b) 
participant observation of meetings, encounters and workshops 
organised or attended by representatives of the organisations 
under study. I then explored the evolution of their strategies before 
and throughout the Morales administration using the method of 
process tracing (Brady & Collier, 2010; George & Bennett, 2005).
The complexity of ethno-linguistic and class-based identities and 
self-identification in Bolivia is well known by now (Grisaffi, 2010; 
Postero, 2007). Despite the rhetorical efforts to create a new 
political identity of the indígena-originario-campesino 
(indigenous-original-peasant)—now codified in the 2009 
constitution—politicized identities in Bolivia are complex, 
competing and contradictory. I use the term indigenous and 
indigenous peasant for the collective actors I studied, since they 
use these terms themselves, at least some of the time, and since 
cultural identity features as part of their struggle at least to some 
extent. 
The five indigenous and campesino social movement 
organisations (SMOs) arguably capture the diversity of indigenous 
organising in Bolivia in including both recognition-focused and 
more class-based movements, in both lowland and highland parts 
of the country. Despite the strength of indigenous mobilising, it has 
never been possible to speak of one indigenous movement in 
Bolivia (Albó, 2008; Lucero, 2008; Postero, 2007, 2017; Rivera 
Cusicanqui, 1987; Yashar, 2005). There was a period of relative 
unity of indigenous and peasant struggles, in the early 2000s, 
culminating in the official signing in 2004 of the so-called Unity 
Pact between the five organisations studied, among others. In 
doing so, they threw their weight behind MAS as “their” electoral 
vehicle (numerous interviews, 2016; García Yapur et al, 2015). The 
pact had been years in the making, with its concrete foundations 
already laid during the 2002 March for the Constituent Assembly. 
The coming together of these five Bolivian indigenous 
organisations in the early 2000s showed their ability to eclipse their 
differences, even if temporarily, in order to develop a common 
agenda and a common strategy of struggle. This is a crucial part of 
the story of the historic Morales election in 2005, at the helm of a 
social movement ‘electoral vehicle’, and the subsequent 
constitutional reform process, which culminated in the popular 
approval of a new radical Constitution in 2009. However, the 
long-standing antagonisms between indigenous and peasant 
social movement organisations have since resurfaced forcefully. As 
of 2016 when I conducted my latest field research in this 
ever-so-fascinating country, two of them, CIDOB and CONAMAQ, 
had left the Unity Pact; in actuality, they have split into two 
organisations, one in support and one in opposition to the 
government.1 This follows the well-known TIPNIS conflict 
(Achtenberg, 2011, 2012, 2013a, 2013b) and represents the 
1 The opposition, so-called organic—organisations have maintained more continuity of leadership and more 
legitimacy, especially internationally, thanks to their independence from the government, and an increasingly 
environmentalist stance.
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turning point in the relationship between Bolivian social 
movements and “their” government. Social movements in Bolivia 
have since experienced unexpected successes as well as 
disappointments.
What is ‘success’ for social movements?
As hinted at above, ‘success’ of course needs to be defined. 
Elaborating on Gamson’s influential study, success for the five 
organisations studied over time is defined as the level of ongoing 
influence on national decision-making processes (Gamson, 1975, 
2014). In this sense, the five indigenous organisations were coded 
according to the nature of their interaction with state institutions, 
ranging from exclusion to inclusion (Stahler-Sholk & Vanden, 2011; 
Vergara-Camus, 2013; Zibechi, 2007). However, this also takes 
into account the extent to which the organisation’s agenda 
continues to be reflected in government policy, and whether the 
organisations’ influence can prevent government actions that go 
directly against its interests.
Certainly, in the case of Bolivia, the indigenous organisations under 
study have generally not experienced either extreme of complete 
exclusion or full state control, but fall somewhere in between. The 
closest to the exclusion end of the spectrum is the experience of 
the CSCIOB during the neoliberal period (specifically 2000-2005), 
which as an organisation did not play as much of a role in the 
mass mobilisations of the Water (2000) and Gas (2003) Wars as 
the other “twins” (Crabtree & Whitehead, 2008; Lazar, 2008), and 
which was criminalised by neoliberal governments as part of their 
‘war on drugs’ efforts.
The two other redistribution-focused “twins” (CSUTCB and 
Bartolinas) were also largely unsuccessful before the election of 
Evo Morales but did play a role in those ‘Wars’ and did attend 
negotiations with neoliberal governments on a number of 
occasions. At the same time, the recognition-focused CIDOB could 
claim some advantages from the neoliberal period, especially the 
granting of territorial rights to indigenous communities claiming 
ancestral rights, with the introduction of the TCO (Tierra 
Comunitaria de Origen, collectively owned and protected 
indigenous territories) regime in the 1990s. It still had limited 
influence on national decision-making, and so did CONAMAQ, 
which due to its more radical demands and more open opposition 
to both the neoliberal regime and recently also the MAS 
administration, has experienced the least positive outcomes of the 
five indigenous SMOs throughout the period studied (numerous 
interviews, 2016; Albó, 2008; Lucero, 2008; Postero, 2017; Yashar, 
2005). 
Beyond ‘co-optation’ 
Now to what extent does the theory of a protest cycle in general, 
and the concept of co-optation in particular help us make sense of 
these trajectories? The fact that many social movement leaders—
especially of the “triplets”—have taken up government positions in 
the Morales administrations would suggest that these 
organisations have been co-opted. Yet, under Gamson’s influential 
classification of movement outcomes (Gamson, 1975), co-optation 
means acceptance of the organisation as legitimate, but without 
any kind of advantages. However, it is undeniable that under the 
administrations of the MAS, all five organisations of the Unity Pact 
have benefited from a number of achievements reflecting their 
programmatic agenda, in terms of political participation, the text of 
the constitution, and its implementation (numerous interviews, 
2016; Garcés, 2013; García Yapur et al, 2015; Postero, 2017; 
Zegada & Komadina, 2014). Then, it is difficult to speak of 
co-optation if at least some of the demands of all the organisations 
have been met. In the current MAS administration, some leaders 
and activists of the organisations themselves are part of the state, 
and those who were elected tend to still insist they consider this a 
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major success. Although this means also having to face the 
challenges of public administration, this tends to be seen also as a 
positive outcome. 
The CSUTCB and the CSCIOB, in particular, make a forceful 
argument that being part of the state’s bureaucratic apparatus is 
one of their main victories as social movement organisations 
(numerous interviews, 2016). The access their leaders have 
gained to decision-making spaces is unprecedented for indigenous 
peasant leaders in a post-colonial country like Bolivia. I interviewed 
Victor Cabezas, the General Secretary of the CSCIIB, on 4th 
November 2016, and Hugo López, Secretary for Participation and 
Social Control of CSUTCB there days later. On both occasions, in 
their respective La Paz offices, the leaders insisted that this is what 
they had fought for (Interview with Victor Cabezas, 4th November 
2016; Interview with Hugo López, 7th November 2016). Since, they 
have focused on getting their demands pushed through the 
Bolivian state institutions. In researching unions and the 
relationship with the state, Lazar highlights that without 
understanding more fully the experiences of so-called co-opted 
leaders, “we should not take co-optation for granted as either 
inevitable or inevitably bad for … members” (Lazar, 2017: 12). 
Thus, ‘co-optation’ can also be a way of getting advantages for 
members, with the results of this integration into the state 
depending on the internal structure of the organisation.
This last factor is crucial. This combination of loyalty to the 
government and loss of the most experienced leaders has indeed 
weakened Bolivia’s indigenous social movement organisations, 
especially compared to the height of mobilising capacity they had 
in the early 2000s. The organisations themselves are aware of this, 
however, and have been devising strategies to respond to this 
unintended consequence of helping bring to power a government 
of their own choosing. When I visited the departmental branch of 
the Bartolinas in Santa Cruz in October 2016, their office was 
hosting a leadership workshop for female leaders, activists, and 
new members alike. This was organised by María Muñoz, the 
Executive Director of the departmental federation, with the support 
of the MAS senator Felipa Merino (and the federation’s ex-director) 
and congresswoman (MAS) Isabel Ortega, formerly Vice-minister 
for Indigenous Justice (‘Indigenous Original Peasant Justice’). 
Isabel Ortega, in fact, was leading the workshop, sharing her 
experiences from years of struggle as a Quechua peasant 
woman.2 
This workshop thus showed the continued interactions between 
social movement organisations and the MAS government. The 
female leaders and politicians showed both loyalty to the 
government they felt they had helped bring to power, and 
insistence on their organisational and programmatic autonomy. 
There was clear recognition of the need to continuously strengthen 
the organisation and train new leaders not forged in the fires of 
road blockades and street battles, in order to continue to fight for 
the interests of indigenous peasant women in the country. 
This was clearly combined with acknowledgement of how far they 
have come. In a personal interview, the Santa Cruz Bartolina 
director told me that access to property rights, political posts and 
anti-discrimination laws are considered within the indigenous 
women’s federation as the greatest successes, fruits of years of 
struggle. Although she thinks that the vice-presidential posts 
should have been offered to a female leader—to “accompany Evo”, 
according to the Andean indigenous logic of gender 
‘complementarity’3—she was clear that many of the central goals 
2 In fact, just like Evo Morales, Isabel Ortega moved from the Quechua highlands to Aymara valleys, and has 
thus been described as both Aymara and Quechua, and involved in combined indigenous peasant struggles. 
This example thus brings to the fore the complex question of what ‘indigeneity’ means in Bolivia, especially 
politically. 
3 Although the organisation was established by indigenous peasant women, who felt their interests could not be 
fully represented in the ‘macho’ CSUCTB, the taking up of Bartolina Sisa’s name in relation to the CSUTCB’s 
Tupac Katari symbolises a reaffirmation of the Andean indigenous notion of chachawarmi, or gender 
complementarity.
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of the organisations have been, or are in the process of being, met 
(Interview with María Muñoz, 22nd October 2016). To put this into 
context, these three indigenous peasant leaders told me numerous 
stories of how a woman de pollera (traditional Andean dress) like 
them before 2005 could often not enter banks, taxis would not pick 
them up, and restaurants would refuse to serve them in all the 
cities in the country.4 Isabel Ortega recounted in a recently 
published collection of life histories, for example: 
“When I was elected as a representative [to the lower chamber], 
even though I had my credentials, the police would not let me enter 
Plaza Murillo; then the international press arrived, and only thanks 
to them were we able to enter to be sworn in. Once in the 
Legislative Assembly, they called us names, insulted us, and 
wouldn’t leave us alone” (Isabel Ortega in García Yapur et al, 
2015: 43).
Racism and discrimination in Bolivia have not disappeared over 
night, but the idea that indigenous rights are legitimate has gained 
incredible traction in Bolivian politics. Going back to Gamson, how 
useful is the term co-optation when a significant proportion of the 
organisations demands have been met?
Beyond ‘transformative moments’
At the same time, what about the demands for a more radical 
transformation of the state? The emphasis on learning how to do 
public administration (‘from protest to proposal’), has meant that 
efforts to transform the institutions of the state in a more profound, 
radical way seem to have all but vanished. Thus, this new wave of 
incorporation (Rossi, 2017) appears to be just that, rather than an 
actual transformation of the institutions of the state as many had 
hoped. Access by social movement organisations to
4 Fabricant (2009) recounts similar stories specifically for Santa Cruz.
decision-making is mediated by the MAS social 
movement-cum-political party, and the promise of direct democracy 
remains unfulfilled. The MAS has been behaving much more like a 
traditional political party than it had promised, as evidenced in the 
emerging Bolivian literature on this topic, such as a recent review 
of parliamentary proceedings by Zegada and Komadina (2014). 
Formal rules for managing the relationship between MAS and the 
social movements that brought it to power were not established 
once MAS became the governing party. There is no legal 
framework that I am aware of, for example, requiring the MAS to 
obtain formal consent of the Unity Pact organisations before 
making political decisions. 
One organisation that could be seen as an attempt to 
institutionalise social movement participation in government is 
CONALCAM (National Coordinator for Change). This is ostensibly 
a forum for Unity Pact organisations to meet, discuss their 
proposals, and evaluate government policy. This is a space where 
real debate could take place and through which popular sectors’ 
demands could be articulated to the inner MAS circle. At the same 
time, in many of my interviews, CONALCAM was described as only 
a space to ‘show-off’ the plurinational and indigenous nature of 
MAS to the media, without any real debate. Similarly, when I visited 
the La Paz offices of the CSUTCB in November 2016, a call to 
participate in a MAS congress was stuck to the wall; not only did 
this state that attendance for the Unity Pact organisations, and 
their numerous affiliates, was compulsory, but also stipulated in a 
prominent place in the letter that attendees are required to “bring 
their flags and dress in traditional clothing”. 
This suggests that reunions with and among social movement 
organisations are perhaps more of a way to reinforce the MAS 
legitimacy as both an indigenous government, and a government 
of social movements, than spaces where a ‘social movement 
government’ can actually be exercised. Thus, despite the fact 
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many of the demands of the SMOs under study have been met 
though constitutional reform, legislative change, and 
implementation, and at least some of them continue to have 
unprecedented access to spaces of decision-making, their impact 
on those decisions is more complex and less significant than might 
be expected under a so-called ‘social movement government’.
Moreover, it is crucial to highlight that this description of 
experiences of access to decision-making apply much more to the 
“triplets” than to the “twins” of CIDOB and CONAMAQ. Although 
the CSUTCB and CSCIOB in particular see their bureaucratic 
participation positively, there are current and former members of all 
five of the indigenous SMOs studied, who complain that those who 
truly have struggled, the so-called organic members, are being 
marginalised by 'invited' technocrats (numerous interviews, 2016; 
Garcés, 2010; García Yapur et al, 2015; Schavelzon, 2012; 
Zegada & Komadina, 2014). 
Indeed, in pursuit of bureaucratic efficiency, new ‘invited members’ 
began to occupy parliamentary positions, indicating, in Dinerstein’s 
words, “a step away from the initial government’s direct 
identification with indigenous-popular movements” (Dinerstein, 
2015: 161). In its concern with expanding the state, effective 
governance and the implementation of public policies—although as 
Kohl argues, those are arguably legitimate aims in their own right 
(Kohl, 2010)—the governing party has indeed limited internal 
spaces of debate. In fact, this was cited as a serious problem by 
leaders and activists within all five of the organisations I studied. 
This also relates to the question of whether and how minority 
representatives, despite their access to spaces of political 
decision-making, can get their agendas reflected in government 
policy. As Yashar (2005) has highlighted, indigenous movements 
face a number of common and fundamental problems when joining 
electoral politics. As discussed above, most experienced leaders 
join the state, and potentially leave the organisations weaker. The 
usually small number of elected representatives find it hard to get 
their communities’ and organisations’ agendas pushed through as 
a minority. The latter has indeed been an obstacle that the CIDOB 
and the CONAMAQ, despite their participation in the constituent 
assembly, have not been able to overcome. 
After the 2005 election, many CIDOB and CONAMAQ leaders took 
up positions within the MAS government; however, their 
experiences have been largely disappointing (Zegada & 
Komadina, 2014). Bienvenido Zacu, a long-time indigenous 
activist, former Land and Territory secretary of the CIDOB and a 
MAS congress-member in the first Morales administration, 
recounted to me how felt he was simply expected to the vote for 
whatever the government proposed (Interview with Bienvenido 
Zacu, 19th October 2016). Consequently, Bienvenido Zacu decided 
to leave and return to Santa Cruz. This limiting of spaces of 
internal debate has been a much bigger problem for the CIDOB 
and CONAMAQ since their demands are increasingly at odds with 
MAS policy, unlike the demands of the CSUTCB, CSCIOB and the 
Bartolinas. 
Conclusion: Just another protest cycle? 
As the MAS government has not pushed for a more radical 
transformation of the state and the economy, with continued 
reliance on extraction, the increasing exclusion of CIDOB and 
CONAMAQ contrasts with the continued inclusion of the “triplets”. 
Even for the latter, however, there seems to be increasingly less 
clarity in the relationship between the institutions of the state, the 
Morales administration, and the social movements that had helped 
bring it to power. Moreover, many of the street-protest hardened 
leaders report a certain distancing from Morales himself, and the 
closing of the direct channels of communication that many of them 
used to enjoy (numerous interviews, 2016; García Yapur et al, 
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2015). Most of the current leaders of the CSUTCB, CSCIOB and 
the Bartolinas, as well as MAS ministers and vice-ministers, 
described to me the continued cooperation and coordination 
between the organisations, the so-called political instrument of the 
MAS, and the executive. At the same time, even they were not 
able to say in concrete detail how conflicts are resolved and who 
gets to have the final say in contentious situations. Only saying 
that ‘consensus’ is always sought, this leaves the mechanisms of 
conflict resolution unclear. 
The social struggles in Bolivia created a vacuum of hope in which 
anything seemed possible. Yet with the nature of this potential 
future contested, however, it seems that, in terms of the 
institutional structure of the state at least, the weight of much of the 
status quo has prevailed. At the same time, at least some of the 
programmatic agenda of all five organisations has been reflected 
in government policy, and, especially as indigenous women appear 
to be taking a more protagonist role in recent years (Krausova, 
2017; Rousseau & Morales Hudon, 2017), indigenous and peasant 
struggles seem unlikely to disappear in Bolivia anytime soon. As 
such, the protest cycle conceptualisation—suggesting the 
inevitable decline of social movements through simultaneous 
co-optation and radicalisation—can only help us so far in 
understanding the ongoing impact of social movements on 
government decision-making in the country. It misses the ongoing, 
everyday collective agency and strategic decision-making of 
leaders and activists on both sides of the institutionalisation 
barricade. 
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“Clases a medias” – the changing contours of Bolivian middle classes
Evo Morales has traditionally referred to the Bolivian middle class 
in dismissive terms. In speeches aimed at different audiences, it 
was customary to hear the President citing sociologist Sergio 
Almaraz (Morales Ayma quoted in Maldonado, 2014; Morales 
Ayma, 2014, 2016), who famously called it a “clase a medias”, a 
“half-baked class”. The expression did not just seem to address the 
elusive contours of this social category, but can be also interpreted 
as a jibe of sorts, alluding to its membership in terms of 
individualism, political disloyalty, and lack of class consciousness. 
Such a stance is not atypical among the Latin American left. In a 
recent publication, Hernan Vanoli compiles a brief inventory of 
attitudes towards the middle class, which elsewhere in the region 
has historically been perceived to be “arriviste and insincere, 
mercenary [cipaya], and treacherous, pliable [acomodaticia] and 
discriminatory, impotent and mediocre, alienated and banal” 
(Semán, Trímboli, and Vanoli 2016, 40). But towards the end of 
January 2018, after a series of significant political events and 
mobilisations during the previous two months, President Morales 
made a surprising statement: “we need to improve, look into, and 
gather the aspirations of the new middle class” (Morales Ayma 
2018a). What could have caused such a shift in the government’s 
stance towards this “imagined constituency” (Wahrman 1995)? In 
this article, I will offer two possible explanations. The first relates to 
socioeconomic changes during the past 13 years, which have not 
only significant altered Bolivia’s socioeconomic structure, but have 
required a new set of categories to understand the country’s social 
landscape. The second explanation involves recent political 
events, which have seen “traditional middle classes” (García 
Linera 2018) pour into the streets in protest against the 
government. Based on these explanations, I will discuss how the 
middle-class category has become contested by politicians and 
intellectuals in recent months, as an inroad into understanding 
what is at stake in this discursive dispute.
Socioeconomic transformations in Bolivia, 2005-2017
After over two decades of coalition governments, Evo Morales was 
elected President in 2005. A combination of economic inclusion 
policies and sustained economic growth came together to 
significantly reduce income inequality. GDP growth between 2006 
and 2016 averaged over 5% per year, well above trends in the rest 
of Latin America (World Bank 2018). The minimum wage was 
raised from Bs440 in 2005 to Bs2060 in 20171, a nominal increase 
of 454%. A program of conditional cash transfers (including Bono 
Juancito Pinto aimed at schoolchildren; Bono Juana Azurduy for 
new and expectant mothers; and Renta Dignidad, a modest 
universal pension scheme) was implemented, injecting money into 
the economy and fuelling internal demand. Before Evo Morales 
came into office, the 10% richest earners in the country generated 
128 times that of the bottom 10%; by 2015 this difference had been 
narrowed to 39 times (Ministerio de Comunicación 2016). 
Measured in terms of income, the government reduced moderate 
and extreme poverty by 23% since 2005. Between 2010 and 2012, 
the country silently underwent a remarkable point of inflection: its 
population went from being classified as predominantly poor, to 
predominantly middle income, and by 2018 over 58% of the 
population were part of this segment (Morales Ayma 2018b).
In order to bring into focus the group which in recent years has 
increasingly come to be known as the Bolivian “middle class”, it is 
crucial to understand that this (arguably residual) category is 
defined as those living above the moderate poverty line (the 
income threshold which allows for the fulfilment of basic needs), 
and beneath the high-income threshold (set at around 5%). In 
2017, the moderate-poverty line was Bs766.702 per person living in 
an urban area, calculated through total household income. This 
1 Approximately equivalent to £30 to £210, at historical exchange rates.
2 Approximately £2.75 per day.
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means that a two-person household with a single earner on this 
salary would be well within the middle-income bracket. The upshot 
of the latter is that this category can feasibly include domestic 
servants, architects, building porters, minibus drivers, lawyers, and 
street vendors, irrespective of levels of education, occupational 
stability, consumption patterns, or a shared set of values.
Approached as a grouping, this bracket may seem absurdly 
heterogeneous in terms of its social composition, yet trying to 
contrast it with measures based around self-identification further 
complicates matters. According to the latest World Values Survey 
(Moreno, Villanueva, and Schwarz 2018), 66% of the adult 
population (and 78% of those aged 12-17) considered themselves 
to belong to the middle class. Of course, one may argue that a 
survey instrument elicits categories which may not reflect 
spontaneous self-positioning, and respondents typically converge 
around middle categories along most scales. But this figure is 
remarkably high even by international standards; the global 
average in the previous wave of the survey (2011-2014) was 57%, 
with Peru at 55%, Argentina at 60%, and Brazil at 40%. As a 
further point of contrast, 66% of respondents in the United States 
self-identified with belonging to the middle class.
The foregoing discussion aims not only to give an overview of 
socioeconomic transformations in Bolivia over the past decade, but 
also how the government has sought to portray inequality 
reduction figures. Indeed, during the campaign leading up to Evo 
Morales’ re-election in 2014, the government listed (among its key 
accomplishments since coming into office in 2005), having taken a 
large percentage of people out of poverty, not into the 
middle-income segment, but into the “middle class” (Ministerio de 
Comunicación 2014). Notwithstanding a Marxian ideological 
heritage (more closely aligned with occupation-based class 
categories tied into social-conflict dynamics), income-based 
stratification rapidly became part of the governmental discourse 
around inequality reduction. The middle class gained a newfound 
protagonism, yet its contours and composition were only beginning 
to be explored.
Of course, the middle-class category can mean very different 
things, depending on where it comes from. A recent publication 
estimated 150-200 definitions, based on two literature reviews 
(Adamovsky, Visacovsky, and Vargas 2015). A single volume on 
economic perspectives on the middle class in Latin America makes 
use of 6 definitions over 9 chapters (Dayton-Johnson 2015). 
Beyond the polysemy of this category, it is clearly a site of 
theoretical and technical debate.
Middle classes in Latin America and Bolivia
In the Latin American context, debates surrounding these groups 
go back several decades. Through an examination of political 
trends in the first half of the 20th Century, Johnson’s seminal book 
on Political Change in Latin America (1958) argued that “middle 
groups” across the region had begun to change their political 
position, shifting from being a clientele of old elites, to forming new 
alliances with “working elements”, altering the balance of power 
and bringing about a potential for progressive politics. While 
scholars such as Pike (1963) and Wagley (1964) fundamentally 
questioned Johnson’s premises, a debate had been installed 
around middle classes and their political role in the region. Like 
kingmakers, through their expansion they were seen to be able to 
sway the balance between the polarised interests that confronted 
elites and working classes. Samuel P. Huntington (1968) went as 
far as seeing in them a revolutionary potential, but predicted that 
as they age, they also become more conservative.
Bolivia’s rapidly-expanding middle-income segment is largely 
concentrated in metropolitan areas (PNUD 2016), and includes a 
growing proportion of formerly impoverished (or otherwise 
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excluded) ethnic groups, notably the urban Aymara. Predominant 
approaches to social ascent in Bolivia from the late 20th Century 
onwards have focused on cultural and identity dynamics, starting 
with the fundamental question of what to even call middling 
segments with mixed status markers. In particular, there is a 
longstanding debate regarding how best to denote prosperous 
urban Aymara and mestizos of Aymara extraction. Referring to this 
group under the broad brush of “cholo bourgeoisie” (Toranzo 
1991), early contributions to this debate portrayed them (often 
pejoratively) as a distinct, and at times adversarial, segment to 
traditional middle classes.
Other labels have since appeared such as “parallel middle class” 
(Himpele 2003, 2008) “Aymara bourgeoisie” (Miranda 2008), and 
even “non-bourgeois middle class” (Gran Poder priest, cited by 
Tassi in Soruco, 2012), with the emphasis variously placed 
between ethnic origin and primary economic activity. More recent 
labels have included “proto-bourgeoisie” (Salazar, Rodríguez and 
Evi Sulcata, 2012), “moneyed plebeian [popular] class” (Tassi et 
al., 2012). Like Portes and Hoffman before her (2003), Rea 
Campos (2016) tends towards a definition which characterises 
these subjects as part of a “petite bourgeoisie commercial middle 
class”, which she also calls “new commercial Aymara petite 
bourgeoisie”. 
What is striking about the direction of this debate around labels, is 
the ever-increasing complexity of concepts used to denote these 
groups. Many of these names include components relating to 
occupational activity, and position within a perceived social 
structure, emphasising the attempts at creating a multi-dimensional 
class concept which, importantly, includes a strong ethnic 
component. Intersectionalities which cut through Bolivian society 
are palpable in the permutations of social categories which need to 
be remixed to account for the country’s recent social 
transformations.
Other approaches have focused on these actors’ capacity for 
ethnic reaffirmation in an urban setting (Guaygua 2003), and the 
limited degree of assimilation of these groups within traditional 
class structures, notwithstanding their economic integration. Tassi, 
for example, has argued that despite this group’s growing 
prosperity and visibility, “this success has not been accompanied 
by social refinement and an adjustment to customs and practices 
of the traditional middle class” (cited in Soruco 2012). Regarding 
these (at times paradoxical) mixed status markers, a recent article 
related to the gendered dimensions of urban real-estate 
transformations in La Paz points out how “a striking feature of 
these patterns is that the image of the person who has 
accumulated enough wealth to displace people, is that of an 
indigenous woman” (Maclean 2018, 2). Other approaches have 
sought to characterise Bolivia’s “new middle class” in settings 
beyond metropolitan centres, including secondary cities (Shakow 
2014) and an emerging “peasant middle class”, made up of affluent 
Aymara coca growers who are able to forge an identity “without 
becoming part of the mestizo middle class” (Pellegrini Calderón 
2016, 21).
While academics have long been debating the ascent and 
fragmentation of middling classes in Bolivia, the topic has only 
recently regained centrality in national politics, a discursive arena 
to which I will now turn.
Bolivian middle classes take to the streets
Over the course of three months, from the end of November 2017 
to February 2018, a series of political events and debates within 
the public sphere continued to shape contemporary 
understandings around social class in Bolivia. On the 28th of 
November 2017, the Constitutional Tribunal (TCP) issued a ruling 
allowing Evo Morales to seek indefinite re-election, despite losing a 
referendum on this point by a narrow margin in 2016. A variety of 
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social actors poured into the streets in protest in the days that 
followed this ruling. During subsequent weeks, medical doctors 
from across the country entered the foreground in protest against a 
substantial reform to the Penal Code. Many of them were upset at 
what they perceived to be a draconian treatment of their profession 
through increased penalties for medical malpractice. After a series 
of confrontations with the police and failed negotiation attempts, 
the government took a U-turn and agreed to abrogate the 
proposed reform to the Penal Code on the 21st of January 2018, 
ending the 47-day strike. Beyond the dispute between doctors and 
the government, the wide popular support which mounted in the 
favour of doctors arguably served as a vehicle for the mobilisation 
of the discontent with the government over the TCP ruling.
On the 43rd day of the protests, vice-president Álvaro García Linera 
provocatively stated that these mobilisations amounted to a “rabble 
[asonada] of a decadent middle class”. Opposition leaders and 
analysts were quick to take up the challenge, partially accepting 
the class category in which the social protests were portrayed, but 
rejecting the pejorative connotations. On the 7th of January 2018, 
former president Carlos Mesa (a prominent opposition leader 
highly critical of the government) published a piece in which he 
portrayed the middle class as “an idealised space” towards which 
all societies should head (Mesa 2018). As a riposte to the 
traditional class prejudice of middle sectors being conservative, 
reluctant to change, and generally incapable of mobilisation, Mesa 
saw renewed political potential in this group, arguably overlooking 
its heterogeneous –and largely underexplored– composition. 
Characterising the middle class as the “main depositary” of 
democratic values, he went on to call them the “arbiters” of the 
electoral destiny of political parties and candidates alike. In turn, 
vice-president García Linera outlined his position in a newspaper 
article published on the 17th of January (2018). In this piece, he 
remarked upon what he perceived to be a dual composition of this 
large grouping, made up by over half of the country’s population, 
whose main cleavage lay between “decadent” traditional groups, 
and “new” groups.
Social ascent, between continuity and change
My own perspective on the trajectory of the so-called “middle-
class” segment is the following: largely marginalised social sectors 
at the turn of the millennium converged around a series of 
demands aimed at deep political change, chiefly around 
anti-neoliberal and anti-imperialist slogans, and a redefinition of 
socioeconomic inclusion. Many of these expectations have largely 
been met, with the arrival of the MAS government, the enactment 
of the new Constitution in 2009, and widespread socio-economic 
transformations over the past decade. As the social landscape has 
become transformed, I believe that many of the new demands 
generated by ascendant segments are being sought in the market, 
rather than in the state. 
Significant media and academic attention has been directed 
towards traditionally “conspicuous” forms of consumption, with 
cholets3 and prestes4 as emblematic of ‘plebeian’ [popular] 
self-affirmation. If the social segments which have experienced an 
increase in prosperity during the past 13 years are chiefly 
concerned with maintaining or increasing their capacity for material 
consumption, this paints a rather simplistic picture of their political 
demands. Conceived in this way, their political choices cannot be 
seen in terms translatable into ideological positions, but as a 
function of pragmatic concerns surrounding their economic 
stability. Should these groups merely aim to continue in this 
3 Exuberant neo-Andean architecture edifices which typically fulfil residential and commercial functions. The 
word is a portmanteau of cholo (an often-pejorative term for urban dwellers with an ethnic background), and 
chalet (which refers to the houses atop these multi-story buildings).
4 Large celebration sponsored by an affluent individual, family or fraternity in the community, often celebrated 
within a cholet (see above).
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trajectory, a continuation of prudent macroeconomic management, 
sustained economic growth, redistributive policies, and expansion 
of housing and consumption credit would viably yield a vote of 
continuity rather than change. Yet such a reading would overlook 
less visible consumption tendencies which are more indicative of 
tectonic shifts in status and identity.
Public services are an arena through which the state comes into 
most intimate contact with citizens. Trends surrounding health and 
education consumption can be seen as important indicators of a 
family’s trajectory of mobility within Bolivia’s changing social 
landscape. Shifts towards private schooling and healthcare 
provision signal a movement not only in status, but in disposable 
income available for these types of expenditure. Symbolic 
boundaries between social groups have traditionally been sought 
through choice of private schools, insofar as they mark forms of 
distinction (see Ball, Bowe, and Gewirtz 1996), and offer access to 
elite social networks. To this extent that this is true in the Bolivian 
context, private education is central to the basket of goods which 
has traditionally enabled social differentiation. Private healthcare, 
in contrast, rather than signalling a “conspicuous” form of 
consumption, will generally involve opting out of state-provided 
services in search of a higher quality of service. A recent study 
(CIS 2018) has monitored consumption trends over a 10-year 
period, revealing increases in expenditure towards private services 
across all socioeconomic segments, with increases markedly more 
pronounced among those in lower strata.
Should these trends continue to deepen, then the type of social 
mobility that will be most politically relevant for the upcoming 
elections of 2019, will not necessarily become apparent by 
observing patterns of material conspicuous consumption, but 
through a gradual breaking away of the “new middle income” 
constituency from state-provided services. This tendency is 
supported by observations such as there being more private 
security guards than state police in certain parts of Central 
America, or Mexican “lower middle classes” having a tendency to 
opt for private university education (Lopez-Calva 2014). The 
relevance of these moves is that they alter the social contract, 
understood as “the combination of implicit and explicit 
arrangements that determine what each group contributes to and 
receives from the state” (World Bank 2012, 11). A reduction in use 
of public services decreases the incentives held by these groups to 
generate collective demands geared towards progressive notions 
of the common good. 
Bolivia continuing along this familiar path of socioeconomic 
development would be a further confirmation of Huntington’s 
prediction that middle classes become more conservative as they 
increase in size (1968, 77). Recent data from the World Values 
Survey in Bolivia (Moreno, Villanueva, and Schwarz 2018) shows 
that on an international level, Bolivian society today is 
comparatively conservative regarding the relation between citizens 
and the State. For example, most Bolivians expect incentives that 
promote enterprise and individual effort (presumably through a 
reduction in state intervention in these spheres), and tend to 
believe economic success is a mark of individual achievement and 
hard work rather than opportunity. These tendencies are at times 
strangely combined with forms of nationalism with regards to state 
ownership over natural resources, or high degrees of 
associationism, despite extraordinarily low levels of interpersonal 
trust (54-67).
The upshot of the previous discussion is that, through a 
State-centred redistributive socioeconomic agenda, the Bolivian 
government may inadvertently have brought about the rise of a 
constituency (if not decisively a class) of voters who may turn 
against them in 2019. In being lifted out of income poverty, the 
relation of these segments to the state apparatus undergoes a 
fundamental shift, along with their demands. At the same time, the 
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government has not substantially updated its ideological discourse, 
and continues to espouse anti-imperialist or anti-neoliberal 
slogans, a rhetorical strategy decisive in the political juncture of 
2005, but which has since diminished in its saliency and capacity 
for attracting political support.
Alongside substantial MAS political rallies, the 21st of February 
2018 (second anniversary of the 2016 referendum) saw large 
opposition-led protests across the country’s main cities. It is hard to 
establish with certainty, exactly which segments of society poured 
into the streets, at least in terms of their class identity and 
trajectories of social mobility. Yet those who took part did so in 
surprising and creative ways, across districts more commonly 
associated with the upper echelons of Bolivian society, such as 
Equipetrol in Santa Cruz and Calacoto in La Paz. From women 
saluting the sun on yoga mats blocking a roundabout, to someone 
in a Chewbacca costume (the towering hirsute character from Star 
Wars) blocking a small street, or a neat line of empty wine bottles 
blocking another: the iconography and performance of the protests 
did provide some clues. These protests suggested an expansion 
not just of the traditional “repertoires of contention” (Tilly 2006), but 
of the social backgrounds of citizens associated with mass street 
protests. There may be some truth in the idea that these 
mobilisations were in large part led by the “traditional middle 
class”, but it was hard to understand where the supposedly “new” 
middle classes were on the 21st of February. If some joined in, they 
blended in seamlessly. Others may have joined the MAS rallies, or 
stayed at home. It may be more insightful to ask who didn’t take to 
the streets on the 21st of February, to understand the constituency 
likely to define the country’s political future at the upcoming 
elections of 2019.
Barthes once wrote that “the taxonomic option implies an 
ideological one. There is always a stake in where things are 
placed: tell me how you classify and I'll tell you who you are (1988, 
47). Voices from across the political spectrum affirm the expansion 
of a “middle class”, but generally overlook the question of whether 
a middle-income segment can be equated with a coherent class 
category, at least in a sociological sense. The opposition would 
generally aim to conceive it as a univocal constituency, bestowed 
with virtues reminiscent of the Aristotelian Golden Mean, according 
to which the good is to be found in moderation, around the 
midpoint in between two vices (excessive wealth or poverty). On its 
part, the MAS government’s natural position regarding the middle 
classes has historically been adversarial, but due to the growing 
size of the middle-income segment, there is a shift towards a 
dichotomic conception of “traditional” and “new” sub-categories. 
Faced with expansion of the latter, the traditional position has 
begun to change, in the form of a renewed interest in 
understanding middle-class demands (Morales Ayma 2018a). At 
the same time, there is a marked dismissal by the government of 
the “traditional” segment, perceived to be a bastion of 
conservativism.
Recent debates surrounding the changing contours of the middle 
class have essentially involved imbuing them with a set of political 
tendencies. Indeed, the practice of grouping large brackets of the 
population into social categories is a standard process in the 
development of political strategy and discourse. Conceiving the 
middle class (in the singular or the plural) as a constituency is 
therefore both a heuristic and a rhetorical device. It is not reached 
through technical means alone, but rather, it involves a significant 
amount of theorisation, ideological positioning, inference and, most 
importantly, imagination.
It is in this light that the contests surrounding the characterisation 
of the changing middle class, become above all contests in 
imagining them as constituencies, and furthermore projecting them 
as coherent groups able to come together within a class identity 
around shared interests. While the recent protests and political 
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events have also shifted public understandings of Bolivia’s social 
landscape, the extent to which recent debates between politicians, 
journalists and intellectuals have influenced these understandings 
is likely marginal. Not much seems to be at stake in the realm of 
class discourse beyond gaining the upper hand in debates around 
the best way to neatly describe the country’s changing social 
composition. 
References
Adamovsky, Ezequiel, Sergio Eduardo Visacovsky, and Patricia 
Vargas. 2015. Clases Medias : Nuevos Enfoques Desde La 
Sociología, La Historia y La Antropología. Grupo Planeta.
Ball, Stephen J., Richard Bowe, and Sharon Gewirtz. 1996. 
‘School Choice, Social Class and Distinction: The Realization of 
Social Advantage in Education’. Journal of Education Policy 11 (1): 
89–112. https://doi.org/10.1080/0268093960110105.
Barthes, Roland. 1988. The Semiotic Challenge. New York: Hill & 
Wang.
CIS. 2018. Movilidad Socioeconómica y Consumo En Bolivia. 
Patrones de Consumo En Sectores Emergentes. Edited by 
Ernesto Perez. La Paz: Centro de Investigaciones Sociales de la 
Vicepresidencia del Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia (CIS) y 
Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo (PNUD).
Dayton-Johnson, Jeff. 2015. Latin America’s Emerging Middle 
Classes: Economic Perspectives.
García Linera, Álvaro. 2018. ‘Asonada de La Clase Media 
Decadente’. La Razón, 17 January 2018.
Guaygua, Germán. 2003. ‘La Fiesta Del Gran Poder: El Escenario 
de Construcción de Identidades Urbanas En La Ciudad de La Paz, 
Bolivia’. Temas Sociales 24.
Himpele, J. 2003. ‘The Gran Poder and the Social Movement of 
the Aymara Middle Class’. Visual Anthropology 16 (2–3): 207–43.
Himpele, J. 2008. Circuits of Culture: Media, Politics, and 
Indigenous Identity in the Andes.
Huntingon, Samuel P. 1968. Political Order in Changing Societies. 
New Haven and London: Yale University.
Johnson, John J. 1958. Political Change in Latin America : The 
Emergence of the Middle Sectors. Stanford University Press.
Lopez-Calva, Luis Felipe. 2014. ‘Mobility, Vulnerability, and Middle 
Classes in Latin America’. The Emerging Middle Class in Latin 
America: Causes, Challenges and Opportunities Conference, 18 
November 2014.
Maclean, Kate. 2018. ‘Envisioning Gender, Indigeneity and Urban 
Change: The Case of La Paz, Bolivia’. Gender, Place & Culture.
Maldonado, Ivan. 2014. ‘Entrevista Para El Pueblo Es Noticia: “La 
Ideología Antiimperialista Nació Por Las Injusticias Del Gobierno 
Norteamericano En El Trópico”’. Discurso Presidencial 779, 
Ministerio de Comunicación, Periódico Cambio, 4 January 2014.
Mesa, Carlos D. 2018. ‘La Clase Media En La Calle’. Página Siete, 
7 January 2018.
Ministerio de Comunicación. 2014. ‘Políticas Sociales Dieron a 
Bolivia El Primer Lugar En Reducción de Pobreza En 
Latinoamérica’, 8 September 2014.
Ministerio de Comunicación. 2016. ‘Bolivia Redujo Brecha Entre 
Ricos y Pobres de 128 a 39% En El Gobierno de Morales’. 2016. 
http://comunicacion.gob.bo/?q=20160122/20421.
93
Miranda, Sergio Gonzalo. 2008. ‘De “Aymaras En La Frontera” a 
“Aymaras Sin Fronteras”. Los Gobiernos Locales de La 
Triple-Frontera Andina (Perú, Bolivia y Chile) y La Globalización’. 
Diálogo Andino, no. 33: 31–46.
Morales Ayma, Evo. 2014. ‘Discurso de Inauguración "Frente Al 
Cambio Climático: Economía y Sociedad Para Vivir Bien”.’ 
Discurso Presidencial 252 - Ministerio de Comunicación, Periódico 
Cambio, 23 May 2014.
Morales Ayma. 2016. ‘Conferencia de Prensa’. Discurso 
Presidencial 828 - Ministerio de Comunicación, Periódico Cambio, 
25 February 2016.
Morales Ayma. 2018a. ‘Evo Confiere Sables a Cinco Nuevos 
Generales de La Policía Boliviana’. In Discurso Presidencial 1.439, 
2–7. La Paz: Periódico Cambio.
Morales Ayma. 2018b. ‘Informe 12 Años de Gestión’. La Paz: 
Ministerio de Comunicación.
Morales Ayma. 2018c. ‘Mensaje Presidencial. Informe 12 Años de 
Gestión’. Ministerio de Comunicación, 22 January 2018.
Moreno, Daniel E, Amaru Villanueva, and Vivian Schwarz. 2018. 
Encuesta Mundial de Valores En Bolivia 2017. La Paz: Centro de 
Investigaciones Sociales (CIS) y Ciudadanía, Comunidad de 
Estudios Sociales y Acción Pública.
Pellegrini Calderón, Alessandra. 2016. Beyond Indigeneity : Coca 
Growing and the Emergence of a New Middle Class in Bolivia. 
University of Arizona Press.
Pike, Fredrick B. 1963. ‘Aspects of Class Relations in Chile, 
1850-1960’. The Hispanic American Historical Review 43 (1): 14. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/2510434.
PNUD. 2016. El Nuevo Rostro de Bolivia: Transformación Social y 
Metropolización. Edited by Ernesto Perez. La Paz: Informe de 
Desarrollo Humano del Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el 
Desarrollo (PNUD).
Portes, Alejandro, and Kelly Hoffman. 2003. ‘La Estructura de 
Clases En América Latina: Composición y Cambios Durante La 
Era Neoliberal’. Desarrollo Económico Cepal 43: 355–87.
Rea Campos, Carmen Rosa. 2016. ‘Complementando 
Racionalidades: La Nueva Pequeña Burguesía Aymara En Bolivia’. 
Revista Mexicana de Sociología, no. 78: 375–407.
Semán, Pablo, Javier Trímboli, and Hernán Vanoli. 2016. ¿Qué 
Quiere La Clase Media? Buenos Aires: Le Monde Diplomatique / 
Capital Intelectual.
Shakow, Miriam. 2014. Along the Bolivian Highway : Social Mobility 
and Political Culture in a New Middle Class. Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press.
Soruco, Ximena. 2012. ‘Coloquio: Mestizajes y Ascenso Social En 
Bolivia’. T’inkazos - PIEB 15 (31).
Tilly, Charles. 2006. Regimes and Repertoires. Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press.
Toranzo, Carlos. 1991. ‘Burguesía Chola y Señorialismo 
Conflictuado’. In Max Fernández: La Política Del Silencio, edited 
by Fernando Mayorga, 13–29. La Paz: ILDIS.
Wagley, Charles. 1964. ‘The Dilemma of the Latin American Middle 
Classes’. Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science 27 (4): 
2. https://doi.org/10.2307/1173303.
94
Wahrman, Dror. 1995. Imagining the Middle Class : The Political 
Representation of Class in Britain, c. 1780-1840. Cambridge 
University Press.
World Bank. 2012. Economic Mobility and the Rise of the Latin 
American Middle Class. Edited by FHG Ferreira, J Messina, J 
Rigolini, and LF López-Calva.
World Bank. 2018. ‘World Bank Open Data’. 2018. 
https://data.worldbank.org.
95
Soledad Stoessel
UNLP-CONICET; FLACSO-Ecuador
CHAPTER 9
96
The “steering wheel class” during the process of political change in 
Bolivia (2006-2014)
Evo Morales took office in January 2006 during the so-called “shift 
to the left in Latin America” (Beasley-Murray et. al, 2010). Ever 
since then, Bolivia has been characterised by two crosswise 
aspects. The first involved the recovery of some state capacities to 
break hardcore neoliberalism (Ramírez Gallegos, 2012), with the 
state shifting towards a national project strengthening domestic 
sources of production, controlling markets and boosting public reve-
nues to redistribute these among the most underprivileged sectors. 
The Morales administration, in this respect, sought broader state 
autonomy from global capital and national interest groups commit-
ted to the preservation of the neoliberal project. Secondly, the 
government tried to restructure the system of political representa-
tion in order to contain a historically mobilised and conflictive civil 
society. Evo Morales was elected president amid a crisis of the 
partisan mediations and a strengthening of grassroot organisations 
(given their political proposals and capacity to incite social conflict), 
in particular trade unions and indigenous-peasant organisations. 
One such organisation was the Confederación Nacional de 
Choferes de Bolivia (CNCB) (National Confederation of Bolivian 
Drivers --), a long-established trade union in a politically strategic 
sector, with a significant power of veto given its ability to paralyse 
Bolivia’s economy. This union forged a political alliance with the 
government of President Evo Morales in order to secure resources 
and political influence. For the government, the political 
incorporation of this social actor was key to assure governability 
and expand its social network for political support. 
This paper details some of the empirical and comparative research 
outcomes resulting from studies undertaken over the last three 
years to primarily determine the political relationship between 
so-called post-neoliberal governments (focusing on Argentina, 
Ecuador and Bolivia) and one particular social actor: the land 
transport trade-unions (bus and truck drivers ´organisations). Here 
we will focus on the Bolivian case between 2006-20141. 
The paper is organised in two parts. We begin describing some 
features of the transport sector, specially its main trade union, the 
CNCB, as well as the most important social demands and conflicts 
that arose involving the transport union leaders during Morales’ 
Government. We then move to develop what we call "logics of 
political representation" (LPR) given the way trade unions 
connected with the national government and the State. By LPR we 
understand a political practice through which someone is 
recognised (via election or appointment) as capable of acting on 
behalf of or representing others in order to satisfy their interests or 
social demands. This practice does not dissolve the distance 
between representatives and represented. Indeed, the gap 
between them is the condition for the existence of the practice of 
representation, but given this insurmountable gap, representation 
will for ever remain a distorted exercise. This is because it is 
impossible to literally translate the aspirations of the represented. 
In order to represent, the representative should divest from any 
original and particular interests. The represented cannot at the 
same time be attended unless they delegate part of their capacity 
of agency to an "other" who can operate as spokesperson and get 
the group recognized as such. This notion of political representa-
tion, that we support, comprises but goes further the classic politi-
cal representation whose main arena is political parties2. This does 
not mean ignoring the significant importance of political parties in 
contemporary politics, but rather to broadly consider the ways in 
which political representation is configured. 
1 We applied two qualitative techniques: interviews and secondary sources. We conducted a total of 30 in 
depth-interviews with trade unions leaders and public officials in areas related to transportation; and we made a 
systematic revision of three Bolivian national newspapers (La Razón, El Diario y Página 7) to collect information 
about the main social conflicts during the period under study.
2 Authors like Urbinati (2006), Rehfeld (2006), Arditi (2015) make reference to this form of political 
representation compared to the standard perspective of political representation based on the primacy of political 
parties and elections.
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In our case study, we have identified mainly two LPRs through 
which the CNCB and the national government interacted: a 
corporatist LPR and a parliamentary LPR. These forms of 
representation activate tensions inherited in any political 
representation dynamic: the representatives will seek to defend 
sectorial interests but also stand up for broader interests in a way 
that their practice is inscribed in the political discourse of the MAS, 
the party embracing them. Therefore, although political 
representation reduces complexity by regulating interests inside 
the political system as well as anticipating expectations of what is 
politically possible, its incorporation entails strategic difficulties for 
social actors.
The “Confederación Nacional de Choferes de Bolivia”
Following Gray Molina (2010), the Bolivian economy can be de-
scribed as structured by three gears: first, the most dynamic sector 
is hydrocarbons and mining; then the export sector enjoying con-
tinuous growth since the eighties; and third, the massive transport 
sector that employs a large section of the urban population. 
The current public transport system (both passenger and freight) 
was inherited from the previous decades of neoliberal structural 
adjustment. Decree 21060 of 29 August 1985 liberalized all 
markets. Transport was completely deregulated. Small land 
transport companies flourished and began to function with high 
levels of outsourcing and informalization of the workforce. 
Railways stopped being the most important modality of transport, 
giving way to land and motor transport as one of the most 
important sectors. These new companies chose their own routes 
and set their own fare ticket prices. This resulted in an overlap of 
routes, disorganisation of the public transport, an increase in road 
accidents (due to the speed as drivers rushed to overtake others 
and "upload" more passengers, in what became known as a 
"penny war") (Alemán Vargas, 2009; Imaña Romero, 2006). Also, 
mass migration during the implementation of the neoliberal model, 
following the “relocalisation” (forced redundancy of some 24,000 
miners) downsizing of the state mining company COMIBOL and 
the privatization of several mines, led to the growth of the urban 
public transport sector. A large number of migrants found a real 
source of employment in the transport sector as it did not require 
much specialisation. This happened within a legal vacuum. By 
2003 transportation was the only strategic sector within the Secto-
rial Regulatory System (Sirese), created in 1994, that didn’t have 
its own regulations, while the telecommunications, electricity and 
hydrocarbons sectors had their own norms.). This meant every 
transport company operated according to its own particular rules, 
competing fiercely with each other. The State did not intervene in 
such disputes, which ended up affecting the population at large 
through arbitrary transport ticket price increases, permanent 
blockades, and other actions.). 
This situation started to change when Evo became President, as 
the government tried to actively regulate the transport sector, with 
mixed results. The CNCB was one of the organisations that most 
resisted state intervention. The government had to address the 
“strategic selectivities” of the State (Jessop, 2016), including 
structural difficulties like the lack of public transport companies and 
poor quality of road infrastructure, and also attend political factors, 
like the power of veto enjoyed by several different trade union 
transport leaders permanently reluctant to any change likely to 
damage their position or interests. 
We have chosen to focus on the CNCB as it is the oldest 
organisation (formed in 1936) and represents the largest number 
of people in the transport sector (with around 250,000 people 
reportedly represented by this confederation). It is the most 
representative organization for the transport sector nationally and it 
has a hierarchical structure and forms of operation. The CNCB 
groups all modes of transport (transfer of passengers by taxis, 
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buses, minibuses, “trufis” and freight transport) and all 
political-administrative levels (local, provincial, interprovincial and 
national) (see picture N°1). It is an organization of ambiguous 
representation given the varied socioeconomic and ethnic 
backgrounds of its members. This is because CNCB formally 
represents workers and waged labourers who basically work as 
drivers, but in practice this confederation promotes the interests of 
the owner-drivers and small entrepreneurs (owners of cooperatives 
that informally hire drivers and who are union leaders at the same 
time). This means the confederation acts as a union but, from time 
to time, it also serves as a chamber.
In this sense, transport workers in Bolivia have fallen behind in 
securing labour rights (they do not enjoy holidays, an 8-hour 
workday and social security benefits). By the year 2005, the infor-
mality of the sector accounted for approximately 75%3. Indeed, 
during the Morales government the demand for retirement was a 
constant claim. In this context, one of the significant on-going 
conflicts relates to the tax burden the government imposed on this 
sector. Increasing taxes would reduce the levels of informality and 
improve the living and working ´conditions of workers. 
3	This trend is not independent of the level of the general informality in the Bolivian economy that remains high: 
with a 60% rate of informality reported in 2008, 63.4% in 2009, and 65%, in 2010 with commerce and transport 
being the largest sectors employing informal workers. 
Picture N°1. Organisational structure of the transport unionism
Transport trade unions always demonstrated a great capacity to 
mobilize and exert pressure to safeguard their claims and inter-
ests. Throughout the neoliberal years (from dictatorship in the 
1970s to the arrival of Evo Morales), the CNCB had a collaboration-
ist position with political power (Bretón et al, 1999). Indeed, in 1965 
it was expelled from the Central Obrera Boliviana (COB), Bolivian 
Workers' Confederation, for lending support to dictatorial govern-
ments. The transporters always allied pragmatically with govern-
ments in exchange for sectorial benefits. Increases in ticket fares, 
subsidies for gasoline, and the removal of customs tariffs on im-
ported goods were some of the on-going demands of transporters. 
If these demands were not satisfied, the carriers went on strike or 
staged blockades. These demands showed their anti-popular with-
drawal especially when these claims affected citizens in general. 
Governments, concerned about their stability, usually ended up 
meeting such claims.
This would in fact be one of the legacies of the MNR period inher-
ited by the Morales government in order to rebuild the State, again 
by prioritising the general interest over particular pressure group 
interests. When Evo Morales took office, the transporters were not 
part of the grass-root support bases of the “process of political 
change”. Afterwards, there would be a political incorporation in an 
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attempt to break neoliberal forms of relationship between trade un-
ions and governments.  
Logics of political representation as conflicting ways of 
political incorporation
I have identified two logics of political representation the CNCB im-
plemented to safeguard their interests and identities: a corporatist 
LPR and a parliamentary LPR. The Corporatist LPR addressed the 
political representation of groups recognized by the State to act 
from within as a “esprit de corps” or shared spirit of comradeship. 
These groups secured representation through their leaders who di-
rectly participated in state institutions. Public authorities recognized 
and appointed those leaders to state positions (and in some cases 
were also designated by the rank-and-file members of organisa-
tions). This participation developed via two aspects: a) the holding 
public positions, such as ministries, commissions, state agencies, 
etc. and/or b) through participation in the drafting and implementa-
tion of public policy/legislation or the influence on public decisions4. 
In our case study, this LPR developed systematically, especially 
due to the second aspect. Parliamentary LPR involved a political 
practice by getting the leaders of social organisations to also 
operate within the parliamentary arena by becoming members of 
congress. The difference is that these Congressmen would 
represent their rank-and-file union membership–the workers- 
instead of the grass root membership of the political party 
supporting their candidacy. It is assumed that legislative politics is 
another way for trade unions leaders to reinforce their influence 
over the political system. 
In Bolivia, the corporatist LPR penetrated political dynamics start-
ing from the 1952 Revolution, specially through the MNR – COB 
4 This definition combines elements of different approaches about corporativism, such as Schmitter, Streeck 
and Lehmbruch (1982); Schmitter (1998) y O´Donnell (1998). 
“cogobierno” or co-government mechanism that faded over time. 
This legal mechanism consisted in direct participation of the COB 
organisations inside the State (albeit as a minority): they had the 
right to appoint four labour ministers and veto mining policy. This 
practice led to a corporatist type of society through which civil 
society organisations, specially workers and trade unions, had 
direct participation in the exercise of political power. Evo Morales 
introduced this mechanism at the start of his administration as a 
means of containing social organisations and also granting them 
representation through direct participation with the potential to 
make public policy decisions. 
In the case of the transport union under consideration, its leaders 
tried to use this mechanism as well as the so-called “cuoteo”, that 
is, the informal practice of suggesting to government that social 
leaders occupy positions to secure vital institutional representation. 
Surprisingly, they did not obtain the same level of success 
achieved by other organisations, like the cooperative miners. 
Despite persistent pressure by leaders to apply for executive 
positions in ministries and secretariats, President Evo Morales 
refused to yield. Those positions were taken up by civil engineers 
with a technical profile and not linked to trade unions. 
Indeed, in the first conflict involving interdepartmental carriers over 
their refusal to pay taxes, Evo said: "the fleet employers are angry 
because I rejected their request regarding institutional charges for 
their sector” (La Razón, May 8, 2006). Several newspapers 
reported that the carriers were upset over the lack of prior 
consultation with the sector. One of the union leaders said: "we 
must have a quota in that area; unless the government creates an 
entity within the National Secretariat of Roads which is under our 
authority, we are going to stage a series of road blockades” 
(Opinion, February 27, 2006). Two former union leaders whom we 
interviewed confirmed this: "it was always like that, two or three 
important positions at least corresponded to our trade union", one 
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of them told us. Given that the corporatist logic was a learned 
practice, that formed part of the identity of these types of trade 
unions, union leaders were completely bewildered at the position 
adopted by Morales. It was vital for Morales to preserve these 
positions disconnected from the influence of the trade unions. 
There were, however, two identified exceptions to this: the 
maximum authority of the Motor Vehicle Registry service and one 
executive office within the Ministry of Public Works, taken by 
transport unionists of the CNCB at the end of 2014. This drew resis-
tance from “Free Transport Association” –another transport trade 
union at odds with the CNCB- whose leaders demanded the gov-
ernment appoint a "neutral" person who curried nor interest favour-
ing any particular trade union. Similarly, some executive positions 
at departmental and municipal levels were occupied by transport 
union leaders, especially those in charge of authorising public 
transport lines: "It is vital that we hold debates in all these spaces, 
in the Executive and the Legislative Branches, in order to be 
heard”, a union leader told us. 
If we move to the second aspect of the corporative LPR, a greater 
dynamism is observed. Two important legislative processes were 
directly influenced by the CNCB: the constitutional reform (August 
2006-December 2007) and the debate and approval of the 
“General Transport Law” (LGT) (N°165) during 2010-2011. During 
the period of the Constituent Assembly, transporters, like other 
social actors, convened to discuss certain articles of the future 
Constitution (Schavelzon, 2012). The government tried to 
incorporate transport as a "state public sector". But, carriers 
refused to be included in this category, because by remaining a 
private sector they could continue to call their workers out on strike 
(the constitution prohibits strategic sector public workers from 
striking). This was one of the constitutional aspects most strongly 
resisted by all transport unions. Despite their differences, they 
acted as an articulated group: “At the time I was the union leader 
of the Federation in La Paz. All transport trade unions formed a 
solid block and we mobilised to Sucre (where the constitutional 
process was underway). We were about 5,000 people and we 
managed to amend that constitutional clause”, we were told by a 
leader who went on to become a Member of Parliament for the 
MAS. 
Regarding the General Transport Law enacted in August 2011, this 
was drafted with strong influence from the transport unions, to 
become Bolivia’s first transport law. A Member of Parliament who 
belonged to the CNCB  drafted the regulation guidelines. Half of 
the 37 people who participated in the discussion panel on land 
transport came from the CNCB. The remainder belonged to the 
Free Transport Association and to different business transport 
chambers. Although the participation of neighbourhood 
associations (“Juntas Vecinales”) was significant, they played a 
diminished role in drafting the regulations. They rejected the way 
the Law was approved as well as its content because they said it 
did not consider citizenship rights, such as the right to enjoy quality 
public transport. The Law also approved the creation of a Sectorial 
Coordination Council with national level representatives as well as 
delegates from different transportation modalities designated by 
ministerial resolution, all with a right to speak and vote.
Concerning the parliamentary LPR, the relationship between the 
transport trade unions and the government became stronger after 
2010. This type of LPR was not unprecedented for both carriers 
and the MAS government. From the beginning of the Morales’s 
government, Parliament became a fundamental arena where 
different excluded social sectors found recognition and expression 
via direct participation. From that moment on, excluded popular 
social groups and certain workers' organisations used the 
legislative field to develop their own agendas and connect with the 
MAS political project (Zegada and Komadina, 2014). Transport 
union leaders always claimed to participate in the legislative lists of 
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the MAS starting the year 2006 (see Table N°1). It was President 
Morales who “invited” these leaders to participate in the legislative 
lists, in some cases partly due to pressure from labour leaders to 
secure greater opportunities for participation. Although the 
percentage of Members of Parliament from the transport sector is 
relatively low compared to other sectors, the increase of five 
transport representatives during the period 2010-2014 to eight 
representatives for the period 2015-2019 is significant5. According 
to Zegada and Komadina (2014), the mining cooperatives and 
transporters were the ones that most participated in Parliament 
and, had the greatest influence on legislative decisions. 
Table N°1. Activity performed before being elected member of 
Parliament/Assembly (Bolivia, 1993-2014)
Ac#vity/Year 1993-1997 1997-2002 2002-2006 2006-2010 2010-2014
Liberal	Professions 48,	7% 37,80% 28,10% 25% 17,70%
Workers,	cra;smen	and	
primary	sector
3,90% 11,20% 11,20% 18,60% 26,30%
Transport 0 2,00% 1,20% 4,20% 5,20%
Companies/private	sector 24% 26,50% 27,30% 27,40% 19%
Elaboration: Author
Source: Observatorio de Elites Políticas en América Latina, Instituto de Iberoamérica.
  
This growing participation of the transport sector can be explained 
due to the worsening of the link between trade unions and 
government during Morales’ second presidential term. A range of 
5 At the time of writing this paper, the information about the origins of the totality of the members of National 
Assembly for the period 2015-2019  was not yet available.  
6 On December 26th 2010, the national government issued Decree 748, which increased the price of gasoline 
by 73% and diesel by 83%. The government tried to equate domestic prices with the prices of neighbouring 
countries to avoid having to increase public subsidies and prevent fuel leaving the country through contraband 
(Deheza, 2012). The price rises led to immediate increases in food products and public transportation fares rose 
100% despite the fact that the government had only authorized a 30% increase. The CNCB called for a national 
strike in clear opposition to the national government. After five days, the government had to reverse its decision 
due to increasing conflict involving popular sectors, like the COB trade union confederation, teachers’ trade 
unions, neighborhood associations, housewives, etc. 
measures adopted by the Morales government damaged this 
relationship: the so-called "gasolinazo" (increase in fuel prices that 
had to be reversed) of December 20106; the approval of taxes that 
affected the carriers, the project to build an integrated urban 
transport cable car system in the city of La Paz that would 
undermine the monopoly of public transport of these unions, 
among others.  In this sense, the government tried to strengthen 
the transport leaders’ support by increasing their parliamentary 
participation. 
In addition, it is worth mentioning another feature: the second term 
of Evo Morales (2010-2014) opened a different cycle of political 
conflict. Morales won the elections with over 60% of the electoral 
votes. It was an unquestionable sign of political support but at the 
same time it represented a challenge. The MAS government 
stopped articulating with social forces that were part of the political 
project, like peasant-indigenous social organizations. 
The study of the parliamentary LPR is partial if we do not assess 
the extent to which parliamentary inclusion of transport leaders 
strengthened or not their influence on public decisions. What have 
been the effects of this type of political incorporation? Based on the 
analysis of the testimonies from both the labour leaders and 
officials, and the analysis of the legislative debates, we can say 
that although the transport sector linked Members of Parliament 
who influenced the debate of some regulatory norms, such as the 
aforementioned Transport Law, their scope for political action was 
weakened.  The testimony of a former transport leader who 
became a Member of Parliament is eloquent: "It is difficult to be in 
Parliament because rank-and-file members demand several things 
and when one arrives at the Assembly, one loses that power one 
had as a union leader. A leader at the federation level has much 
more power than a deputy. The President must now attend the new 
leader, who is the one who has the power to summon rank and file 
members to mobilise. By playing an active part in this process of 
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political change, I must respond to this project". Another union 
leader who became a Member of Parliament complained that the 
President did not meet him anymore after he became a Member of 
Parliament. 
Nevertheless, if we move to the analysis of the social action of this 
trade union, we can observe that it still shows great capacity to get 
involved in conflicts. Some analysts argue that political 
institutionalisation of collective action causes demobilisation and 
co-optation, the participation of union leaders in the Legislative 
Branch did not in turn result in a weakening of its capacity for 
social mobilisation and for shaping the political agenda. What was 
affected was the influence of the leaders as Members of 
Parliament, but not the social pressure exercised by transport 
workers and union leaders. In effect, the levels of social conflict 
associated with the transport unions remained high. By January 
2014, transporters constituted the second social actor most 
involved in conflicts, after neighbourhood organisations. By the 
year 2011 in the context of Transport Law debate, transporters 
were among the first four social actors to trigger conflicts in the 
public space, despite having direct representatives in Parliament7. 
Conclusion
To conclude, this brief paper shows two main aspects of the 
political process in Bolivia during 2006-2014 from a study of the 
relationship between the government and the main transport trade 
union. It first of all shows us several breakdowns in the neoliberal 
cycle. The Morales government sought margins of state autonomy 
in order to implement a political project to benefit the people. The 
fact that the President did not accept that trade union leaders hold 
7 These social conflict figures were taken from the UNIR Bolivia Foundation. http://unirbolivia.org/nuevo/. Date 
of reference: February, 26th, 2018.
key public positions (until the year 2014 when we finished this 
research), like the Vice-Ministry of Transport, is indicative of his 
need to keep some strategic state areas free from the influence of 
the transporters’. Added to this, Morales arranged a kind of deal 
with transport leaders in order to freeze transport ticket prices. 
Contrary to the neoliberal cycle when transport rates fluctuated 
according to the political junctures, during Morales terms in office, 
these rates didn’t increase. The State granted trade unions 
handsome subsidies provided they didn’t increase fares or 
transport rates. To support this pact, the government sought by all 
means the approval of the transport law to regulate public 
transport, in order to undermine trade union intentions to increase 
transport rates. 
Secondly, this analysis highlights a serious dilemma for transport 
leaders in terms of political representation. Representing sectorial 
interests as well as having to honour the political obligations 
requirements of the MAS government represented a major 
difficulty. This tension between particular and general instances is 
derived from the type of political make-up of the MAS. It combines 
a vertical and decisionist political style with a horizontal one, 
derived from the fact that the MAS is a set of social and 
communitarian associations organised principally  as trade unions. 
The demand for party discipline was clearly observed in the 
“Gasolinazo” conflict. The confederation’s rank-and-files members 
challenged the leaders who held Parliamentary seats, for their 
weak stance against that the Gasolinazo government decree 
raising fuel prices that directly affected the drivers. Although this is 
not the first time transporters managed to hold Parliamentary 
seats, three novel issues emerged during post-neoliberal cycle: a) 
the fact that their political actions were jointly implemented without 
representing (only) the particularity of each modality of transport 
(urban transport, freight, etc.), b) the organic incorporation of union 
leaders to the MAS political project, but not of union rank and file 
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members; and c) the simultaneous presence of the transport 
sector in Parliament and in Executive Branch positions at 
departmental and municipal levels (and to a lesser extent, 
nationally). To sum up, there is no doubt regarding the growing 
power enjoyed by transporters coupled with the tensions the face 
within. 
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Revolution and Communication
On 4th February 2018, President Evo Morales addressed his 
“cocalero” supporters, at his political base, in the Chapare tropics 
of Cochabamba, and asked them to be ready for what he called a 
digital war that would take place in social media (El Deber 2018c). 
This digital war can be considered the new battlefield of ideas as 
the Morales Government is trying to consolidate and impose its 
narrative while other actors of the civil society attempt to challenge 
it.
This is not the first time that a central government is trying to 
impose its discourse. During the 1952 Revolution the Movimiento 
Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR) Government used state media 
to influence society while it used different methods to try to control 
the private press. The military governments that followed also 
attempted to control the media. The arrival of Evo Morales and his 
“democratic revolution” have seen a different effort from the 
government to control the media, directly or indirectly, to impose 
his view. However, Bolivia’s citizens have always had a way to find 
alternative voices. For example, by using miners’ radios or social 
media the different actors of civil society (farmers, labour unions, 
professionals, politicians, etc.) have resisted or have tried to 
develop a different narrative.
The purpose of this paper is to describe and understand the impact 
of these two revolutions on the media, and how the battle of ideas 
has evolved and now includes the social media space.
National Revolution
Before the Revolution
In 1933 Armando Arce, a well-known journalist and intellectual, 
founded El Universal, a cultural newspaper that also covered 
international and political affairs. The paper was created when 
Bolivia was immersed in the Chaco War (1932 -1935). Under 
Arce’s leadership and with contributions from Augusto Céspedes 
and Carlos Montenegro, El Universal was one of the first 
newspapers to launch vigorous campaigns for social and economic 
reform, challenging the establishment of the time. According to 
American Journalist and author Jerry W. Knudson, it was the only 
Bolivian newspaper which opposed the war. The government 
closed its publication in 1935 (Knudson 2009, 36-38).
Arce, Montenegro and Céspedes were part of a generation of 
intellectuals strongly influenced by the nationalist and socialist 
ideologies that gained ground after the end of the Chaco War. All 
three were long established journalists and authors. Through their 
writings, they instigated a social revolution in Bolivia. One year 
after the closure of El Universal, Arce and Céspedes founded 
in1936 La Calle or The Street, to combat what they called La 
Rosca, the mining and landowner elites that managed Bolivia’s fate 
until 1952. The name of the paper “indicated that it was willing to 
take to the streets to wage war against entrenched privilege” 
(Knudson 2009, 37).
Journalist and media expert Rafael Archondo explains that the 
modern press in Bolivia was formed at the beginning of the 20th 
century. Most newspapers were aligned and identified with the 
mine or “tin barons” and large landowners. El Diario was founded 
by Manuel Carrasco and was under shareholders’ control of tin 
baron Simon I. Patiño. In 1917, La Razón initiated its circulation. It 
was owned by Felix Avelino Aramayo (another tin baron). In 1919, 
Demetrio Canelas, an intellectual and journalist linked to Bolivia’s 
large landowners, founded La Patria and in 1943 Los Tiempos. In 
1929, Última Hora was launched. Another tin baron, Mauricio 
Hochschild, owned it. Archondo noted that perhaps the most 
notorious of these papers was La Razón, “its most famous bastion, 
the flagship of the so-called feudal mining oligarchy” (Archondo 
2016). 
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La Calle was a newspaper setup in 1936 as an alternative to the 
conservative establishment broadsheets like La Razon, El Diario 
and Los Tiempos. Following the foundation of the MNR in 1942, 
the newspaper aligned with the party’s political views. It also 
became one of the most forthright defenders of the nationalist 
principles upheld by President Gualberto Villarroel (1943-46), who 
governed with the MNR support. When he was tragically removed 
from power and hung in front of the presidential palace, the 
incoming government closed the newspaper. The journalists and 
editors of La Calle, including Armando Arce, Augusto Céspedes 
and Carlos Montenegro, became prominent MNR intellectuals who 
developed a revolutionary nationalist ideology to enable this 
political pary to seize power via a popular uprising on 9 April 1952, 
and introduce radical reforms that led to nationalisation of the tin 
mines, agrarian and education reform, as well as universal 
suffrage. 
Knudson stated that the 1952 Revolution “would not have 
succeeded if the MNR had not  aroused and sustained the social 
conscience of the thin middle sector through newspapers and 
literature. As La Nación, official newspaper spokesman of the 
revolution for twelve years once declared: ‘Traditionally, the MNR 
is a party of journalists. The founding staff was [in 1941] almost 
totally composed of newspapermen who marked the awakening of 
the conscience of the Bolivian majorities from that memorable 
nucleus of revolutionary thought that was La Calle. As the years 
passed, those men occupied high functions in the government and 
in diplomacy, but almost always as a consequence of their activity 
displayed in the press.’” (Knudson 2009, 39)
The 1930s witnessed the emergence of a new media actor, the 
state radio. In 1929, the Costa brothers launched Radio Nacional, 
the first broadcaster in Bolivia. However, during the Chaco War, the 
government realised that it needed an instrument to keep up its 
citizens’ morale. As a private broadcaster Radio Nacional did not 
fulfil this purpose. In 1932, the Centre of Propaganda and National 
Defence (CPDN in Spanish) designed a radio project with three 
objectives: organise a propaganda service for an international 
audience; spread propaganda at national level (which offered a 
commercial and cultural service for its local audience); and create 
links with the indigenous population (Aymara or Quechua) by 
broadcasting in their own language to educate them. In 1933, 
Radio Illimani began to broadcast under these principles.
French Historian Daphné L’Angevin notes that the project defined 
three spaces or “battlefronts”: foreign countries, national population 
and the indigenous population. The fact that the indigenous 
population was clearly not included in the “interior propaganda” 
shows the divisions in Bolivia as this segment was excluded from 
national life (L’Angevine 2009, 8).
It was the first attempt by a Bolivian central government to 
influence the narrative using radio. The approach towards the 
indigenous population was paternalistic, and Radio Illimani was the 
voice that represented a small local elite in La Paz. By 1952, the 
MNR Government used the state radio to disseminate the 
principles of its national revolution. 
The State and the Press
Just before the 1952 Revolution, the most important newspapers in 
La Paz were La Razón, El Diario and Última Hora. Each one of 
them represented the interests of the mining elite that controlled 
the country. During this period, the main political parties also had 
their own official papers such as En Marcha (MNR) and Antorcha 
(Falange Socialista Boliviana, FSB) (Tórres 2011, 149). In March, 
Presencia was launched. Born as a weekly newspaper, Presencia 
was supported by the Catholic Church and managed by a group of 
young intellectuals: Huáscar Cajías, Alberto Bailey and Alfonso 
Prudencio. This newspaper became one of the most important 
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media outlets in Bolivia, recognised for its professionalism and 
impartiality.
The rise to power of the MNR on 9th April 1952 had a deep impact 
on the media as several newspapers and radio stations were 
forced to close, sometimes violently. Several journalists lost their 
jobs or ended up in exile. At the same time, a new generation 
emerged, press unionism made its entrance, and state media 
reached a golden age. 
Newspapers identified with the old regime were violently attacked. 
Such was the case of La Razón, owned by the mining mogul 
Carlos Aramayo. The newspaper’s installations and equipment 
were destroyed, coercing it to close down. Los Tiempos in 
Cochabamba suffered a similar fate, as it was occupied in 1953 by 
MNR supporters after a failed coup against the government. Its 
facilities were seized, although the destruction was less extensive. 
This newspaper stopped circulating until 1964, when the MNR 
government fell. Both actions were criticised by international press 
guilds, such as the Inter American Press Association (IAPA), as 
violations against freedom of the press. In the case of La Razon, 
no police protection was provided by the government. Years later, 
questioned about that lack of official protection, Víctor Paz 
Estenssoro said: “I refused to shoot the people to protect the 
property of Aramayo” (Knudson 2009, 42). Rafael Archondo 
explains that the Revolution of 1952 clearly changed the balance. 
In fact, “the great miners’ media system rushed to its collapsed” 
(Archondo 2016; my translation).
In its effort to have better control of the media, The MNR 
Administration created the Press, Information and Culture 
Undersecretary (SPIC in Spanish). Through it, the government 
controlled the distribution of supplies for the printed press. The 
SPIC monitored the circulation and content of the printed press. 
Any newspaper that was critical of the regime received reduced 
quantities of paper and ink. Another way to place pressure on 
these newspapers was to claim that imports of (spare parts of) 
critical equipment and tools had been delayed. Consequently, local 
newspapers, such as Tarija’s El Antoniano (1896 – 1953), were 
forced to close because of a lack of supplies (Tórres 2011, 
150-151).
The government not only intended to control or eliminate the 
critical press, but it also strengthened state media. The MNR 
realised the power of the radio. During an insurrection in August 
1949, for example, several clandestine radios controlled by the 
MNR went on air. Once in power, the MNR strengthened Radio 
Illimani. Prominent leaders, such as Juan Lechín Oquendo, used 
the facilities of this radio station to address the nation (Quisbert 
and Simón 2013, 95).
To reinforce its views the government expanded its presence from 
state radio to other media outlets. La Nación, a state newspaper 
under the leadership of Saturnino Rodrigo, was launched on 12th 
October 1952. According to Archondo, a new generation of 
journalists aligned with the new revolutionary ideas emerged with 
the launch of this new newspaper. “Suddenly, a very conservative 
labour segment transformed into a new intellectual bastion of 
nationalism” (Archondo 2016; my translation).
“Our purpose was simple. It was to facilitate, through the press, the 
attainment of the objectives for which we were fighting. In other 
words, it was an attempt to enlist the help of the press for our 
revolution,” said in 1963 Víctor Paz Estenssoro, during a speech 
before the National Press Club in Washington (Knudson 2009, 39).
The 1952 Revolution encouraged the organisation of journalists in 
unions. On 23rd March 1954, the Press Workers Union of La Paz 
(STPLP in Spanish) was launched, involving members of the “only 
three circulating newspapers: El Diario, Última Hora and La 
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Nación.” The APLP (Asociación de Periodistas de La Paz) initially 
opposed the creation of this press union, but later the guild and the 
union learned to live together.  The former represented owners and 
media entrepreneurs while the latter served the interests of the 
workers (Tórres 2011, 153).
By 1963, journalists became less aligned with the MNR 
Government and radio newscasts were booming. Among them, 
Radio Altiplano, Nueva América, Fides and Radio Cruz del Sur 
stood out. Journalists were prepared to fight for freedom of 
expression, and the opportunity came in 1964 when the 
administration of Paz Estenssoro, who was controversially 
re-elected, imposed censorship. Both, members of radio and 
printed press, rejected the measure, and they stopped working. 
The protest continued until the deposition of Paz Estenssoro by a 
coup led by General René Barrientos Ortuño. Bolivia entered a 
new period characterised by authoritarian military regimes and the 
resistance of community or miners’ radios, which provided an 
alternative voice.
Alternative Media: The Miner’s Radio
The origin of community radio in Bolivia, most notably the miners’ 
radios, can be traced back as far as 1949, or even 1947 if Radio 
Sucre is included. The station was “founded in the mining districts 
of Catavi and Siglo XX by high school teachers in Llallagua, the 
local town close to the two mining centres. Second, came La Voz 
del Minero (1949)” (Gumucio-Dragon 2005). 
Media and communications for development expert, Alfonso 
Gumucio-Dragon, explains that the miners’ radio network is one of 
the most outstanding examples of popular and participatory 
communication in the world. “It is not often that we encounter radio 
stations that have been conceived, set up, managed, technically 
run, financed and maintained by the community” (Gumucio-Dragon 
2001, 13).
The Revolution of 1952 and the nationalisation of the mines 
encouraged the miners to continue supporting the creation of 
community radios as they helped them to express their voices, 
expand their culture and improve their economic situation. By the 
end of the 1950s, there was a network of around 30 community 
radios across the country.  With the arrival of the military regimes 
during the 1960s and 1970s, the miners’ radio network became 
fundamental to resist authoritarian control.
The ‘Process of Change’
When Evo Morales rose to power, he almost immediately 
complained about what he called the lack of support from the 
media. Since then, his government took direct or indirect actions to 
control the media and impose its narrative. The relationship had 
been a difficult one, and the arrival of social media has complicated 
it even more.
Before the Confrontation
Evo Morales and his vice-president Alvaro García Linera were no 
strangers to the media. As leader of the coca growers in Chapare, 
Morales often appeared in the press for his protests and marches 
against the government’s drug policy that focused on coca 
eradication. García Linera, a former guerrilla fighter, became a 
public figure after he left prison in 1997 and appeared in different 
media outlets as an analyst or columnist.
Both political leaders opposed and questioned the governments of 
the time. Journalist and media expert Raúl Peñaranda argues that 
although there is no empirical evidence, it is evident that Morales 
and García Linera received broad coverage from the media, 
regardless of their leftist and anti-system views. They opposed the 
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excesses of the previous neo-liberal regimes, a view that 
regardless of media coverage, would become prominent in Bolivia. 
There is no doubt that press coverage helped them (Peñaranda 
2014, 91).However, when Morales and García Linera competed for 
the presidency and vice-presidency, amid a polarisation trend in 
the country, the relationship with the press changed.
Evo vs. Media, polarisation
In a report on the 2005 Bolivian electoral process, Argentinian 
consultant Carlos Fara cited a study from the Asociacion 
Latinoamericana para la Comunicación Social, which found a clear 
trend to discredit Morales and the MAS. The report states that 
Bolivia’s TV channels presented an imbalance in the way such 
news stories were covered drawing attention to a lack of sources 
and their one-sidedness, with no verification of facts or contrasting 
views presented. It notes that opinion pieces and editorials, which 
appeared throughout most printed media, explicitly rejected 
Morales and his party (Fara 2005, 136).
Raúl Peñaranda analysed 56 editorial and opinion articles from six 
national newspapers published before the elections in 2005. He 
found that 41 of the 56 stories favoured the right-wing candidate 
Jorge Quiroga (73%) and only 15 (27%) favoured Morales 
(Peñarana 2014, 94).
The media’s negative attitude towards Morales left a deep mark. In 
his inauguration speech in 2006 Morales complained of being 
“subject to media terrorism by some journalists and media 
channels as if we were animals, as if we were savages” (Página 12 
2006), describing the press in a subsequent radio interview as the 
“government’s worst enemy” (Molina 2014, 46).
The first four years of the Morales Administration (2006-2010) were 
characterised by a deep polarisation and social tensions, 
stemming from clashes between the new MAS Government and 
the traditional economic and political elites which had concentrated 
their power in the eastern part of the country – in particular, Santa 
Cruz. This elite opposed, for example, the new constitution 
proposed by the Morales Government; demanded more autonomy 
for the regions they controlled and ultimately promoted a 
referendum to revoke Morales’s mandate (which he won). 
The Bolivian media felt the impact of the country's polarisation. In 
an article published in 2007 on the internet portal Rebelión, 
Spanish journalists Pascual Serrano (founder of the portal) and 
Ricardo Bajo (director of the Bolivian edition of Le Monde 
Diplomatique and columnist in various media in Bolivia) identified 
several media outlets aligned with what they called the Bolivian 
right and opposing the Morales Administration. Among them, they 
mentioned the national newspaper El Deber, owned by the Rivero 
family – a traditional bastion of the economic elite in Santa Cruz – 
and El Diario owned by the Carrasco family (a traditional elite 
family from La Paz). Bajo and Serrano also mention the Television 
network Unitel, owned by the late Osvaldo Monasterios, a 
conservative agro-industrial entrepreneur from Santa Cruz 
(Serrano and Bajo 2007). 
Media expert and journalist Fernando Molina explained that a 
combination of economic needs and political differences between 
the government and media owners disturbed the independence of 
several newsrooms, as journalists found it difficult to do their jobs 
properly. “Journalists cannot comply with their duties because of a 
lack of resources and they urgently need extra support from the 
media owners, providing them with an additional tool to influence 
their decisions” (Molina 2014, 48; my translation). The media also 
depended on around 200 big advertisers and the central 
government was just one of them. Local and regional advertisers 
were important and many of them were aligned with the political 
opposition. This situation changed the nature of the media, which 
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was increasingly influenced by political decisions (Molina 2014, 
48).
Meanwhile, the Morales Administration strengthened state media 
to express its views. Molina (2014) explains that the government 
launched the newspaper Cambio, continued reinforcing the state 
news agency ABI (Agencia Boliviana de Información) and renamed 
the state TV channel Bolivia de Televisión. It also changed the 
name of the state radio network Illimani to Patria Nueva and 
amplified its coverage through agreements with local and 
community radios across the country.
A 2009 report by Peñaranda found that between 2006 and 2009 
the main news stories focused on the most negative aspects of the 
political and social conflicts that affected Bolivia during this period 
without providing proper context or balance. For example, on TV 
there was a total absence of any explanations of the nature, reach 
and causes of the conflicts. News stories were limited to showing 
the conflicts that occurred, the immediate consequences and the 
opinions of some protagonists, omitting any consideration which 
would allow for a better understanding of the situation (Peñaranda 
2009).
Within the context of polarisation, covering the news became a 
dangerous business. A report from the National Media 
Observatory, an initiative of the UNIR Foundation – an organisation 
dedicated to promoting democracy and the enhancement of 
journalism in Bolivia –, revealed that in 2010 more than 100 
journalists suffered aggression while they covered the news. The 
main aggressors were social movements, many of them favourable 
to the government, followed by the police. In the report, the authors 
mention that hostile acts by police officers ranged from the 
confiscation of equipment to beatings and arrests (ONADEM 
2011).
Hegemony and Control
From 2008, the Morales Government began to consolidate its 
position by indirectly controlling several private media 
organisations in Bolivia and by limiting advertising to only those 
media outlets more favourable to the government. In his book 
Remote Control, Peñaranda claims that the Morales Government 
pursued a strategy of acquiring private media through 
entrepreneurs close to the administration, or in line with its 
ideology. For example, he mentioned that the TV station ATB and 
La Razón, both part of the Spanish group Prisa, were acquired by 
Carlos Gill, a Venezuelan businessman close to the late 
Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez (1999-2013), a close Morales 
ally. TV stations PAT, Full TV and Abya Yala would also become 
part of this network. Representatives of these media and from the 
Morales Administration denied these accusations (Peñaranda 
2014; Molina 2014).
It is also important to note that by 2010, the Bolivian State became 
the leading economic actor. Within this context, state 
advertisement represented one of the main sources of income for 
Bolivia’s media outlets. The Morales Administration, according to 
its detractors, has been denying state advertisement to those 
media considered not in line with its views, adding pressure on 
those organisations as there are few alternatives for income 
generation. The Morales Government denied the accusations and 
insisted that it cannot buy advertisement space in all of Bolivia’s 
media outlets since there are thousands of them. However, 
President Morales said in a tweet published on 4th May 2017 that 
the media outlets that do not receive state advertisement “are the 
ones that lie, insult, defame and despise freedom of expression…” 
(La Razon 2017; El Deber 2017; my translation).
Economic and political pressure on media organisations has had 
an impact, with several well-known journalists forced to resign or 
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being sacked. An example is Amalia Pando, a well-known TV 
presenter and highly critical of the current administration. She quit 
the national network Erbol in 2015 arguing that she wanted to 
avoid what she called the government’s economic pressure against 
this organisation regarding the need of receiving state 
advertisement (Erbol 2015). Some media companies have also 
been forced to shut down or limit their operations due to a lack of 
resources. Examples include Catolica TV, a national TV network 
which in 2018 cancelled its news programmes and fired 23 
employees. In an interview with the national newspaper El Deber 
(2018a), Catolica TV’s director, rev. Guillermo Siles said that there 
are a lot of restrictions from the Government regarding state 
advertisement and he also lamented the lack of support from the 
private sector.
Why did the Morales Government try to control the media? 
Fernando Molina identifies two possible answers. The first one 
relates to ideology: The government is anti-liberal and does not 
believe in the liberal principles of the media. It defends 
constructivism, where all actors can modify society. Journalists can 
contribute or destroy the model, so they need to be controlled. 
Finally, there is an ethical and intellectual superiority of collectivism 
over capitalism. The media are part of the state. Finally, there is 
the logic of confrontation, and several private media outlets are 
seen as the enemy.
The second thesis refers to the implosion of the political system 
and the crisis of the traditional media because of the arrival of the 
digital media and more direct forms of communication. The political 
system and the traditional media that was related to it lost their 
credibility and a new paradigm emerged (Molina 2014, 68-70).
International organisations have also been quick to question press 
freedom in Bolivia. A 2016 report by United Nations for Education, 
Science and Communication (UNESCO) found that while the 2009 
constitution guarantees freedom of expression and of the press in 
Bolivia, some legislation approved between 2014 and 2016 
jeopardise these same rights (Torrico Villanueva and Villegas 
Taborga 2016). For example, art. 82 of the Electoral Act regarding 
the election of judicial authorities, does not allow public debate as 
it prohibits candidates to express views or opinions to the media 
and also prohibits media outlets to create spaces for public opinion 
regarding the candidates. Art. 16 of the law against discrimination 
and racism imposes economic sanctions or suspension of licence 
to any media outlet that authorises or publishes racist or 
discriminatory ideas. 
In April 2018, Reporters Without Borders published its 2018 World 
Press Freedom Index which showed that Bolivia dropped three 
places, from 107 in 2017 to 110 in 2018, out of 180 countries 
studied in the report. It noted: "Bolivia’s media are advised to 
refrain from any negative comments about [Morales] or his 
administration. Under Supreme Decree 181 of 2009, journalists 
who 'lie,' 'play party politics,' or 'insult' the government may be 
denied income from state advertising... Journalists who are 
regarded as troublesome are subject to judicial harassment" 
(Reporters Without Borders 2018). 
Social Media: The Digital Battlefront
Bolivia’s Digital Landscape
According to the international social media agency We Are Social, 
Bolivia has a population of 11.3 million, 70% of the population lives 
on urban areas, the median age is 24.6 years and literacy reaches 
96% of the population.
The agency also revealed that there are 6.5 million active social 
media users (58% of the total population) and 6.10 million mobile 
active social media users (55%).
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Tipnis, referendum and digital war
The high penetration of social media was noted by the 
Government, its opposition, the media, and civil society alike, 
which meant that a new front opened in the battle to control the 
political narrative in Bolivia.
The indigenous protest in August and September of 2011 against 
the government’s plan to build a highway through the indigenous 
territory and national park, Isiboro Sécure (Tipnis) gained strength 
and visibility thanks to Facebook and Twitter. Activists jumped on 
the opportunities that social media gave them to organise and 
provide information about this protest. Clashes with the police also 
went viral. In an October 2013 article, Bolivian researcher and 
social media specialist, Natalia Chávez Gomes da Silva, identified 
1,831 tweets about the Tipnis conflict in August and September 
2011, 55% of them were information (broadcasting) and 44% 
reflect personal opinion (criticism, support, protest, etc.) (Chávez 
Gomes da Silva, 2013).
Social media also played an important role in Morales’ defeat 
during the 2016 referendum that sought to allow him to bid for a 
third re-election. An influence-peddling scandal involving a former 
girlfriend of President Morales, Gabriela Zapata, went viral putting 
the government on the defensive. News of a deadly fire in El Alto 
city, days before the vote, linked to efforts to destroy evidence of 
corruption committed by a former MAS mayor also spread through 
social media contributing to Morales’ referendum defeat. This 
prompted an angry response from the Morales administration, 
which accused its opponents of using social media for obscure 
purposes.
According to the Bolivian Agency of Electronic Government and 
Technologies of Information and Communication (Agetic) the most 
popular social media and messenger platforms in Bolivia are 
Facebook (94% of internet users), Whattsap (91%), YouTube 
(40%), Twitter (17%), and Instagram (15%) (Agetic 2017). Social 
Media analyst José Torrez notes that politics is one of the most 
important topics discussed on these social media platforms. 
Whether one has an opinion or not it is difficult not knowing about 
the situation of the country or any political activity on social media. 
This information does not come from official sources but from 
groups or citizens that use social media as a space for protest or 
support (Torrez, personal communication, March 15, 2018; my 
translation).
A 2016 report by researcher Eliana Quiróz explains that political 
parties, government authorities and political figures did not initiate 
the "interest in using the new digital spaces for public and political 
purposes; it started from civil society." However, journalists began 
to use it more frequently after the Tipnis conflict, and political 
opponents became more active after the 2016 referendum (Quiróz 
2016).
The use of social media to express opposition against the Morales 
government became even more evident after the constitutional 
court ruled, on 28 November 2017, that he could seek a third 
re-election. This ruling ignored the result of the February 2016 
referendum. Opposition to a new criminal code, led by the health 
sector, was also organized through social media.
The Morales administration has responded angrily to social media, 
announcing plans to create legislation to control it. On 24 February, 
a government representative, Leoncio Gutiérrez (the director of the 
department against racism and all forms of discrimination – which 
falls under the vice-ministry for “decolonization” – told reporters 
that his department is working on a proposal to regulate the use of 
social media. This has yet to materialize and, so far, there is no 
official legislation in Bolivia regulating the use of social networks. 
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Following the afore-mentioned protests however the government 
did implement a new strategy. Addressing his followers in his home 
turf of the Chapare, on 4th February 2018, President Morales 
asked them to be ready for a new digital war in Bolivia that will take 
place in social media. On 31 May, MAS leaders said that 80 youth 
activists had been trained as “cyber-warriors”. Grover García, the 
head of the MAS in Cochabamba, mentioned that another 500 
people would be trained in the use of social media (Página Siete 
2018). Critics of Morales have denounced that this “digital war” is 
being led by the Directorate of Social Media, created in 2016 with a 
budget of Bs. 5,000,000 (approx. US$700,000) to be used in 2018. 
Communications minister López explained in January 2018 to 
Bolivia’s press that the funds were originally allocated in 2017 but 
were not used then (El Deber 2018b). MAS leaders insisted that 
the cyber-warriors were trained as volunteers and that they do not 
work for the ruling party nor the Morales government. 
By 2019, President Evo Morales opened accounts in Facebook 
and Instagram, to reinforce and complement his activities in his 
Twitter account, which he opened in 2016. His main political rival in 
the electoral race, Carlos Mesa, has been active in Twitter since 
2011 and in 2018 opened Facebook, YouTube and Instagram 
accounts. But the battle of the ideas is taking place not only on the 
candidates’ platforms. Political leaders, journalists and 
cyber-activists all expressed their views with various levels of 
intensity, aiming to influence a large number of digital citizens, 
especially on Twitter. (Furlong and Cybel, 2019)
Journalist and media expert Rafael Archondo said in a 2017 
interview that "the influence of social media will grow steadily. It is 
a battlefield in which the Government can lose or win, depending 
on its ability to distribute content successfully.” Today, these words 
are more relevant than ever.
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Revolutions in Bolivia
There is no doubt that Bolivia is currently going through processes 
of flux, upheaval and profound change on a social, political and 
economic level.  The policies and symbolism of the MAS 
administration has transformed governance and the political 
landscape in Bolivia.  The economic boom of the early 21st century 
has brought with it changes in Bolivian social structures that have 
seen the expansion of new middle classes with increased 
consumption power.  New technologies have opened up spaces for 
greater communication, not only within Bolivia but across the 
globe.  In this volume we have interrogated whether or not these 
transformations represent the ‘revolutionary’ changes that some 
have claimed them to be.  A comparison with the 12 years of 
revolutionary rule under the MNR has been instructive here in 
understanding the current processes of change in Bolivia.  
Revolutions are never absolute, and the processes behind 
moments that come to be recognised as cardinal points in the 
history books are as remarkable for their continuities and 
contradictions as they are for the ruptures that they mark in a 
country’s development and identity.
Many of the papers in this volume have suggested that the 
processes of change that were promised and hoped for with the 
inauguration of Evo Morales as President have not been fully 
realised.  The inclusion of indigenous people, and in particular the 
promised administrative autonomy in a State defined by plurality, 
has come under particular scrutiny.  On a discursive level we have 
seen that there were potential visions of plurality that could be far 
more transformative, radical, and inclusive of indigenous people.  
Moore argued that Filemón Escobar’s vision of Pachacuti was far 
more challenging to the logic underpinning colonial domination 
than the modernist vision of inclusion that the MAS has promoted.  
This theoretical critique is reflected in empirically based 
observations of the way that the policies to achieve plurality and 
autonomy have fallen short, as argued by Powęska.  Matthes’ 
detailed study of claims for autonomy, very few of which have been 
realised, also explored the inevitable disconnect between rhetoric 
and reality, but with an emphasis on how new spaces have been 
created for new discursive and institutional developments that 
reflect the political desires and practical possibilities of a given 
historical moment.  
The political processes behind these ‘revolutionary’ moments were 
discussed by John Crabtree and Anna Krausova.  Crabtree 
focussed in particular on the engagement with popular sectors 
during both the MNR and MAS periods of rule.  Whilst the term 
‘populism’ should always be used with caution, as he emphasised, 
it is clear that support gathered from protest and patronage was 
key to the success of both parties.  Comparing the different 
discursive strategies in these two periods underscores the 
importance of ideas of indigeneity to constructing the hegemony of 
the MAS, and the ultimately technical and economic factors which 
curtailed the populist promises of both governments.  Krausova 
focusses on popular protest, which has long been a feature of 
Bolivian politics, and its crucial role in the MAS rise to power.  The 
MAS, the ‘political instrument’ of social and political movements, 
once in power, had to move from ‘protest to proposal’, and, as 
Krausova illustrated, there has been a distancing of the 
government from social movements as the MAS project has 
adopted a modernisation programme based on extractivism.  
Stoessel’s analysis of transport unions and their relationship with 
the Bolivian State over the early years of the Morales 
administration also reflects this dynamic.  These chapters 
demonstrate the importance of understanding both continuity and 
change, as well as the economic and political landscape in which 
potentially revolutionary actors are working, in assessing whether 
or not these transformations constitute revolution.    
Chapters also examined the interpretations of grand scale political 
changes at local scale.  Into Goudsmit explored how the 
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undeniable structural changes associated with both the MAS and 
MNR rule were experienced in the valley of Toracari.  The grand 
events and changes of both periods have been strategised and 
interpreted by people in their everyday lives in ways which both 
show the potential for real change, and the resilience of traditions 
and hierarchies.  Jonathan Alderman’s chapter looks at the local 
level negotiations involved in making the MAS promise of 
‘indigenous autonomy’ a reality.  His fine-grained analysis of 
constitutional and legal mechanisms is accompanied by in depth 
empirical work which shows how complex local identities, networks 
and power dynamics shape the real meaning of these legal 
instruments.  
The economic and social changes which Bolivia experienced over 
both potentially revolutionary periods are perhaps as striking as the 
political transformations.  Evo Morales’ rule has coincided with a 
period of unprecedented economic growth in the country’s history, 
and the worldwide explosion of social media.  The rise of the 
middle class in Bolivia, and how it intersects with racialised 
hierarchies has attracted particular interest and is potentially an 
enormously transformative power.  Villanueva showed how the 
consumption patterns and political choices of the middle class, 
including new modes of protest, are changing the country’s political 
landscape and choices in public policy. The proliferation of 
technology is related to this rise in consumption power, and 
Souviron’s chapter explored the influence that social media has 
had on political debate under the Morales administration, with 
particular reference to freedom of the press.
Whether or not the Morales’ administration, and the changes that 
have accompanied their ascent to power, will come to be defined 
as ‘revolutionary’ is a question for history.  The year 1952 is 
engraved in the national consciousness as the country’s definitive 
revolution.  It could be argued that the events of that year set in 
motion the processes of change that have culminated in the 
current process of change, although the MAS would question this 
argument as it explicitly criticises the MNR assimilation policies of 
the indigenous population. A consensus, reflected in this volume, 
would seem to be emerging that MAS policies have fallen short of 
the political rhetoric of their ascent to power, as did the MNR 
revolution.  Nevertheless, there is broad agreement that national 
political structures have been overturned, and that Bolivia, socially 
and economically as much as politically, has dramatically changed 
since the years of protest which preceded the MAS electoral 
victory in 2005. It is important to keep in mind, though, that these 
transformations have played out differently in different parts of the 
country. Like the MNR reforms of the 1950s and 1960s, people 
from the low, middle and the high classes, as well as old and new 
elites, have been able to take advantage of the changing political 
circumstances. Both MAS and MNR politics had to confront 
culturally moulded attitudes to authority and expectations of 
well-being that have been difficult to change in 12 years of 
government. 
In this current election year of 2019, there is heightened concern 
about the sustainability of the transformations that have taken 
place.  The questions which dominate Bolivian politics at the 
moment are no longer framed by the discourses of 
anti-neoliberalism and decolonisation which characterised the 
protests of the early 21st Century.  The dominant questions 
currently are the sustainability, both economic and environmental, 
of Bolivia’s modernisation, the influence of China and, crucially, the 
question of succession, as Evo Morales, contrary to majority and 
much legal opinion, stands for President again.  Experience 
elsewhere in the region would suggest that the ‘pink tide’ of radical 
governments which swept the continent in 2006 are about to be 
overturned by a populist pull to the right.  The test of the MAS 
revolution will be the extent to which the social, political and 
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cultural changes which have been achieved, survive these 
pressures. 
120
